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Abstract 
 
Decentralisation has become a global norm that has changed the face of education 
governance in many countries since the late 1970s. Indonesia was completely swept up 
by this movement in 2001 after the severe legitimacy crisis ended the three-decade-
reigning centralist regime of the New Order. This thesis aims to analyse the way 
educational decentralisation helped to save the nation from the crisis, but was then faced 
with challenges from the local district governments because the central government 
endeavoured to restore its control. Using the analytical concepts of the new institutional 
theory and drawing upon data from documents and 38 interviews with strategic 
informants, the thesis investigates how the institutional legitimacy of educational 
decentralisation was garnered, manipulated, and then contested. The thesis focuses on 3 
case studies: Indonesia as the national case, and the two municipal governments of 
Kupang and Surabaya as comparative case studies of local district education governance.  
Like other newly decentralised nations have experienced, the narrative of educational 
decentralisation in Indonesia was initially scripted by multilateral actors with the 
neoliberal spirit of market supremacy. However, against the liberal and critical arguments 
that suggest the weakening of the central state or the rise of market institutions as the 
follow-up of educational decentralisation, the findings show a rather contrasting reality. 
Decentralisation has facilitated the proliferation of Weberian states in the local district 
arenas, which equally claim institutional legitimacy for governing the local educational 
system in their respective ways.  
After analysing interviews and documents from the embedded multiple case studies, the 
presentation of the findings is organised into three main parts. In the first part, the thesis 
analyses the global and local processes of the delegitimation of the centralist regime, and 
the way decentralisation becomes a strategy for garnering compensatory legitimation for 
the central state. In this case, decentralisation was part of the loan condition imposed 
externally by the multilateral institutions, the World Bank and IMF, and also became the 
magic word to settle down the internal secessionist aspirations.  
In the second part, the thesis also discusses the institutional mechanism that enabled the 
central government to restore its power after decentralisation, while keeping itself 
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legitimate. In this sense, the decentralised structure remained, but the central government 
employed the discourse of local incompetence to introduce other means of centralisation. 
Lastly, in the third part, from the comparative studies of two local district governments, 
Kupang and Surabaya, the thesis shows how the legitimacy of the central government 
authority continues to be challenged in the localities. Despite the central government’s 
pressures for national standards and their enforcement measures, local educational 
governance survives with different models and practices.  
In conclusion, I argue that the different local governance types do reflect an ideal practice 
of decentralisation. However, in Indonesia this ideal is not the case because 
decentralisation has created different and illegitimate local practices. They are 
illegitimate because these practices are not based on the solid consensus of the regulatory 
structure and norms which exist between the central and the local states. Thus, rather than 
becoming a local basis for reinforcing the legitimating capacity of educational 
decentralisation as a global institution, the different practices might become the local 
source of delegitimation. Some national states would rethink their conformity to the 
international pressure of decentralisation if they were aware that the policy would 
potentially lead them to another crisis of legitimacy.     
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 Chapter I  
Introduction 
 
Historical Problem 
Before the 1980s, most of the countries in the world centralised their education 
management (see Figure 1.1). In this sense, the ministry of education, either alone or 
together with other central ministries, was controlling the education system. Only some 
countries like the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia are traditionally decentralised. In 
these countries, education is the responsibility of the state governments. The federal 
government of Canada even does not have a ministry of education. In Asia, Japan was 
the first nation that decentralised its education management. The country devolved the 
responsibility of education management to local authorities in 1948 following the end of 
World War II when that country came under close US influence. The report issued by the 
First American Mission on Education recommended that Japan change its centralised 
system and imitate the American model of school districts and school management that 
incorporates larger community participation (Muta, 2000). 
 
Figure 1.1. World Education Governance Before 1980 
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Since the 1970s, decentralisation has become a major item on the agenda of the global 
educational reform movement, which came as part of either market reform or 
democratisation. The trend emerged after the crises of the centralised welfare state in 
Western societies and the crises of authoritarian regimes in developing nations, which 
then transformed the fundamentals of state governance, from government to the market 
and from the central to the local authorities (Jessop, 1999). The goal of educational 
decentralisation is to break down the management and financial structures of a national 
education system as well as encouraging more local community participation (Carnoy, 
1995; McGinn and Welsh, 1999; Rhoten, 2000; Weiler, 1990). Many nations, from the 
east, like the Philippines, to the west, like Spain; from the poorest, like Ethiopia, to the 
more prosperous, like New Zealand; from the ideologically communist, like China, to the 
most capitalist like Singapore; and from countries lowly ranked by international 
education testing institutions, like Brazil, to the highly ranked, like Finland: all have 
engaged in some form of educational decentralisation (see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2. The Worldwide Expansion of Educational Decentralisation (1980s-2000s) 
 
 
Indonesia is one of the countries deeply affected by the global decentralisation movement. 
There had been several efforts by the country’s government to cope with such global 
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pressure (Devas, 1997; Malo and Nas, 1991), but none had much effect until the 2001 
decentralisation big bang (Bünte, 2004; Fealy and Aspinall, 2003). The post-2001 
decentralisation was one of the major institutional reforms that ended the dictatorial 
Suharto’s New Order regime in the late 1990s. Before the reform, Indonesian education 
was highly centralised and fragmented. The management of education was shared 
between the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MoHA). The MoEC was responsible for the curriculum of all primary and secondary 
schools and the personnel of secondary schools: the MoHA was responsible for the 
personnel of primary and junior secondary schools. Both departments had their provincial 
and district or municipal offices and this made management highly bureaucratic. The 
2001 decentralisation reform dissolved both departments’ organisational structures in the 
regions, which gave the district and municipal governments greater autonomy in running 
most public service sectors, including education. Adopting common decentralisation 
practices, some policy reforms were also enacted to give schools a degree of managerial 
autonomy and to provide the community with a participatory role in policymaking. 
Governance fragmentation and inefficiency were the problems that most concerned 
Indonesian reformers when they firstly discussed and formulated the reform program 
(Jalal and Supriadi, 2001). By removing the central government’s bureaucratic structure 
from local bureaucracies, it was expected that education delivery would become more 
efficient and the district government the only education authority in the regions (World 
Bank, 1998a). However, this has never been the case. On the one hand, decentralisation 
was welcomed by local élites as a big increase in power and authority. They do become 
dominant education authorities which control all public schools and teachers in their 
territories. On the other hand, despite the central-government structure’s removal, 
education decentralisation reform did not significantly reduce the MoEC’s influence. 
Two years after decentralisation, in 2003, a new education law was passed and the MoEC 
was given a new role: that is, setting the national education standards. With these 
standards, the ministry is authorised to inspect school performance through the school 
accreditation, student performance through the national examinations, and teacher 
performance through the teacher certification policy. In addition, to ensure those 
standards were maintained, the central government started to regulate almost all facets of 
education: from curriculum to school uniforms. There are hundreds of ministerial 
regulations and trillions of rupiah allocated from the central government budget to support 
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the implementation of the standards. This makes the structure of Indonesian education 
governance so contradictory: it is radically decentralised but at the same time highly 
standardised. 
The demands of decentralisation and standardisation have become increasingly 
stronger from the two competing parties: the local and central governments. The MoEC 
keeps producing and revising regulations and policy strategies to enforce the standards 
only to find that they are too often neglected by the local governments. Many of the 
MoEC’s regulations of things like school fees, principals’ appointment, teacher 
management and classroom size were evaded because they were at odds with local 
interests. This practice has frustrated MoEC officials who frequently express their 
bitterness. They are helpless to deal with all the local noncompliance because the MoEC 
no longer has the power to apply political pressure. And, only one decade after 
decentralisation, the argument for recentralisation is becoming increasingly louder from 
MoEC officials. In 2011, at a public workshop, the MoEC’s Office for Research and 
Development called for an evaluation of educational decentralisation (Antaranews, 2011; 
Kompas, 2011b, 2012a; Okezone, 2011; Republika, 2011a). However, reinstating central 
government bureaucracy in the regions is believed by a prominent education professor 
and former MoEC senior official to be like ‘running into a brick wall’ (Participant 34). 
He believed that the local government resistance to educational recentralisation would be 
strong because teachers make the largest element of local bureaucracy and local elites 
will not give up their control. 
 
The Theoretical Problems 
A large body of literature has been produced that gives accounts of the importance and 
the realisation of education reforms in the second half of the twentieth century and since. 
Most of the proposed reforms were driven by the logic of the rational market and the 
crises of the bureaucratic state. This suggests that, because the bureaucracy fails to 
provide for efficient and effective schooling, it is time to adopt a new style of governance 
whose objectives are efficiency and achievement (McGinn and Welsh, 1999; Riddell, 
1998). This logic has dominated the thinking of most policymakers and policy analysts 
in their views of education reform and its implementation. From this perspective, the 
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problem of educational decentralisation reform is whether it creates efficient education 
management. Factors such as personnel capacity, political will, lack of resources and 
unstable government have become determining variables that account for success and 
failure of the reforms (e.g. Calvert, 1995; Lubienski, 2003; Robertson and Tang, 1995). 
Another dominant perspective of the reform has been that of critical scholars. From 
the perspective of this group, the problems of educational decentralisation reform stem 
from its effects on social inequality. Guided by some neo-Marxian perspectives of state 
and capitalism, they construe the story of reform as the story of hegemony and power 
relations. More than merely a matter of organisation, education reform is perceived by 
this group as an ideological issue. Its operation is not controlled by individuals but by the 
power of global neoliberal ideology. Robertson and Dale (2009) point out that 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and UNESCO are 
representatives of that neoliberal ideology. They force policymakers all over the world, 
sometimes using aid as an instrument, to adopt more efficient models of education 
governance where the private sector and community participation is granted a greater 
influence. Ball (2008) and Burch (2009) perceive that neoliberal education reform works 
in a more elusive way in its call for privatisation. Apart from its organisational design 
that replicates market-like structures in terms of school management, competence-based 
curriculum or quality assurance, the reform also influences the proliferation of new 
market institutions manifested in entities like private schools, private tutoring, book 
publishing, assessment consulting and more. The market tends to serve the élite classes 
more than others because of the degree of access to resources. In the end, there is evidence 
that neoliberal reforms all too often lead to increases in inequality (Apple, 2006a). 
Nevertheless, I argue that questions of inefficiency and inequality are only side effects 
of decentralisation, and both effects might happen together in one case only. And, despite 
many criticisms of inefficiency and inequality that have resulted from educational 
decentralisation, the policy is more extensively adopted still. Neither the problem of 
inefficiency nor of inequality affect the structure of decentralisation adopted by any given 
nation. They mostly affect the technical strategies used to deliver the policy. This thesis 
offers to elaborate another way of understanding the problem of the educational 
decentralisation policy. Educational decentralisation has been adopted globally because, 
at first, nations see it as the only legitimate means to govern their education system, 
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regardless of its capacity to develop efficient management and to deal with educational 
problems including inequality of access. These technical and ideological questions are 
put aside and separated from the main motivation, that is, of garnering legitimacy. As the 
legitimacy is obtained by a nation, the process might develop and the legitimacy might 
also be questioned. When legitimacy is achieved, then not only the technical strategy but 
the decentralised structure itself will also be affected. 
 
Research Problems 
Having discussed the historical and theoretical problems, this thesis proposes that the 
problem of Indonesian educational decentralisation rests in the question of legitimacy. As 
it was in many other countries, educational decentralisation was embraced in Indonesia; 
first, not because the central government needed to create an efficient bureaucracy or 
democratic governance but because it needed to survive. Decentralisation was, at that 
particular moment, seen to be the only policy that would ensure the nation’s legitimacy 
to survive in the eyes of the global and local communities. The legitimacy of 
decentralisation came from its promises of democratisation and efficiency, which were 
popular discourses at that time. The problem of this legitimacy-motivated policy adoption, 
however, is the incongruence of the external policy that has been adopted and the internal 
environment that uses the policy or is addressed by it. In Indonesia’s case, educational 
decentralisation is faced with technically incompetent local government personnel or the 
inadequate local resources. In this situation, the challenge for the central government, 
which has devolved its power, is how to efficiently address the technical problems of 
education without necessarily losing its legitimacy. A failure to manage this situation 
would lead to bigger complications where the central government legitimacy is 
questioned and, to some extent, defied. Differences in local education governance 
practices are an ideal outcome of decentralisation. But the different practices that emerge 
from the evasion of central government rules might reflect a situation where the central 
government’s legitimacy is contested. 
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Research Questions 
The research questions for this study are formulated as follows: 
1. How did the global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the 
implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia? 
2. How did the central government preserve its legitimacy while devolving powers to the 
local governments, but also retaining significant powers of its own? 
3. How is the institutional legitimacy of the educational decentralisation policy contested 
at the local level? 
 
Conceptual Frameworks 
I use the approach offered by the new institutional theory to explain the relations between 
globalisation, educational decentralisation and legitimacy. The institutional theory holds 
that organisational structures are constructed not for the sake of gaining an efficient 
management but for garnering legitimacy. There are three key institutional concepts I use 
in this thesis to explain how this legitimacy is managed: institutional environment, 
decoupling, and structuration or destructuration. 
Institutional Environment 
Scott defines the institutional environment as particular arrangements of regulative, 
normative and cultural cognitive structures that provide coherence, meaning and stability 
to organisational action (Scott, 2013). The institutional environment emerges from the 
shared historical processes of socialisation that then become taken for granted and possess 
rule-like status (Scott, 1987a). These processes define what is and what is not an 
organisation, either by means of individuals’ perceptions of how is it supposed to look 
like (cognitive), their shared values on what are the ideal goals it should achieve 
(normative), or restrictive rules on what function does each individual have within the 
structure (regulative). Arnove (2012) argues that nowadays education policy is the 
product of a global–local dialectic. The global policy is adopted by some nation-states, 
either through the internalisation of the discourse or through the agency of global actors. 
The global nature of decentralisation campaigns in the 1980s developed the strong 
institutional environment that influences its adoption in many countries. As such, strong 
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local aspirations for democratisation would increasingly render obsolete the current 
centralised structure. 
At the heart of this process is the idea of legitimation. From the organisations’ 
perspective, conformity to institutional pressure is critical for their survival. 
Organisations have to make themselves recognisable by their environment and, in doing 
so, they have to abide by the pertinent rules within this environment. Once this has been 
done, organisations will find themselves legitimate to exist and to run their activities 
(Scott, 2013). The adoption of decentralisation gives the nation-state legitimacy, not only 
in the eyes of local populations but also in those of the global community. Otherwise, the 
nation-state would face a severe legitimacy crisis that would threaten its survival. The 
concept of legitimacy crisis is also used in this study to emphasise the importance of that 
institutional pressure. Originally coined by Habermas (1973) to describe the crisis of the 
late state-controlled capitalism, a legitimacy crisis is the condition of a discrepancy 
between the general interests of the population and established political and economic 
systems. In Indonesia’s case, all the post-1998 reform projects were instigated to deal 
with the legitimacy crisis of the New Order’s authoritarian and centralist state. In this 
sense, decentralisation was adopted with the purpose of restoring the deteriorating 
legitimacy of the central state. 
Decoupling 
The idea that legitimation can be achieved only by conforming to institutional pressure 
has given to these institutions a status of rationalised myth. Given these myths’ powerful 
function to maintain the stability of the organisational order, organisations adopt them 
ceremonially and with ritual assertions of confidence and good faith (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). However, the ceremonial adoption of myths leads to a contradiction, which runs 
counter to the logic of technical efficiency. It is because the myths can arise from a 
different environment that they cannot fit into particular organisational settings (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). The contradiction between institutional and technical environments is 
then solved by a mechanism called decoupling. The organisation keeps its institutional 
legitimacy by making changes in its formal structure but at the same time retaining some 
strategic practices unchanged. Habermas (1973) terms it the separation of expressive 
symbols that influences a universal willingness to follow from the instrumental function 
of administration. 
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At this stage, the concept of decoupling will be useful in explaining how the 
institutionalisation of education decentralisation might result in the restoration of another 
centrally controlled structure while the decentralisation policy remains in place. For a 
nation with decades of centralist traditions, moving to a decentralised system is certainly 
challenging. The decoupling might take place in one of two ways: the policy–practice 
decoupling or means–end decoupling (Bromley and Powell, 2012). The former happens 
when the decentralised structure is established, but the central bureaucracy restores its 
power through another means of control. This policy–practice decoupling is useful to 
analyse the phenomenon of ‘centralised decentralisation’ where the national government 
keeps its power despite the decentralised structure. Meanwhile, the means–end 
decoupling happens when the decentralised structure is forming and the central 
bureaucracy can no longer exercise its influence at the local level, but the goal of the 
decentralisation itself is not achieved. This type of decoupling is useful in explaining the 
phenomenon of ‘decentralised centralism’ where the local government remakes itself as 
a new power centre despite the implementation of school-based management policy. 
Structuration and Destructuration 
Organisations interact with each other in an organisational field. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) define an organisational field as ‘an aggregate of organisations whose interaction 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life’. The organisational field in the education 
sector might consist of schools, governments, book publishers, teacher associations and 
even political parties. The most fundamental basis on which the organisational field 
works is the relational system. Earlier field theorists like Bourdieu argue that ‘to think in 
terms of field is to think relationally’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96). The 
organisational field is patterned through relations among its participants. These 
organisations interact with each other forming a network of constraints (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). In this sense, the pattern of relations is greatly determined by the 
possession of symbolic capital, that is ‘any property (any form of capital whether physical, 
economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with 
categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to give it value’ 
(Bourdieu et al., 1994: 9). Bourdieu and colleagues (1994) claim that the state is an 
institution where all of those capitals are concentrated. 
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Hence, given the degree of symbolic capital, the relations among organisations in the 
field might lead to either structuration or destructuration (Scott, 2013; Scott et al., 2000). 
Structuration is the process through which the field becomes more highly structured in 
terms of increased consensus, dense relational networks and a stable hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, relations between field participants are not always of mutual agreement, 
common interests and obligations. Instead, the organisational field also constitutes an area 
of differentiation in which domination and resistance might take place (Alford and 
Friedland, 1991). Hence, in addition to structuration, there might also be the process of 
destructuration, which is when the relational process is leading to ‘the breakdown of 
traditional organisational forms and patterns of behaviour, the dislodging of belief 
systems and the dismantling of governance structure dominant in earlier periods’ (Scott, 
et al., 2000: 27). Both concepts are used to analyse the process where the institutional 
legitimacy of education governance is contested among the field participants with the 
most resourceful symbolic capital: the central and local states. 
 
The Logic of the Study 
This study analyses the way the institutional legitimacy is obtained, manipulated and 
contested in the implementation process of educational decentralisation in Indonesia. The 
institutional legitimacy is obtained through global and local pressures. From the global 
perspective, educational decentralisation reform represents the effect of the 
institutionalising of the world model of education governance (Meyer et al., 1997). 
Indonesia’s adoption of decentralisation has certainly come about from this global 
pressure. Conformity to global rules would make the nation’s education system legitimate 
in the eyes of the global community. This part discusses how the global institutional 
pressure took place and influenced the adoption of education reform in Indonesia. Despite 
the importance of external legitimacy, however, the policy must be adopted to recover 
internal legitimacy as well, that is, legitimacy in the eyes of the general populace 
(Habermas, 1986). This is because a greater institutional change must emerge from the 
internal legitimacy crisis. Hence, this part also discusses the internal legitimacy crisis and 
how the policy was used to address the crisis. 
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Furthermore, this study traces the structural transformation that has taken place as a 
result of this decentralisation reform. Certainly, it was much expected that the reform 
would alter the nature of education management from highly centralised and state-
oriented to more decentralised and non-state-oriented. The central government has to 
create such a decentralised structure to preserve its institutional legitimacy, but from its 
perspective it also has to make it work efficiently. Given its nature as an external 
institutional template, the decentralised structure is not necessarily viable to address 
effectively the internal educational problems. Hence, in this part of the analysis, the study 
uses the concept of decoupling to explain the way the central government manipulates 
the institutional legitimacy to attain what it sees as a more efficient governance. 
In the last stage, the study offers a new perspective on analysing the traditional 
centralisation–decentralisation dilemma (Bray, 1999; Weiler, 1990). Some central 
governments have made efforts to regain some control, which has left local authorities 
disempowered (e.g. Hanson, 1989; Hawkins, 2000). In others, the decentralisation was 
radicalised so that the central state was weakened (e.g. Bodine, 2006; Cerych, 1997). In 
Indonesia, neither the central government nor local governments were weakened by the 
decentralisation policy, which makes the relation between the two more dynamic. This 
makes the two organisations as equally powerful in the organisational field of education 
and leads to the situation where the institutional legitimacy is contested between them. 
To show that the contestation for institutional legitimacy leads to either the process of 
structuration or destructuration, this study employs comparative case analyses involving 
two Indonesian local governments, those of the cities of Surabaya and Kupang. The two 
share similar characteristics, that is, both are administrative capitals and metropolitan 
cities for their respective provinces. However, they are different in terms of the possession 
of symbolic capital, which can, hypothetically, create differences in their responses to 
central government pressure. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises nine chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, serves as the introduction 
and describes the research problems. Chapter 2, ‘Institutional Change and Indonesian 
Education Governance’, traces the historical transformation of modern Indonesian 
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education governance. It records how changes in the institutional environment have 
affected the way education has been managed from the period of Dutch colonialism 
through to the New Order, that is, from 1800 to 1998. Different environments brought 
different logics and governance systems, which affected the structure of the organisation 
of education. There are three periods that this socio-historical analysis will deal with: the 
colonial period with its caste-based education institutions; the nationalist period with its 
nation-building ideals; and the developmental period with its bureaucratic-state 
institutions. 
Chapter 3, ‘Literature Review and Conceptual Framework’, reviews the gaps between 
current studies as well as the perspective adopted in this study. It explores general and 
particular concepts that shed light on the way the problems of Indonesian education 
reform can be analysed. It first clarifies some basic definitions and assumptions on 
decentralisation and education decentralisation. It then examines previous studies on this 
theme to show some gaps that this thesis is to fill. This chapter goes on to elaborate some 
theoretical concepts being used to study the problem of educational decentralisation and 
proposes criticisms of those perspectives. The presentation of institutional theory follows 
and starts by discussing the concepts of ‘world culture’ and ‘world model’ through which 
the institutional theory views the issue of globalisation and global policies. Following this 
is an elaboration of the ‘institutional environments’ concept to examine how and why the 
new decentralisation policy is being adopted. The discussion moves to reviewing the 
concept of ‘decoupling’, which has been widely used in many institutional analyses for 
different purposes. After reviewing this, there is an assessment of the concept of 
‘organisational field’ as a tool to analyse the dynamics of local responses to the education 
decentralisation reform. This chapter also discusses in what settings can the ‘structuration’ 
and ‘destructuration’ of organisational fields take place. 
Chapter 4, ‘Research Methodology’, offers the methodological assumptions of the 
thesis based on theoretical constructs outlined in Chapter 3. It provides philosophical and 
technical justifications for the adoption of qualitative methodology. In addition, the uses 
of case studies are also explained. Moreover, the chapter also describes and elaborates 
the technical methods of data collection and analysis. In the last part, it also addresses 
important issues of validity and reliability and ethics.  
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Chapter 5, ‘Decentralisation and the Legitimacy Project’, expounds the process of 
obtaining the institutional legitimacy of Indonesian educational decentralisation. The 
chapter argues that educational decentralisation is politically constructed for the sake of 
rejuvenating the central state’s legitimacy. This chapter commences with a discussion of 
the global deinstitutionalising of the centralist model of governance and Indonesia’s 
responses to it during and after the New Order. It then discusses the particular pressures 
of education reform in the Indonesian context from external and from internal institutional 
environments. This is followed by the elaboration of the early formulation of education 
reform as a response to such pressures. 
Chapter 6, ‘Manipulating the Legitimacy: the Centralised Standards in the 
Decentralised Structure’ explores how the compensatory legitimacy project of 
decentralisation has resulted in the resumption of the central state control of education 
through the power of standardisation. This further facilitates the imposition of the 
regulatory and interventionist nature of the role of standardisation. However, the political 
autonomy of local governments has given them new powers and those local interests in 
many cases run counter to the central government’s policies. We elaborate two cases of 
the application of policy where the application demonstrates the fragmentation of 
Indonesia’s education governance: cases involving school funding and teacher 
management. 
Chapter 7, ‘Educational Decentralisation and the Rise of the Neo-patrimonial State: 
the Case of Kupang City’, displays the first case study where education governance is 
centred on the leadership of the city mayor and his political colleagues. Local bureaucracy 
and schools are both co-opted for political ends. The chapter begins by briefly illustrating 
how this neo-patrimonial state is conceptualised and then contextualised in the case of 
Kupang. It then examines how this neo-patrimonial model is politically constructed in 
that locality. 
Chapter 8, ‘Educational Decentralisation and the Rise of the New Managerial State: 
the Case of Surabaya City’, discusses of the second case study, that of Surabaya. In 
contrast to Kupang, in Surabaya educational decentralisation has resulted in a more 
autonomous local authority. The mayor does not allow herself to be directly involved in 
decision making by the city education office (Dinas). After elaborating a conceptual 
position of the new managerial state, the chapter provides an analysis of how this model 
Chapter 1 
14 
of governance practice is constructed in Surabaya. The chapter then describes how the 
Dinas develops the policy and coordinates its implementation in schools on the basis of 
this managerial logic. 
Chapter 9, ‘Discussion and Conclusion’ summarises the theoretical and practical 
implications of the research findings. It reviews the objectives established in Chapter 1 
and discusses potential areas for future research. The application of institutional analysis 
to explain the problem of decentralisation is applied here and concludes this thesis. 
 
Conclusion 
Educational decentralisation is a global movement whose pressure has influenced the 
massive educational reform in many countries, including Indonesia. As in many 
developing countries, educational decentralisation in Indonesia is part of the greater 
political reforms that followed the reign of the New Order authoritarian government in 
the late 1990s. However, at odds with most education reform studies that discuss technical 
questions of efficiency or inequality as well as ideological questions of privatisation and 
neoliberalism, this study focuses on the sociological problem of legitimacy. This problem 
of legitimacy is analysed using some conceptual frameworks introduced by institutional 
theorists. Concepts of institutional environment, decoupling and destructuration are used 
to explain respectively how the legitimacy is obtained, manipulated, and contested in the 
implementation of educational decentralisation in Indonesia. This study of Indonesia’s 
education reform is relevant because of some problematic effects that it has on the current 
governance of Indonesian education. The relevance of this study will appear when we 
place Indonesia’s effort to decentralise its education within the broader historical context, 
which is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 Chapter II 
Institutional Change and Indonesian Education Governance 
 
Introduction 
Since its inception, the organisation of Indonesia’s education has been continuously 
transforming following the changes in its institutional environment. Different 
environments brought different logics and governance systems, which affect the structure 
of respective organisational fields. In this sense, the dynamic of global and local 
institutional environments in influencing the shape of educational arrangements has been 
present since the very beginning. In Indonesia, the earliest institution for education was 
religion and it was taught by international travellers from India, China, the Middle East 
and Europe (Azra, 2004; Penders, 1968; Schmutzer, 1977). As such, the modern 
education system was introduced through the global trend of colonial expansion from the 
16th to the 20th century when European nations claimed territory in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas as their colonies. This was the period when state involvement in education was 
first introduced. During this colonial period, any development that occurred in the mother 
countries caused pressure for the colony to create its local arrangement. The early colonial 
era, for instance, was marked by the rise of mercantilist policies so that technical 
education was promoted to help strengthen mother country’s economy. Yet, as the ideas 
from the French revolution were spreading and the ideology of liberal-humanism 
becoming very popular in Europe, some adjustments were also made in colonial policies 
(Schmutzer, 1977). 
The 20th century became the age of nation-state expansion, particularly in nations 
formerly colonised. When European countries had been devastated from the two world 
wars, many of their former colonies claimed their independence and established new 
nation-states. For these new nations, education was to help accelerate their nation-
building projects. However, there is always a local dynamic in the way these new nations 
gained their independence, each in a different way. Indonesia was no exception. During 
this period, there was also a time when the Cold War between capitalist and communist 
ideological blocs influenced national education policy in Indonesia (Kelabora, 1983; 
Thomas, 1981). 
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. The establishment of the New Order in 1965 marked the point of the neoliberal 
capitalist triumph over its communist adversary. During the New Order period, education 
policies were made to strengthen the fragile state through economic development after 
years of ideological conflict. 
All of these different institutional settings came with different governance system 
arrangements. All previous periods had their own experience of centralisation and 
decentralisation, particularly after the state became involved in administering this sector, 
the education sector. Since the early 20th century, the Dutch colonial government had 
initiated decentralisation policies in which local governments were given the 
responsibility of financing the schools as well as designing the local content of these 
schools’ curricula. The New Order and the previous governments continued these 
practices, certainly with some variation. However, the problem was not how centralising 
or decentralising the government was, but rather how structured were the rules and 
regulations under every governance setting. This chapter discusses how the global and 
local institutional dynamics influenced the transformation of education in Indonesia and 
how these arrangements created a more structured policy implementation. 
 
The Religious Construction of Education 
As had been the case in other Asian countries, religion was the first institution to facilitate 
the provision of education in Indonesia. Education was regarded as the main agent for 
promoting religious values and recruiting proficient preachers. A Chinese traveller, I 
Tsing, who made a journey to Sumatra in the 7th century, witnessed the prevalence of 
Buddhist temples with the monks teaching religious values (Lee, 1995; Penders, 1968). 
Initially, the teaching was addressed to unlimited, large numbers of the local populations. 
Then, as religion became more entrenched in social and political life, a more structured 
system of education called asrama developed. Pupils boarded in institutions away from 
their homes and places of origin (Bradjanagara, 1956). The academic subjects were 
mostly religious teachings in which pupils were trained ‘to cultivate clairvoyance, study 
the secrets of the cosmos, and prepare himself for death’ (Anderson, 1972: 53). In addition, 
pupils were also given tuition in Indian arts, philosophy and science (Lee, 1995; Penders, 
1968; Tsuchiya, 1975).  
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As the site of moral training, asramas imposed on their students the requirement to 
live modestly and to withdraw from worldly interests. To maintain this principle strictly, 
some historians have written that among the typical characteristics of asramas was that 
most were in isolated places: mountains, forests and caves. Through this, they became 
self-sufficient and independent from any political order and social intervention (Anderson, 
1972). And, eventually, as they reached the stage of renunciation or worldly rejection, 
they would possess a clear vision and sharp conscience. It would enable them to diagnose 
societal problems and offer a solution. As Anderson has noted, the asrama as spiritual 
centres even became the source of power in Javanese political culture. The asrama 
teachers or ajars became a reference for rulers to maintain political order. Their ascetic 
practices were believed to ‘give them special insights into the inner state of the world and 
into the future flow of Power within it’ (Anderson 1972: 53). However, this early religious 
education exclusively catered for royal family members; the kingdoms needed to 
strengthen their legitimacy by assigning religious advisors (Lee, 1995; Penders, 1968). 
As Islam in turn came to power in the 12th century, new centres of religious education 
appeared. There are several theories of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia. Some historians 
postulate that it was brought by Indian pedlars in the 12th century, while others thought  
that it was spread by either Persians or Arabs in the 9th century (Azra, 2004). The Muslim 
preachers replicated their Hindu–Buddhist predecessors in their Islamic teachings. The 
religious teachings initially took place in mosques or langgar. Here students were taught 
basic Islamic doctrine, Koranic recitation and daily ritual practices. Students were loosely 
bound to the system; their attendance was not regularly recorded. . Instruction was given 
daily but within a short period of time after working hours. Apart from langgar, Muslim 
preachers also adopted the asrama system, renaming it pesantren or pondok. Unlike in 
langgars, pesantren taught Islamic traditions more rigorously. They resembled the 
asrama boarding school system where students lived and spent most of their time. 
Langgar and pesantren were autonomous organisations run by clerics, who were known 
as ulamas or kyais, who served as legitimate education authorities in their respective 
localities. 
Before the expansion of pesantrens in the 18th century, Muslim scholars (ulama) were 
part of the state administration. These ulamas played a political role as proprietors of 
religious authority. They were assigned titles like syaikh al-Islam (supreme teacher of 
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Islam), mufti (legal arbitrator), qadhi (judge) and penghulu (local religious officer). The 
affiliations of some ulamas within the kingdom raised political competition among them 
with regard to claims of religious authority. In the 14th century, for instance, the Sultan 
of Aceh supported the prominent ulama, Nuruddin Ar-Raniri, to ban the teaching of a 
sufist metaphysical theory called wahdat al-wujud (the unity of existence) introduced by 
another rising scholar, Hamzah al-Fansuri (Azra, 2004). Consequently, ulamas were only 
allowed to teach official doctrine as the state-sponsored ulama community decreed or 
otherwise would be charged with heresy. As political crises hit major Indonesian 
kingdoms in the middle of the 18th century, many ulamas lost their political influence. 
They relinquished their positions at the centres of power to reclaim their traditional 
leadership in religious education. They took the path the Hindu–Buddhist priests had 
followed before: they retreated from the worldly political hustle. Following this period, 
pesantren developed as the most extensive education institutions in the Archipelago. 
In the 16th century, Portuguese settlers arrived in Maluku. They established colonies 
and their influence spread to many other eastern islands. It was through these European 
settlers that Christianity was introduced to Indonesia. Christian education became the 
transition model from previous religious institutions for education to modern, state-
sponsored schooling systems in Indonesia. Although the military rulers facilitated the 
provision of education, the learning system was organised independently by the Church 
and in the interests of religious missions (Kroeskamp, 1974). The first Christian school 
was founded in Ternate, North Maluku, in 1538. The establishment of a Jesuit mission in 
1546 by its charismatic leader, Francis Xavier, added much to the effort of school 
expansion. By 1560, there were 30 schools in Ambon and 26 in the Uliassan islands. But 
the number is believed to be higher because the Portuguese succeeded with their 
conversion program over all their areas of influence: Tidore, Bacan, Halmahera, Saparua, 
Nusa Laut, North Sulawesi, Borneo, Flores and Timor (Kroeskamp, 1974). During their 
rule, the Portuguese imposed compulsory education for all native people regardless of 
social status. Using the Portuguese language as the medium of instruction, the schools 
taught Christian doctrine, writing, reading and arithmetic. Despite its dependence on the 
government, the Church had a great degree of freedom in running the schools. No state 
regulations were produced to control the arrangement of education during the Portuguese 
period (Penders, 1968).  
	 	 Institutional Change and Indonesian Education Governance  
19 
Education and the Colonial State 
The Mercantilist Era 
The arrival of the Netherlanders in 1605 completely changed the nature of education 
governance in Indonesia. Even though the clergy kept their major religious role, they 
tended to become state servants who worked within a state system. The Dutch initially 
ruled the archipelago as a trade company in the name of the Vereenigde Oost-indische 
Compagnie (VOC) or the United East-India Company. Even though the company was 
seen as a for-profit business organisation, in the archipelago it manifested itself as the 
bearer of government functions (Anderson, 1983). The company extended its influence 
in Indonesia over a much greater territory than did the Portuguese. In addition to its 
hegemony over former Portuguese areas, it also subjugated local rulers in many other 
parts of the archipelago, the most important of which were the Javanese kingdoms. The 
company established its representatives in every locality and the native administrations 
had to obey their dictates. From  1706, the Company held the right to appoint subordinate 
officers of the regent, positions in practice that were mostly filled by Dutch nominees 
(Furnivall, 2010). 
Under the VOC, the Church remained an important education institution, but now 
education started to be state-regulated. Schools functioned not only as a medium for 
religious teaching but also to make stronger connections between the people and the 
company (Kroeskamp, 1974). The 1617 orders from the State General in the Netherlands 
to the VOC governors general mentioned that the company was required ‘to organize the 
spread of the Christian religion, the building of good schools and other necessary matters 
pertaining thereto’ (Govaars-Tjia, 2005: 32). The company drew up the regulations, 
provided the facilities and paid the teachers, and the Church served as technical organiser. 
The regulations arranged by the company did not touch upon the pedagogical and were 
limited to three aspects: the subjects taught, the school hours and the school holidays. The 
others were left for the clergymen (Kroeskamp, 1974). 
With their European ideological assumptions, the initial Dutch religious education 
preoccupation was to eradicate the influence of the Roman Catholic Church from 
Indonesian schools. It was easier to do this in Java, which was not affected by European 
influence to the extent that the eastern islands were, a result of their century-long 
connection with the Portuguese and Spaniards. In these eastern islands, the Dutch 
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schooling requirements met resistance from local communities and the Company had few 
teachers because of its interdiction of Catholic preachers. A compulsory education system 
was then enacted with a pound of rice given as compensation for those willing to teach 
children. The effort to introduce Dutch as instructional language also failed in most 
islands. The native peoples were accustomed to Portuguese and to Malay, which forced 
teachers to use the latter language rather than the former (Govaars-Tjia, 2005; Penders, 
1968). 
Following the departure of the VOC in 1799, the Netherlands kingdom that took over 
the colonial administration arranged more significant changes. Education was no longer 
a matter for the religious and therefore the leadership role of the Church in education was 
supplanted. The way education was organised during this colonial period was influenced 
by the institutional transformation within the state itself. The period of the 1800s was 
marked by severe economic crises in the Netherlands Indies. Not only did the VOC leave 
a catastrophic economy behind, but the new government itself was nearly bankrupted 
because of massive spending for military campaigns against local uprisings, the most 
important of which were the Java War and the Sumatran rebellion by puritanical Muslims 
(Carey, 1976; Dobbin, 1977). The government imposed a cultivation system policy 
(cultuurstelsel), causing villagers to spare 20 per cent of their lands for planting 
exportable, government-mandated commodities. If this requirement was not met, they 
had to work in a government-owned plantation for 60 days a year. Indonesian historians 
satirically named this policy as ‘forced planting’ (tanam paksa) (Van Niel et al., 2003) 
The vision of this, the 19th, century was to create an effective colonial estate where all 
available resources were to serve the European ascendancy. Hence, apart from supporting 
the economy, education was also to sustain social arrangements established by the Dutch. 
During this colonial period, Indonesian society was divided into three hierarchical layers: 
the Europeans at the top of the pyramid, the local aristocrats who supported the Dutch 
administration as civil servants, and the indigenous population working in agriculture or 
other primary production (Kartodirdjo, 1978). Early government primary schools were 
termed Europeesche lagere scholen (Welsh and McGinn), which served European 
families and a limited number of local aristocrats only. In 1848, the colonial government 
started to open schools exclusively for native Indonesians. They established two types of 
elementary school: the five-year first-class primary schools (eerste klasse) catering for 
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local aristocrat families; and four-year second-class schools (tweede klasse) for the 
general population (Bradjanagara, 1956). 
Despite the stratification, both types of schools were to teach technical skills necessary 
for either government officials or lower administrative employees in European companies. 
The first-class schools taught a more extensive range of subjects, such as reading, writing, 
mathematics, drawing, singing, earth sciences, animal sciences, plant sciences, physics 
and the Javanese and Malay languages. The second-class schools taught more basic 
subjects: reading, writing and traditional languages. However, all schools, particularly the 
first-class, had to customise their curricular content so that they matched the broader state 
agenda. Bradjanegara describes it as follow: 
 
…. There was a subject that had never been taught even in the Dutch lower school 
(i.e. ELS), which was the land survey (landmeten). The subject was taught to 
prepare the implementation of government cultuurstelsel policy… The drawing 
subject taught how to draw land maps. The math subject must teach calculations of 
land tax (landrente) and coffee administration (Bradjanagara, 1956: 58). 
 
The Ethical Policy 
The twentieth century, however, sparked a different institutional environment. Since the 
end of the 19th century, the Europeans met internal pressures derived from the radical 
ideas from the French Revolution, which inspired a liberal revolution in the Netherlands. 
The result was that in 1848, the Netherlands adopted liberal political reforms through a 
significant constitutional amendment that replaced the monarchical government with a 
parliamentary government. The new constitution also mandated the use of popular 
elections as a mechanism to establish the lower house of parliament, provincial councils 
and the municipal councils (Schmutzer, 1977). This liberal movement also effected 
internal transformations within Dutch Calvinism, which previously opposed the liberal 
reforms, but then became more moderate and proposed a humanist doctrine in relation to 
the government’s treatment of its colonies. In 1878, the Christian Anti-Revolutionary 
party issued its ‘New Progressive Platform’, which made recommendations to educate 
Indonesians morally; to administer colonial riches in consultation with the people and to 
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the best advantage of their country; to assist the Indonesians to a more independent 
position in the future, and to promote Christianity in Indonesia (Schmutzer, 1977). 
Hence, the colonial vision of a state transformed to respond to the pressure of the 
environmental change in the mother country. All government policies for indigenous 
Indonesians during the 1900s made reference to what was then popularly termed the 
ethical policy (ethische politiek). The policy involved a revision of former views of 
Indonesia as a wingewest (region to make a profit), that the government had to work for 
the welfare of the colony and that a process of civilising must take place. In 1906, the 
Minister of the Colonies, Dirk Fock, declared ‘we have undertaken to rule the people 
through their own leaders and that implies the training of subordinates in all branches of 
administration’. The statement was then reflected in the government plan to introduce 
general compulsory education for all Indonesian people. This education was no longer 
designed solely to prepare skilled labourers, but also to transfer new values that would 
civilise the indigenous and unite them as loyal citizens (Penders, 1968). 
In 1903, the government established a new three-year system called volkschool or 
desaschool (village school) for those in remote areas. By 1914, those who had finished in 
the village schools were able to continue their education in a newly established two-year 
vervolgschool system. By that same year, the government also reorganised the current 
first and second-class schools. The first-class schools were transformed to Hollandsch 
inlandsche school (HIS) with an extended attendance period of seven years. The HIS used 
Dutch as the medium of instruction. The government also added one more year to the 
duration of education at second-class schools and upgraded its curricular content to nearly 
the standard of the first-class schools. A secondary school system was also introduced in 
1914, called Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (MULO). This was three-year junior 
secondary system for those who had completed ELS and HIS. The government then 
established schakelschool in 1920 for pupils who had finished at the second-class schools 
and vervolgschool as a transition before entering MULO. One year earlier, in 1919, a 
senior secondary system was introduced for the indigenes, called algemeene middelbare 
school (AMS). Graduates of AMS were equivalent to those of the schools for Dutch 
families, hogere burgerschool (HBS) (Bradjanagara, 1956). 
Despite the wide-ranging policy, this state-sponsored school system failed to attain 
legitimacy. The problem was partly technical but mostly institutional. The technical 
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problem arose from the fact that the government education campaign for natives was not 
allocated adequate funding. A report in 1898 claimed that although the budgeted amount 
allocated for each pupil of European descent was 122 guilders, the amount for each native 
student was only 10 guilders (Djojonegoro, 1996). Another report said that, in 1900, 
education spending was 4,109,000 guilders and 65 per cent of this was being disbursed 
to support European schools whose pupils were less than 1 per cent of the population 
(Zainu'ddin, 1970). However, Schmutzer (1977) claimed that the problem was generally 
caused by the lack of government funding. In 1907, it was calculated that the cost to 
educate natives alone would come to 125 million guilders of less than 200 million guilders 
in total. Therefore, from the 186 new schools in 1909, only ten were acceptably funded 
(Schmutzer, 1977). After the great depression in the 1920s, the central government had 
to tighten its budget and some government schools, particularly volkschools, had to find 
their own funding. As a result, parents had to pay more to send their children to 
government schools, which caused them to opt out of sending their children to school. 
Those who finished their primary education did not continue to secondary (Suwignyo, 
2013). 
The greatest challenge to government education, however, came from the nature of its 
system, which was less popular among the new generation of educated natives, who could 
see the importance of an independent nation as well as identifying with the local culture. 
The technical and vocational approach to education just did not fit a long-standing local 
belief that education as the transmission of meaning rather than of skills. In addition, the 
discriminative character of the school system also led to a campaign against the colonial 
government. Rather than unifying the population, the system otherwise promoted the 
spread of a nationalist spirit of resistance. This challenge resulted in the expansion of 
community-supported, private education institutions, which in the early 20th century had 
become independent of religious constraints. In addition to traditional pesantrens that 
continued to enrol native Muslim children, a number of private schools were built for the 
indigenous population. The schools were influenced by the contradiction between the 
state-promoted Western archetype and the locally developed anti-colonial ideology. 
Hence, although their organisation was modelled on Western schools, these schools 
infused a new ideological content into their teaching and education goals. Most were run 
by one or other of three major organisations: Taman Siswa, Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdhatul Ulama, and these schools aspired not only to separate themselves from the 
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government system but also to lead their youth to more cultural awareness as well as 
encouraging a spirit of national cohesion. 
Pesantrens, which were affiliated with the traditional Muslim organisation, Nahdhatul 
Ulama, continued their traditional non-classroom and teacher-centred learning. They 
taught traditional Islam using textbooks written by mediaeval Islamic scholars or using 
commentaries of them by more recent scholars (Dhofier, 1980). Meanwhile, 
Muhammadiyah, a modernist faction of Indonesian Muslim organisations, developed 
their schools based on more pragmatic and practical ideas of Islam. They adopted Western 
methods to teach secular subjects and Islamic morality at the same time (Federspiel, 1970; 
Nakamura, 1983). Apart from these two was Taman Siswa (literally, Garden of Pupils), 
which introduced a combination of a Western schooling system and the old Javanese 
asrama system. Ki Hajar Dewantara, the founder of Taman Siswa, always highlighted 
the importance of cultivating first children’s own cultural values before taking on external 
ideas (Radcliffe, 1971). Following the post-World War I economic recession in 1920s, 
the colonial government’s cutting of its education budget made government schools even 
more expensive and these independent schools became the most favoured education 
destination for Indonesian parents. By the end of the 1930s, there were no fewer than 
2200 private schools in Indonesia with almost 142,000 native students enrolled 
(Zainu'ddin, 1970). 
This development had led to two policy responses from the colonial government. First, 
the adaptation of Western education systems for the needs of indigenous pupils 
(indigenisation) and the major strategies for doing this were to replace many European 
teachers with Indonesians; to devolve budget and management for schools to provincial 
and municipal governments; to reorganise second-class schools; and to reform the 
curriculum by using local content and enriching context (Suwignyo, 2013). This policy 
appeared to be motivated by the central government’s drive for budget efficiency rather 
than a broader cultural strategy. The colonial government was indeed successful in 
reducing its education expenditure in that period. Replacing European teachers with 
Indonesian teachers reduced operational spending mostly because of the disparities in 
salary between Europeans and Indonesians. As such, the decentralisation strategy 
transferred the financial burden to already suffering local governments and even village 
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administrations (Suwignyo, 2013). Those policies were certainly clinched by the 
aggressive politico-cultural movement of the private schools. 
This then led to the second policy response, the restriction of private school expansion. 
At least two regulations had been issued by the colonial government for this purpose: the 
1923 regulation 136 on the supervision of private schools and the 1932 regulation 494 or 
what the government contemptuously called the ‘Wild School Ordinance’ 
(Wildeschoolen Ordonantie). The first regulation mandated all non-subsidised schools to 
register themselves with the government and their teachers to report all of their teaching 
materials. It also gave authority to the government to suspend a teacher or close a school 
if their actions were seen to violate public order. Meanwhile, the second regulation moved 
further to oblige all private schools to seek a licence from the provincial government 
license before they could operate. The second regulation provoked massive resistance 
from nationalist activists, among them were the Taman Siswa founder, Ki Hajar 
Dewantara, in Java and Muhammadiyah leader, Abdul Karim Amrullah, in Sumatera. The 
massive protest against the regulation led to its abolition only five months after its 
enactment (Sugiharta, 2014; Zainu'ddin, 1970). 
The Dutch failure to consolidate the education system led to the destructuration of the 
organisational field. The colonial state lost its legitimation as a single education system 
reference. Apart from the state education system controlled by the colonial government, 
many private school systems were embracing the new nationalist vision. They continued 
to do so until the Japanese invasion in 1942. Similar to the Dutch, the Japanese made an 
effort to control the system. In March 1942, they abolished all European schools in the 
country. Using their repressive military power, they were to some extent successful in 
consolidating the system into a single institutional framework. They altered schools to 
become centres for Japanese cultural indoctrination and military training. Students and 
teachers were obliged to do physical exercises and take part in the saluting ceremony for 
the Japanese Emperor every morning before school activities began (Suwignyo, 2012). 
The Japanese government also managed to convince prominent nationalist leaders to 
cooperate under Japanese command. However, during the three years of Japanese 
occupation, 1942 to 1945, schooling declined. Primary school enrolment plunged by 30 
per cent, and secondary school numbers fell by nearly 90 per cent (Bjork, 2005). All the 
people’s energies were forced to support Japanese military campaigns. Thousands of 
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youth were sent to join informal training in a number of Japan-sponsored organisations, 
the most important of which was PETA or Pembela Tanah Air (the Nation’s Defenders), 
which provided military training (Tilaar, 1995).  
When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, the new government inherited this 
institutional complexity: there was the unconsolidated but institutionalised Dutch 
education legacy on the one hand, and a more consolidated but short-lived and fragile 
Japanese system on the other. As the nationalist leaders came to hold power, they made 
their hard-fought nationalist ideals into the archetype of a new state-sponsored education. 
Yet this had never been a simple one-night success. The raging nationalist faction always 
wanted to break from the past nation-denigrating colonial model, but no adequate 
blueprint was available to develop a new system. 
 
Education and Nation-State Building 
The Organisational Arrangement of Education Governance 
Some scholars have been known to support a theory that education is the most effective 
medium to spread nationalism. Early institutional analyses held to the theory of education 
and the nation-state, that is, since the 18th century, the motivation to build a nation-state 
accounted for the expansion of mass schooling (Ramirez and Boli, 1987). Globally, 1945 
was a year of nation-state formation (Meyer, et al., 1997). World War II had just 
concluded and new nations were coming into being from former colonial territories as 
they gained autonomy from their previous administrations. Education was made to serve 
this new political project in Indonesia. Lee (1995) describes the first policy measure the 
Education Minister of the new independent republic initiated during his service. 
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Earlier, the Republican government had taken some steps to assume control of 
education. On 29 September 1945, Dewantoro, as Education Minister, issued an 
interim guide to all educational leaders, school principals, and teachers in Java 
advising a number of changes to be adopted immediately. The guidelines were brief 
and intended more to signal the beginning of a new political era rather than to 
launch any major programmes. Schools were urged to instil the spirit of nationalism 
especially through daily singing of the national anthem and rising of the Republican 
flag. All school regulations promulgated by the Japanese were revoked. Only 
bahasa Indonesia was allowed with English and German included in the secondary 
schools (Lee, 1995: 32) 
 
Indeed, up to five years after the 1945 independence proclamation, no important technical 
policy was forthcoming because there were two administrative systems claiming control 
over the archipelago: the nationalist republican and the previous Dutch administration 
that returned after the war. In 1948, the Dutch took control over most territories. During 
that period, the bloody nationalist war took place to oust the Europeans from the land. 
Many schools were closed because their teachers joined the war effort. During this five-
year period, education was organised under each state or province and the Dutch school 
system continued to operate in many areas. In this sense, the role of the Ministry of 
Education was not so very influential in guiding the education system. It was not until the 
Round Table Conference in the Hague in 1949 that the Indonesian government regained 
full sovereignty. 
Following the integration motion in 1950, the Ministry of Education, Instruction and 
Culture (DEIC) regained power. In this formation period, the nationalist influence was 
real. The portfolios of the education minister were mostly occupied by the Yogyakarta 
circle, or those who had an affiliation before independence with the Taman Siswa 
nationalist movement (Kelabora, 1983). Ki Hajar Dewantara, the Taman Siswa founder 
and central figure, served as the first education minister of the Republic. Other Taman 
Siswa activists, for instance, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, Teuku Mohammad Hasan and 
Sarino Mangunpranoto, also served the portfolio successively. 
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The first education act was ratified in 1950 and outlined how national education should 
play a role in the larger context of nation building. The goal of education was defined as 
‘creating moral and capable human beings as well as democratic citizens with a sense of 
responsibility towards the prosperity of society and country’ (article 3). Adopting Taman 
Siswa’s idea, the law also stated that the education process should run based on 
Indonesians’ own culture. The commentary part of the act further elaborated  the cultural 
foundation of the Indonesian education system as follows. 
That the foundation must be totally different from that of education and instruction 
during the Dutch era, and (this is out of the question), no need to be elaborated. 
(That is firstly) because the instruction during the Dutch period was not deeply 
rooted in Indonesian society, our people did not feel that those schools were their 
own. Despite any arguments, those schools remained alien properties for 
Indonesian people. The second reason is that the Dutch schools admitted only a 
small portion of Indonesian people, predominantly the elites. Ordinary people 
generally did not get any chances to obtain education and instruction in those 
schools (GoI, 1950). 
 
The burning desire to break free from the colonial past was manifested in the government 
school reorganisation policy in June 1950. The government abolished the current six 
types of primary school and seven types of secondary school established by the Dutch, 
which were still using Dutch nomenclature and being run on the basis of social class. 
These organisations were merged to form a universal, age-based school categorisation: 
sekolah rakyat (elementary school), sekolah menengah pertama (junior high school) and 
sekolah menengah atas (senior high school). In addition, there were other secondary 
vocational and technical schools. The government controlled the curricula in all schools 
and the Indonesian language as the medium of instruction was made compulsory. All 
private schools, including those that catered for foreigners, had to have the Indonesian 
language as one of their course subjects. The teaching of Dutch was totally dropped from 
Indonesian public schools in 1950. Dutch teachers who wanted to continue working in 
Indonesian schools were selected according to stringent criteria and had to teach in 
Indonesian (Suwignyo, 2013). 
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Despite its success in gaining legitimacy in the anti-colonial campaign, the nationalist 
education effort to embrace and define its own identity became more complicated. 
Indonesia is a nation with over 400 hundred ethnic languages (Nababan, 1985) and a great 
variety of belief systems (McVey, 1993). To accommodate such differences, President 
Soekarno had earlier formulated the Pancasila, which literally means five principles, and 
this was approved as the state ideology. These five principles are a belief in God, 
humanitarianism, nationalism, representative democracy and social justice. Yet, there 
was still no consensus among politicians on how this Pancasila should help in guiding the 
nation. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the country had witnessed many separatist and 
political revolts, which almost caused its disintegration. It also saw 24 governments in 
succession; each a coalition government. For the education portfolio alone, Indonesia had 
15 different ministers from different political and ideological backgrounds during this 
period. 
The ratification of the Education Act (law 4 of 1950) showed how such a political 
environment worked. The Act was drafted when the education department’s leadership 
was under an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) politician, Ali Sastroamidjojo (1947–
1949), and later was ratified when another PNI politician, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro 
(1949–1950), was in office. The part most debated was related to religious teaching in 
schools. In the name of Pancasila, the Act discreetly asserted the state’s neutral position. 
Article 20 [1] stated that ‘in public schools religious subject will be given; parents are to 
decide whether their children are taking the course or not’ (GoI, 1950). Yet, the official 
commentary of this article was rather strong. 
a) Whether a certain school is to provide the religious subject would depend 
on students’ age and intelligence. 
b) Adult students may decide independently whether to take a religious course 
or not. 
c) The nature of religious teaching and its hours will be regulated within a Law 
regarding its school type. 
d) The religious subject does not influence a student’s promotion. 
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The Act also allowed private schools to match the type of religion being taught in their 
schools with their respective institutional foundation. This meant, for example, that 
Muslim children in Catholic schools would possibly receive Christian rather than Islamic 
instruction. Before being ratified in 1950, the Act had caused massive protests across the 
country. In early 1949, Masyumi, the biggest Islamic party, walked out during the 
parliamentary session when the Bill was passed. In Sumatra, Mohammad Sjafei, former 
Education Minister and respected politician, submitted a statement called the Sumatera 
Memorandum to Minister Sastroamidjojo urging the annulment of the Act (Suwignyo, 
2013). On 16 October 1949, Daud Beureuh, the military governor of Aceh, issued his 
own statement called the Aceh Memorandum. The memorandum demanded the 
government to make religious teaching a compulsory subject in schools; to acknowledge 
the education in religious schools equal to the training in government schools; to convert 
the status of religious schools to government-run schools; and to regulate the mixing of 
male and female students so that local Islamic practices in Sumatera not be violated 
(Tilaar, 1995). 
Soekarno showed a reluctance to ratify the Bill given such massive controversy, but 
the acting president, Asaat, authorised the Act in April 1950. After it had been ratified, 
two prominent Islamist factions, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and Partai 
Masyumi, moved refusal motions in the Parliament. The PSII labelled the regulation an 
‘educational system which humiliates mankind’ (Suwignyo, 2013). Masyumi also refused 
to comply with the Act and demanded the government make religious instruction 
compulsory in school. The factions argued that ‘by not making religious lessons a 
compulsory subject for schoolchildren, the government is jeopardising the future life of 
the Indonesian people, in particular, Muslims. The government has made a policy which 
diverges from the first principle of the state ideology, the Pancasila’ (Suwignyo, 2013). 
In September 1950, Masyumi took over the coalition government and Prime Minister 
Natsir soon assigned an independent professional, Bahder Djohan, as the new education 
minister. Because of the change of state arrangement from a federal to a unitary system, 
the Act lost its legitimacy to integrate a national system. In 1954 another PNI government 
was formed under the leadership of a former education minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and 
the Act (law 4 of 1950) was then declared effective (GoI, 1954). 
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Despite the education system being centralised, the Law provided the room for a more 
decentralised administration. One year after the Education Act was passed, in 1951, the 
government issued a regulation on this decentralisation scheme. The regulation devolved 
the control of basic education to the provincial governments. Such responsibility covered 
administrative aspects such as school finance, school personnel, school licences, student 
admissions and resource distribution. Other technical matters such as curriculum content, 
the choice of textbooks, school inspections, school holidays and international school 
affairs remained under central government control (GoI, 1951). The decentralisation was 
then followed by the transfer of physical resources and personnel to the provincial 
authorities. The provinces now had the authority to hire and fire public school teachers. 
In 1953, the Education Ministry announced that secondary schooling would be 
gradually devolved to the provincial governments and when this had been done the 
control of primary education would be shifted to the district governments. In the late 
1950s, the provinces did have additional responsibilities, such as setting up public 
libraries, managing literacy campaigns and organising emergency teacher training 
courses (Lee, 1995). By 1959, the administration of formal teachers’ training schools, 
SGA and SGB, were entirely handed over to the provincial governments. They were also 
assigned responsibility to control the special schools for Indonesian Chinese (Lee, 1995). 
Following decentralisation, the organisational arrangement of education authorities 
was also adjusted. The provincial governments established their own education 
departments, called Dinas PPK or Provincial Education and Culture Departments, which 
were independent of the central ministry and directly responsible to the governor. 
Whereas politicians were enthusiastic with the decentralisation arrangement, it did not 
satisfy the education professionals. PGRI, the largest Indonesian teacher association, was 
unhappy with the policy, arguing that less capable and inexperienced bureaucrats were 
running the Dinas PPK. These bureaucrats were accused of having no concern with 
education matters and no understanding of what teachers and schools really needed. 
Therefore the association demanded that the decentralisation policy should be revoked 
and control centralised and should expand into the administrative realm as well (Lee, 
1995). 
In response to this, by 1957 the central Education Department established the Kantor 
Perwakilan PPK or the Office of the Representative for Education and Culture. This 
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office was the provincial branch of the central education department and its head served 
as the minister’s representative on all education matters in the region. No further 
responsibility was attached to this office other than it coordinate a number of ministerial 
inspectorates in the province that were to conduct regular school inspections. Their role 
seemed to be more ceremonial than technical. In many provinces, the role of Perwakilan 
PPK and Dinas PPK overlapped because of some technical problems. The distance from 
Jakarta hindered coordination and the appointment of local people as the Perwakilan PPK 
office heads had made the offices more inclined to local than to central government’s 
interests and they would make independent decisions without consulting Jakarta. Also, it 
frequently happened that the same person became head of perwakilan and of dinas offices 
because of limited local resources (Lee, 1995). 
However, the strong liberal democratic approach to building the nation-state neither 
integrated the nation nor strengthened the state. Ideological and political confrontations 
were the striking feature of Indonesian politics in the 1950s. The result was a highly 
unstable government. In one decade, 1950 to 1959, the country had seven governments 
in succession, all coalition governments. Education department leadership shifted from 
one political party to another, each with their different political agendas. Secessionist 
movements were also widespread in a number of regions, which led to massive military 
campaigns. In July 1959, President Soekarno declared the abolition of parliamentary 
democracy by launching his own presidential cabinet. Naming his version “guided 
democracy” (demokrasi terpimpin), he also dismissed the elected constitution-making 
body called Konstituante. In 1960, he also banned two major political parties, the social 
democratic Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and the Islamist Masyumi, which were widely 
associated with the Indonesian Revolutionary Government (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia/PRRI)   rebellion a couple of years earlier. 
Localising the Global Ideological Confrontation 
The move from liberal to guided democracy could be linked to the localisation of the 
global developments of the Cold War, that is, the ideological confrontation of US 
capitalism with Soviet communism (Bunnell, 1966). Soekarno himself had frequently 
criticised parliamentary democracy as an imported Western democracy and marked his 
guided democracy government with many confrontational campaigns against what he 
called NEKOLIM or neo-colonialism and imperialism, which in most cases were 
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associated with US allies (Lev, 1966). In 1957, Soekarno imposed his radical anti-
Western strategy by taking over a great deal of Dutch-owned property. Following this, 
the state controlled almost all productive plantations, more than 50 per cent of export 
trade companies that were previously under foreign control, 250 factories, and several 
banks and mining companies (Berger, 1997). On 19 December 1961, he launched the 
Trikora military operation to claim West Papua from the US-supported Dutch hegemony. 
One year later, he established another military campaign to combat the establishment of 
the British-supported Malaysia Federation. In January 1965, the President even declared 
Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN as his protest against this Malaysian development. 
At the same time, however, the President built closer relations with the Eastern bloc 
countries. He was known to have good connections with communist leaders in Moscow 
and Beijing. Some analysts argue that Soekarno’s idea of guided democracy itself was 
very much influenced by the communist system (Liu, 1997). In 1956 Soekarno himself 
said that he was more impressed with what he found during his visits to socialist than to 
capitalist countries. He was impressed by the way one-party systems in China and the 
Soviet Union organised a more integrated society without internecine strife among the 
people (Ghoshal, 1982). Internally, he then included communism as part of his new 
ideological project called NASAKOM, which stands for Nasionalisme (nationalism), 
Agama (religion) and Komunisme (communism). In his address on the Independence Day 
commemoration on 17 August 1959, he introduced MANIPOL–USDEK as additional to 
the state ideology of Pancasila, which reflected the transposition of global ideological 
conflicts into an Indonesian context. MANIPOL–USDEK is an acronym for Manifesto 
Politik (political manifesto) of UUD 1945 (the 1945 constitution), Sosialisme Indonesia 
(Indonesian socialism), Demokrasi Terpimpin (guided democracy), Ekonomi Terpimpin 
(guided economy) and Kepribadian Indonesia (Indonesian character). 
These developments certainly affected the arrangement of national governance. Since 
the mid-1950s, Soekarno had turned to become the Indonesian Communist Party’s 
unofficial patron. Always the backbone of all presidential policies during the guided 
democracy period, the PKI enjoyed greater political influence than it ever had before. 
Against opposition, the president took unpopular political stands by advocating 
communist involvement in the government. He assigned a number of PKI associates to 
cabinet portfolios, among which was education. From 1957, the PKI politicians took 
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control of the Education Department from the Taman Siswa member and PNI politician, 
Sarino Mangunpranoto. The communist-sponsored minister, Prijono, survived for the 
whole period of Soekarno’s presidency and became the longest serving education 
minister in Indonesia’s history, from 1957 to 1966. Prijono was never a formal member 
of PKI, but was known as a strong supporter. He was awarded Stalin’s Prize for Peace in 
1954 and his son was granted a university scholarship in Moscow in the 1960s (Kelabora, 
1983; Thomas, 1981). 
The appointment of Prijono soon became the new source of ideological conflict. 
Prijono was held responsible for moving the Indonesian education system to the left 
(Kelabora, 1983; Thomas, 1981). Prijono engaged in some political manoeuvres soon 
after he assumed office. He sacked the ministry’s allegedly pro-American secretary-
general, Marnixius Hutasoit, replacing him with another communist advocate, Supardo. 
The pair replaced many bureaucrats in the department as well as headmasters and teachers 
in government schools to enable the introduction of communist programs. In 1964, he 
was involved in an open confrontation with 27 anti-communist officials in the Department, 
which led to his removal from office. However, Soekarno moved him to another position, 
as Coordinating Minister of Education, a portfolio with no technical authority (Suwignyo, 
2012). 
Under Prijono, the influence of communism in education became apparent. In 1960, 
he announced an education reform manifesto called Pancawardhana. Pancawardhana 
meant five improvements in pupils’ respect for national and international morality and 
religious belief; intellectual capacity; emotional and artistic lives; manual works; and 
physical training. After its launch in 1960, a number of books were published to develop 
a public understanding of the program. In 1961, the book, Memperkenalkan Sistem 
Pendidikan Indonesia ‘Pancawardhana’ (Introducing the Indonesian education system 
of Pancawardhana), written by Atmaprawira, explained that the system was a tool to 
create ‘socialist human beings of Indonesia’. Another author, Sutarto, proposed that as 
part of the implementation of Pancawardhana, once a year schools need to arrange an 
extra-curricular activity called ‘labor camp’ (Tilaar, 1995). 
As with Pancawardhana, it provoked a massive challenge from Muslim politicians who 
accused it of running counter to the state ideology of Pancasila. The fact that it did not 
mention the belief in one God was regarded as near enough to saying that it was a 
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communist program. The controversy was aggravated by a later development; Prijono 
combined Pancawardhana with Pancacinta, the principles introduced by a PKI subsidiary 
organisation, Lembaga Pendidikan Nasional (LPN) or National Education Institute. 
Prijono himself denied such an indictment, claiming that Pancawardhana was a version 
of Pancasila that could be implemented. He was given support from Soekarno, who said 
that Prijono’s Pancawardhana had his blessing (Thomas, 1981). 
However, because of escalating ideological debates and conflict, in September 1964, 
President Soekarno established a state commission to evaluate and advise on 
improvements to the Pancawardhana education system. By 1965, the commission 
recommended the creation of a new system, the Pancasila National Education System 
(PNES) whose operation would be administered and supervised by the National 
Education Council. The council was then established as a vanguard to accommodate all 
ideological and interest groups. Some non-partisan educators were also coopted to the 
council to give it the appearance of professionalism and neutrality. Despite the 
accommodation of many views, however, the council failed to gain consensus because 
each ideological group refused to compromise (Kelabora, 1983). 
On 25 August 1965, the official PNES was launched through a Presidential Decree 19 
of 1965. In contrast to the previous 1950 Act that was more technical, this new 24-article 
regulation was more concerned with the promotion of political points of view than with 
the technicalities of regulating education. For example, it contended that education should 
be based on Pancasila and the MANIPOL–USDEK. It contained one particular article 
that dealt with ‘the politics of national education’, which was defined as the resistance 
against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, feudalism and capitalism. The 
regulation confused the Education Ministry’s curriculum developers because of its 
opacity. In designing the subject-matter content, for instance, the developers failed to 
break through the ideological boundaries (Kelabora, 1983). 
The ideological competition had a huge effect not only on the higher-level institutional 
order but also at the lower level organisational arrangement. The energy for education 
was dissipated in a nation-wide ideological split. Education organisations experienced 
massive politicisation and the central government’s education department was controlled 
by the PKI and many public-school teachers became communist followers. After 1965, it 
was estimated that 32,000 school teachers were alleged to have a communist link 
Chapter 2 
36 
(Thomas, 1981). On the other hand, many private schools, mostly those owned by Muslim 
organisations, organised themselves to oppose the communist influence. The PKI was 
known to be  strongly opposed to pesantren and the described leaders of the pesantrens, 
the kyais, as one of the seven devils (Hefner, 1987). In this state of curricular anarchy, 
ideological groups also formed and propagated their own version of the curriculum in 
schools. The PKI, for instance, issued teaching guides and persuaded teachers to follow 
them. Quoting from one of the PKI’s pamphlets for teachers of English, Thomas recorded 
the following: 
 
For teaching English, instructors are urged to secure material from progressive 
magazines… In addition, the teacher can edit material from Eckersly’s text (a 
locally popular British English-language book) to make it more appropriate to 
Indonesian conditions. For example, among the exercises, the sentence ‘John went 
to Liverpool yesterday’ can be changed to ‘the workers went on strike yesterday’ 
(Thomas, 1981: 375) 
 
The most important effect of this ideological conflict was its decoupling from technical 
arrangements in schools. The glorious national programs and agendas did not meet and 
did not help with the besetting problem of Indonesia education: a shortage of everything. 
In 1955, it was reported that schools had to exclude around 4.5 million children; there 
were not enough places for the children. In 1967, in the Republic’s capital, Jakarta, it was 
estimated that nearly 250,000 school-aged children could not be accommodated 
(Zainu'ddin, 1970). The nation had also lost many skilled and experienced European 
teachers because of nationalist ideological restrictions. Many Indonesian teachers 
themselves had left school during the war either to join the armed forces or to pursue a 
career in government institutions that were in need of more educated employees. In 1951, 
it was estimated that the new teaching labour force needed to be recruited to fill as many 
as 140,000 positions. The government also had to retrain around 50,000 active teachers 
for them to adapt to the new system (Bjork, 2005). 
The effect of these technical problems was a massive destructuration. Because of poor 
organisation, shortages of buildings, facilities and staff, many teaching programs in 
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government schools ended up being performed as crash courses and emergency trainings. 
The number of private schools increased much faster than government schools but 
without any close inspection. Teacher standards also went down from what had been 
internationally benchmarked during the colonial time. The desire to infuse nationalist 
ideology, combined with the lack of experienced teacher trainers, caused teacher training 
to concentrate more on content than on teaching skills (Bjork, 2005). In those emergency 
classes, for example, the government was only concerned with teaching materials: 
schools might recruit their teachers from occupations ranging from civil servants to 
shopkeepers (Zainu'ddin, 1970). 
 
Education and the Neoliberal Bureaucratic-state 
The 30 September 1965 crisis was the turning point for the Soekarno government. Six 
senior anti-PKI military generals were murdered but the motive for the killings has been 
the subject of many historical interpretations since. The official, New Order-sponsored 
history textbooks described this as a communist revolution, but later, after the collapse of 
the regime in 1998, some historians revisited the accounts of the events of that time and 
noted it simply as a military coup. Despite the theories, many political and social events 
that followed this revolt have never been a mystery. The anti-communist movement, with 
massive military support, destroyed the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of 
those who had, or were accused of having, communist links. The country was in chaos 
and Soekarno was deposed in 1967. General Suharto, who held the real power since 1966, 
was sworn in as the new president in 1968. He named his new government the New Order 
and labelled Soekarno’s era as the Old Order. 
The change from Soekarno to Suharto also marked an ideological transition from the 
left to the right. Because of the Cold War, this left-to-right transition allowed political 
and other influences to flow from the West rather than the East. In his memoir, former 
US ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, acknowledged that, since the late 1950s, 
Washington was actively involved in Indonesian politics by ‘placing our best bets 
squarely on the Indonesian army… to preserve the pro-American, anti-Communist 
loyalties of the top officer group in the army’ (as quoted in Anderson, 1983: 487). This 
US support of the New Order regime was also indicated by the silence of the US 
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government over the genocide performed and facilitated by the military after 30 
September 1965 (Jones, 2002). The most evident result of this ideological change, 
however, was in Suharto’s policies. He prohibited the propagation of communist ideology 
and adopted more policies that encouraged foreign investment and promoted a liberal 
economy. 
The New Order’s embrace of more active economic development was to escape the 
legitimacy crisis that arose from the national political and economic catastrophes caused 
by unmediated ideological conflict and unstable government. In 1965, inflation climbed 
more than 500 per cent and the rice price skyrocketed by more than 900 per cent. The 
country’s export revenues fell to USD450 million from USD750 million in 1961. In fact, 
the country badly needed to import as much as USD650 million product value. The debt 
was calculated to reach USD2175 million and would have been due to be repaid between 
1966 and 1974. In 1966 alone there was a USD530 million commitment that needed to 
be settled, whereas the foreign exchange trade generated not more than USD430 million 
(Kelabora, 1983). The situation forced the New Order to embrace an institutional shift 
from politics to the economy and from nation building to bureaucratic consolidation. 
Suharto recruited pro-Western Indonesian economists, graduates from US universities, 
for his economic team. The most influential set in Suharto’s economics circle was known 
as the Berkeley Mafia because most of its members were graduates of the University of 
California’s Berkeley campus. Economists were the most prominent of Suharto’s 
advisors and to whom the President owed his policy of five-yearly development plans 
(Repelita). Suharto styled his government as the development government and his 
government’s program as Repelita, which stands for rencana pembangunan lima tahun 
or five-year development plan. Suharto coupled his liberal economic vision with the 
doctrine of order and stability. He deemed previous ideological conflict and uncontrolled 
political rivalry to have been unhealthy and had consumed the nation’s potential for the 
future. Later, after the first election in 1971, he reduced the number of political parties to 
three, and, after prohibiting communist and Marxist ideology, imposed the Pancasila as 
the only legitimate ideology for all organisations. There were some initial protests, 
particularly from Muslim politicians but, using intelligence and military operations, he 
effectively silenced the dissenters. He strictly controlled mass gatherings, intimidated his 
critics, detained protesters and had some radical activists killed. As the president had 
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succeeded in eliminating factionalism in the defence forces, his military campaigns to 
defeat the remaining separatist movements always went unchallenged. 
During the New Order, Indonesia enjoyed the most stable government since its 
independence (Anderson, 1983). The essential scaffolding that supported this strong state 
was the bureaucracy. Because the Suharto regime had marginalised political parties from 
the centre of the political stage, the Indonesian New Order became a bureaucratic polity. 
The bureaucracy formulated, administered and supervised the government’s policies; the 
role of the parliament was ceremonial (Jackson, 1978). Unlike previous administrations, 
the New Order bureaucracy was free of ideological competition. To maintain a single 
loyalty, Suharto obliged all public servants to affiliate with his party, Golkar. He 
centralised power under his hand: all governors and local government leaders could only 
be appointed with his approval. To ensure stability, he adopted the Nasution doctrine of 
a dual function for the military (Dwifungsi ABRI), which allowed the defence force to 
act as ‘military’ and ‘social political’ forces. As the latter, the military was permitted to 
take part in almost all civilian activities, including government bureaucracy and social 
organisations (Crouch, 2007). During the New Order, many active military officials were 
posted as ministers, members of parliament, local government leaders, executive 
managers in state-owned enterprises, public university rectors and even chairmen of sport 
organisations. 
Education was very much influenced by this environment. In a speech at the Persatuan 
Guru Republic Indonesia’s conference in November 1967, the New Order’s minister of 
education, Sanusi Hardjadinata, said that the focus of education would move from 
‘divisive mental issues’ to the support of the government’s economic development 
program (Elder, 1987: 144). Mashuri, Hardjadinata’s successor, later, in May 1968, added 
that the unachieved social welfare under Soekarno’s guided democracy was simply 
because education’s function was not run in parallel with the realisation of ‘society’s 
needs’, which was economic growth (Elder, 1987: 145). The first Pelita was launched in 
1969 with the focus on agricultural development. In 1968, a new curriculum was prepared 
by the government to replace the 1964 Pancawardana-inspired curriculum, a curriculum 
that emphasised the intensification of vocational training at the secondary level. A 
particular reform on teaching agriculture was proposed, though ended being kept on as a 
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long-term project. In return, the government generated extensive training of agricultural 
agents to assist 12 million small-holding families in food production (Kelabora, 1983). 
In addition, a campaign was organised to remove unapproved ideological content from 
work performed by the education bureaucracy. Suharto discharged all Prijono’s men 
because they were allegedly associated either with the PKI or Marxist ideology. During 
his presidency, he appointed two military officials as education ministers: Syarif Thayeb 
and Nugroho Notosusanto. The government obliged all public servants to be trained in 
the ideological comprehension of Pancasila. In 1971, Suharto established a government 
civil-servant association, the Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (KORPRI): all civil 
servants, including teachers, throughout the country were automatically registered as 
members. The organisation helped the regime to ensure the loyalty of its public service 
workers (MacDougall, 1982). In 1978, Minister of Education and Culture, Daoed Joesoef, 
imposed a policy restricting the political activity of university students, which was known 
as normalisasi kehidupan kampus (NKK) (Normalisation of Campus Life) and 
established a campus-based agency called Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (BKK) 
(Coordinating Body for Student Affairs). The policy outlawed the previously autonomous 
student councils and gave the university rector full authority to appoint and remove 
leaders of student organisations (Saunders, 1998). 
In 1973, the Indonesian government was blessed with a large oil financial bonanza and 
at the end of that year announced a school building program: SD INPRES or the 
Presidential Instruction Primary Schools. The program caused 31,000 primary schools to 
be built and 196,000 new teachers to be hired. In four years, school enrolment increased 
by 32 per cent, from 13.1 million to 17.3 million pupils in 1977. There were similar 
improvements in secondary school enrolments. The government had constructed 950 new 
junior and senior secondary schools, rehabilitated 2000 others, built 2000 school 
laboratories, and distributed 35 million textbooks and nearly 4 million library books. In 
addition, the government built 63 technical high schools, five technical training centres 
and 367 new vocational-school classrooms. Around 24,000 and 2300 new teachers had 
also been employed for junior secondary and senior secondary schools respectively: these 
developments helped to increase student enrolments. In 1977, junior secondary schools 
enrolled 2.34 million students, 66 per cent more than in 1971 when only 1.41 million 
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students were registered. Senior secondary school enrolments recorded a 68 per cent 
increase from 654,000 in 1971 to 1.1 million pupils in 1977 (Heneveld, 1979). 
Those impressive numbers were not matched with improved quality of education 
because drop-out rates remained high and the quality of teaching was still poor (Heneveld, 
1979). But these improvements did provide the New Order government with an important 
source of legitimation for its developmentalist doctrine. The New Order continued to gain 
huge popularity and, with the help of its military and bureaucratic support, won five 
consecutive elections. When the 1970s revolution ran on the legacy of old education 
governance template, the later period was the time for more bureaucratic consolidation. 
In the forty years since 1951, the authority for education had been divided between the 
central and regional governments, resulting in a complexity of management. The 
Education Department itself became the most dispersed institution with 27 provincial 
offices (Kanwil), 302 district and municipal offices (Kandep) and 3500 sub-district 
(Kancam) offices (King, 1998). These offices worked hand in hand with the already 
established local education dinas in the provinces (Dinas Tingkat I), in districts and 
municipalities (Dinas Tingkat II) and in sub-districts (Dinas Ranting) (King, 1998; Tilaar, 
1995). 
For the New Order, this complex bureaucracy helped the regime to keep control 
because both sets of government officials were fully under Jakarta’s command. Although 
the local offices of the education ministry belonged to that ministry, the provincial and 
district governments that ran their local education offices were supervised by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. The Local Government Act 5 of 1974 stated that whereas provincial 
governors are elected through consultation involving provincial parliament and the 
Minister of Home Affairs (MoHA), the district and municipal government heads were 
elected through consultative sessions at which the local parliament and the governor 
reached agreement. In much the same way that the president had authority to select a 
provincial governor from a list of gubernatorial candidates, the MoHA was authorised to 
select a regent or a mayor from a similar set of candidates. In practice, however, such 
processes were ceremonial only: the successful candidates were nominated from Jakarta. 
Suharto appointed many active military officials to become governors or district and 
municipal heads (Malo and Nas, 1991). 
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As Jackson argues, the New Order bureaucratic polity became the strong backbone of 
Suharto’s leadership because it was ideologically regimented and politically unified with 
no divergent loyalty (Jackson, 1978). Nonetheless, the bureaucracy was internally 
pluralist and, because ideology no longer mattered, the competition became politically 
and financially resource driven (Emmerson, 1983). In 1985, the MoEC released the plan 
to extend compulsory education from six to nine years over the next ten years. The 
department saw that the managerial duplication had thwarted its effort to enforce a more 
standardised and integrated governance. The decentralisation had allowed the regional 
governments to mishandle their authority. The department claimed that regional 
governments often reallocated the central government’s school subsidy to cover the dinas’ 
overhead cost so that many schools lacked adequate operational funds. In 1995, the head 
of the national civil servant council reported, in a parliamentary session in Jakarta, that 
many teachers were transferred by their local governments to administrative positions in 
unrelated portfolios, such as being appointed village heads and members of local 
parliaments while retaining their teaching salary (King, 1995). 
In 1989, the new National Education System Act 2 of 1989 was ratified, which met 
the MoEC’s desire to take full control of primary education, which had been traditionally 
administered by regional governments. The Act stated that the whole education system 
should be the minister of education’s responsibility (GoI, 1989). It removed provisions 
related to any involvement by subsidiary government administrations as had been 
previously arranged under (education) law 4 of 1950. In the following year, to implement 
the new Act’s mandate, the MoEC released the government regulations 28 of 1990 on 
Basic Education and 29 of 1990 on Secondary Education. Ordinance 28 of 1990 revoked 
all responsibilities previously attached to regional governments leaving only their 
ownership of land and buildings (GoI, 1990a). In one sense, the MoEC added to its 
established technical responsibilities all other administrative arrangements from teacher 
transfers to the practicalities of distributing school grants. Both ordinances also arranged 
for ministerial authority to extend to the school level. The ordinances proclaimed public 
school principals to be responsible to the minister on education management, school 
administration, personnel development and infrastructure utilisation (GoI, 1990a, 1990b). 
The result was that regional government offices of education (Dinas Pendidikan) lost 
their function because most of their responsibilities were transferred to the local offices 
of the central government’s ministerial representatives. 
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Nevertheless, the MoEC’s effort to recentralise met internal challenge, not from the 
regional governments, but rather from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) to whom 
all regional government heads paid loyalty. The issue became the source of tension 
between the two departments with no conclusive solution. The MoHA objected to the 
policy and claimed it was a setback to the government’s attempts to promote more 
extensive decentralisation to the districts and municipalities. They also argued that the 
retraction of responsibility would make local governments indifferent to the progress of 
education in their respective territories, which, in turn, would affect teachers’ welfare 
(King, 1995). The MoHA’s insistence was understandable; the department stood to lose 
one of its most important financial raisons d’être. The regional governments only 
contributed 0.23 per cent of the total primary education budget;  the major amount came 
from the central government disbursed through the MoHA (King, 1995). The MoHA 
would also lose its control over 1.41 million primary school teachers whose salaries were 
also distributed through the department (Tilaar, 1995). 
The central government also had to defer to the global pressure for decentralisation, 
which the World Bank described as a ‘make or break issue’ for the nation (Bjork, 2005). 
In 1994, this concession to decentralisation was released in the name of the local content 
curriculum (LCC). It was a revised version of the 1987 policy that had failed. Funded 
partly by loans from the Asian Development Bank and formulated under the leadership 
of an international consultant from the University of the Philippines, Evelina Vicencio, 
the 1994 policy version allowed a 20 per cent portion of the school curricula to be 
developed locally. In addition, the LCC would need to  be relevant to the needs of the 
local community and the local labour market, and had to be developed under the 
supervision of the regional offices of the MoEC (Bjork, 2005). As King (1998) argues, 
this turned out to be a symbolic concession; the MoEC officials retained their decisive 
role in accepting what was to be acceptable local content. Similarly, Bjork (2005) 
contends that the policy did not cause any change to the institutional culture of 
bureaucratic dependency among school personnel. 
In 1998, Suharto’s New Order regime collapsed after a series of economic and political 
crises. In response to extensive criticism of the over-centralised New Order regime, the 
new government, in 1999, launched a new decentralisation policy that extended 
autonomy to district and municipal governments. Following this, the MoEC reorganised 
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its structure, and abolished all its provincial, district and subdistrict representative offices. 
Schools were also given a degree of autonomy through a school-based management 
formula. In this sense, the MoEC retained its role in technical matters only and the MOHA 
was completely removed from any involvement in education administration. The latter 
institution only conducted supervision to general local government administrations with 
no more responsibility for leadership appointments. In 2005, local governments were 
given more autonomy when the system for electing local government heads was moved 
from parliament to the people. All of this reform effort brought significant changes to 
educational arrangements and the next chapter will discuss whether this reform has had 
an effect on larger institutional change. 
 
Conclusion 
Education decentralisation has been present in Indonesia throughout its history. However, 
the degree and characteristics of decentralisation have changed over time. If 
decentralisation can be broadly defined as autonomy in terms of freedom from control by 
the central state, then we can consider early religious education as one type of 
decentralisation. This was the form of radical decentralisation; the state was hardly 
involved in education. The mercantilist period in Indonesian history was a time of 
transition to state intervention as education started to be regulated, though the churches 
remained autonomous organisers. State involvement was limited because the state itself 
was not in the form of an official public institution but rather was represented in the form 
of a private organisation with economic and repressive military powers, the VOC. As the 
official state institution appeared in the form of the Netherlands Kingdom, education 
started to be state-regulated and the legitimacy of the religious authority was replaced. 
The state at this time was represented by the central administrative government in Batavia 
with the purpose of binding its people into one citizenship. But the first modern state for 
Indonesia had a race-based social structure, and education was made to support and 
maintain that structure. The administration was centralised in Batavia and paralleled the 
centralised model used in the Netherlands. Thanks to the late 19th century European 
liberal revolution, the colonial state of Indonesia adjusted accordingly by introducing a 
more humanist approach. The colonial government set out to make education available 
for all natives in all regions and the local administrations were involved in the 
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arrangement. However, the government failed to gain internal legitimacy for its education 
policies and practices because of the increasing nationalist sentiment among the natives. 
Pressed by the post-war global spirit of nation building and local aspirations of a 
multicultural nation, the new independent republican government resumed the 
decentralisation policy. The regional governments were authorised to manage the 
administrative matters of basic education, while the central kept the control over technical 
arrangements in addition to the control of higher education. To perform its technical 
function, the central government established representative offices at all subsidiary 
administrative levels. Hence, there was the duality of authority at the regional level, the 
representative offices of the central ministry and the local government-affiliated 
education offices. This became more complicated and bureaucratic as their coordination 
overlapped. The cold war influenced national ideological and political conflicts in the 
1950s and 1960s, which added to the complications and destructuration of education 
governance. The New Order government brought back the centralisation idea into 
practice in the late 1980s and strengthened the role of local representative offices of the 
MoEC. Along with the consolidated bureaucracy and a liberal economic approach, the 
New Order was successful in restructuring education. Tens of thousands of schools were 
built and student enrolment steadily increased. The New Order regime lasted more than 
three decades until 1998 when its legitimacy crumbled from the pressure of a new 
institutional environment: the wave of democratisation. This gave decentralisation a new 
setting. 
 
 

 Chapter III  
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
Introduction 
Educational decentralisation has been a buzzword for the past three decades. The term 
arose for one of the central themes of education reform movements spreading around the 
world. Nowadays, not only have such decentralisation movements become more strongly 
entrenched in traditionally decentralised education systems, such as the USA and 
Australia, but they also have transformed the giant centralised systems of China and some 
Latin America countries (Arnove et al., 2012; Mok, 2003; Winkler and Gershberg, 2000). 
Many scholars have proposed that globalisation is responsible for this diffusion of 
educational decentralisation. Globalisation theorists believe that as the world is 
increasingly tending to become borderless, and as time and space are gradually 
compressed, the convergence and integration of world culture is inevitable (Luhmann, 
1997; Meyer, 2000). Among the profound manifestations of this convergence has been 
the integration of global economic systems and the increasing trend to political 
unilateralism. These factors have affected education systems quite extensively.  
McGinn (1997), for instance, suggests that the proposal of educational decentralisation 
has been propounded since the late 1950s by the World Bank as a model for global 
education governance reform. The efforts to decentralise education was in line with the 
greater transformation in economic modes of production from being centralised (Fordism) 
to more decentralised, localised and flexible (post-Fordism). However, McGinn 
concludes that the adjustment to this global pressure has been overemphasised so that 
decentralisation reform has had a little effect only to improve education in practice. 
Carnoy (2000) also highlights that the result of educational reform campaigns by 
international institutions like the World Bank is not consistent with the claimed benefits. 
After billion dollars of loan, poorer countries are still not able to avoid inequality of 
opportunity nor the debt trap, and education reforms founded on market competition 
create greater school stratification and allow education inequality for children from 
different social backgrounds (Carnoy, 2000). 
However, such political and economic determinism misses the point that most policies 
are designed with many ambitious objectives and programs in a response to what 
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policymakers define as problems; the education sector is no exception. It may be true that 
the massive neoliberal programs of economic reform that are promoted by the World 
Bank and the IMF have contributed to the expansion of decentralisation, but this is not 
necessarily the only reason why nations decentralise their administrative systems. As well 
as that global market theory, it has also been theorised, for example, that educational 
decentralisation might be justified as a way to give local teachers more autonomy in 
decision-making away from bureaucratic intervention. This is to counter the effects of 
poor bureaucratic performance and at the same time rejuvenate teachers’ professional 
identity (Murillo, 1999; Sachs, 2001; Wong, 2006). In addition, it has been proposed that 
educational decentralisation is a way to involve local communities and parents in 
education policy-making. This is not only to give parents their right to have information 
and to contribute to their children’s education, but also to reinforce the prevailing ideals 
of democracy (Gandin and Apple, 2002; Hanson, 1995; Plank and Boyd, 1994). 
Hence, what matters in this context is beyond globalisation and its deterministic 
political and economic effects. What makes decentralisation legitimate in global and local 
contexts is the most important matter. In the Indonesian case, the reform to 
decentralisation was preceded not only by pressure from global economic institutions but, 
more importantly, by the internal aspirations for democracy and the crisis of state 
legitimacy. These have resulted in a more ambitious reform program covering a wide 
range of ideals: market competitiveness and efficiency, democratic participation, and 
professional autonomy. From the Indonesian policymakers’ point of view, the 
accommodation of these ideals not only reflects the coverage of current education 
problems, but also gives the reform a much stronger legitimacy. Sociological theorists 
who study organisational behaviour have been long concerned with ‘a mechanism by 
which organisational structures, policies, and practices acquire social legitimacy and 
ultimately become taken-for-granted as normatively appropriate in the population’ 
(Davies and Guppy, 1997). The mechanism is usually referred to as institutionalisation. 
The institutional theorists believe that shared practices, as in educational decentralisation, 
are constructed through one or more institutional pressures. Different sources of pressure 
lead to different practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
I follow this institutional perspective in seeing how an ambitious program of 
educational decentralisation has been carried out in Indonesia. To some extent, the 
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political and economic perspective of globalisation does explain the case in the way that 
the educational decentralisation was initiated following the influence of the World Bank 
and the IMF. However, either the principles elaborated in the policy or the routine 
implementation reflects that the educational decentralisation program is constructed on 
the basis of more contradictory institutional pressures. In this sense, educational 
decentralisation takes its legitimation not only from the global economic pressure, but 
also from the local dynamics of democracy, the ascendancy of professional values, and, 
last but not least, the remaining interests of the state’s significant role. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Initially, it presents the theoretical debate on 
educational decentralisation and how this is treated in Indonesian academic literature. 
This is followed by an explication of institutional theory and some conceptual disputes 
within the theory. Lastly, I return to the discourse of educational decentralisation by 
showing how some conceptual constructs of the institutional theory are applied to assess 
the problem of decentralisation in global, national and local contexts.  
 
Decentralisation and Educational Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is much debated. The debates range from extreme denial of centralism 
to the elusive language of centralisation and from the territorial transfer of authority from 
the central to subsidiary government organisations and schools, to the functional 
movement from deferring to the state’s authority to that of market forces. To 
accommodate such variation, a number of scholars have suggested particular categories 
to distinguish one perspective from another. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) propose 
classical categories of de-concentration, delegation, devolution, privatisation and de-
bureaucratisation. Smith (1985) adds other categories: deregulation and autonomy. All 
these categories reflect the continuum of authority from central to local; from centre to 
periphery; from highly bureaucratised to less or non-bureaucratised; and from strictly 
regulated to loosely-controlled. We can argue from Rondinelli’s classic classification that 
while absolute centralisation concentrates all or most decision-making authority in the 
hands of parallel central government organisations; de-concentration is the distribution 
of responsibilities and administrative authority to subordinate organisations within central 
government ministries or agencies. In contrast, delegation is the transfer of responsibility 
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to more autonomous sub-national or local government organisations away from central 
control although still accountable to it. Here the degree of autonomy is higher than that 
of the de-concentration. Meanwhile, devolution provides much greater autonomy to those 
local government organisations because they enjoy full authority and power over the 
mandated policy. Finally, privatisation works beyond territorial classification, which can 
be defined as the handing over of some functions to other non-government organisations, 
usually to avoid a complex bureaucratic burden. To this extent, decentralisation might 
also be associated with de-bureaucratisation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). 
The remaining question with this continuum is whether the range from centralisation 
to decentralisation does reflect the gradual reduction of authority from the central state 
on the one hand and the corresponding increase in the authority of local or other 
organisations on the other. Most scholars propose the ‘yes’ answer. Oates (1993), for 
instance, suggests that decentralisation will reduce government size in that its intervention, 
in particular decentralised fields, would be restricted. Yarrow and colleagues show that 
the UK’s massive privatisation program during the 1980s reduced government 
involvement in enterprise decision-making (Yarrow et al., 1986). However, the question 
is that when governments or states know that decentralisation will reduce their power and 
authority, why then do they continue? To discuss the question we have to know why states 
seek to decentralise. 
Conyers observes that the objectives of decentralisation have been trapped in three 
contradictions: managerial versus political, top-down versus bottom-up and explicit 
versus implicit. It is always evident that the managerial aspect becomes part of the 
explicitly stated objectives, whereas the political objectives are almost always unstated 
(Conyers, 1984). What is explicated in the policy documents with respect to the objectives 
of decentralisation are improved administrative efficiency, increased system 
effectiveness and increased local participation (McGinn and Street, 1986). Yet, more 
political motives, such as power distribution among government hierarchies and among 
particular interest groups, are commonly unstated (Conyers, 1984). However, noting 
those explicit motives, McGinn and Street argue that the first two motives, which are 
moved by the over complicated bureaucracy and the failure of central planning, do 
indicate a demand to recover and maintain the competence of the central state rather than 
distributing the power. In this respect, increased local participation is only instrumental 
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for the first two motives. Local participation helps the central government increase its 
effectiveness and efficiency (McGinn and Street, 1986). 
In this sense, McGinn and Street offer another perspective to decentralisation, seeing 
it as not the distribution of power but the shift of the locus of power. Against the 
perception of seeing government as a monolithic political system standing apart from 
other non-governmental groups or individual interests, they contend that the government 
is instead ‘a complex system of competing groups or factions whose members are both 
within the government and external to it’ (McGinn and Street, 1986: 473). Hence, 
decentralisation is the way the government reconsolidates itself among the competing 
group interests. Depending on the context, this consolidation might be achieved by 
shifting power from central to local governments, from one central institution to another 
or even from government to the private sector. Therefore, when decentralisation is 
expected to increase participation, it does not mean participation of all individuals but of 
particular individuals or groups (McGinn and Street, 1986). This analysis helps us to 
understand why some decentralisation reforms fail and why some established powers 
within government are not resistant to the change. The reforms fail not because they are 
not implemented but mostly because they are resisted internally. As long as powerful 
groups see that decentralisation does not seek to change the balance of power so that their 
established status is not undermined, there will be no resistance. 
Educational decentralisation follows the logic of this wider debate on decentralisation. 
Despite the high expectations of decentralisation, many scholars have demonstrated that 
at least the continuum has never worked in one way, that is, from centralisation to 
decentralisation. Weiler’s study has proven that there is always a tension between 
decentralisation efforts and the need for central control (Weiler, 1990). Rarely does 
decentralisation policy produce a decentralised system. Rather, many decentralisation 
attempts are instead absorbed into existing centralised and semi-centralised structures of 
education governance. He contends that the argument of power redistribution for 
decentralisation is incompatible with the interests of the modern state in maintaining 
effective control. As such, the argument of improving efficiency seems irrational 
considering that the reform would generate a costly expansion of resources, particularly 
for local government. Weiler then offers a fascinating thesis of compensatory legitimation 
as the motive behind educational decentralisation. Decentralisation is a strategy to 
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camouflage the state’s effort to repair its eroded legitimation because of its distance from 
the basis of the political system, its inefficient bureaucracy and its structural inability to 
attend to variations of social, cultural, geographical and economic background of the 
society. Thus, decentralisation is not about giving authority to the local or non-
governmental actors but about ‘appearing to be committed to decentralisation and thus 
reaping the benefits in legitimation to be derived from that appearance’ (Weiler, 1990: 
442). 
Consistent with Weiler’s view is Karlsen’s conception of ‘decentralized centralism’ 
(Karlsen, 2000). Karlsen analyses the dynamics between centralisation and 
decentralisation in education policy reform in four areas: initiative, content, level and 
simultaneity. However, all of these dynamics are anchored in the idea of central control. 
Considering the area of initiative, Karlsen suggests that although some decentralisation 
reforms resulted from the bargaining between central and local institutions, they 
eventually serve central interests. The decentralisation of power to local institutions is 
also making these institutions responsible for implementing central goals. As such, the 
dynamic of content shows that giving freedom of curriculum design to the local authority 
would legitimate greater efforts of standardisation by the central authority. However, 
Karlsen’s analysis of the dynamic of levels and simultaneity leads to a more interesting 
question about the possibility of multiple centres and how to deal with the contradiction 
that arises. He suggests that in educational decentralisation, either central or local 
government can perform the role of the centre in relation to schools. On the other hand, 
local government and schools can be on the periphery from the central government’s 
perspective. The problem arises when these various centres come with different or 
contradictory regulations. This is what he calls the dynamic of simultaneity, which is 
when ‘centralisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ clash. He found this dilemma in the case of 
the Norway and British Columbia decentralisation reforms when the central policy of 
management by objective (MbO), which allows the central government’s control over 
school management, meets the new independent school Act, an Act that enables local 
schools to be run independently. To this problem Karlsen suggests that the stronger 
authority of the central government will promote accommodation to both interests 
(Karlsen, 2000). 
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Nevertheless, the problem of multiple centralities lies not only in how the conflict 
between these centres is settled, but also in the way these powerful institutions, whether 
in conflict or collaboration, overcome local interests. Thus, what is to be expected from 
decentralisation is not the distribution of authority to a different level of government but 
the expansion of state ideas and practices into the decentralised units. In Indonesia, the 
possibility for that kind of decentralisation is large because of the nature of political 
decentralisation as the mother of the decentralisation policy in general, and educational 
decentralisation in particular. The following part of this chapter will discuss this issue in 
greater depth. 
 
Educational Decentralisation in Indonesian Literature 
Indonesian educational decentralisation can hardly stand alone as an exclusive reform. It 
is strongly linked to wider political reform and, in particular, to political decentralisation. 
Major studies saw this political decentralisation as one of the greatest achievements of 
the reforms after the collapse of the New Order’s authoritarian and centralised regime in 
the late 1990s. In this sense, decentralisation is the antithesis of the previous governance 
style. The more the central state decreases its power, the further the new government 
moves from its predecessor. Many studies have paid much attention to political 
decentralisation; little has been paid to educational decentralisation. Although studies of 
political decentralisation have expanded their discourse from merely technical issues to 
further theoretical debates (e.g. Hadiz, 2004; Sidel, 2011; Ufen, 2008), major writing on 
Indonesian educational decentralisation falls into policy assessment or pedagogical 
concerns (e.g. Bandur, 2009; Bjork, 2005; Jalal et al., 2009; Kristiansen and Pratikno, 
2006; Sumintono, 2006). Most of these assessments claim that, even though the 
institutional arrangement of democratic and autonomous governance has been set up, the 
substantial goals of this arrangement are still far away. In other words, the discrepancy 
between policy intention and implementation remains an essential concern. There are a 
number of empirical studies worth reviewing in this thesis. 
Bjork’s anthropological study of the responses of school communities to the 
implementation of the local content curriculum policy constitutes one of the most 
important and influential sources for Indonesian educational decentralisation study (Bjork, 
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2005, 2006a). Based on ethnographic studies in several junior secondary schools in East 
Java and interviews with central government officials, the study suggests that 
decentralisation has not gone very far in schools because the local stakeholders, that is, 
teachers and parents, keep to the old cultural mindset of bureaucratic dependency. Many 
teachers tend to become obedient civil servants rather than innovative and autonomous 
professionals, most parents interpret ‘participation’ as making a financial contribution 
rather than sharing opinions, knowledge and skills. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
despite its decentralisation initiative, central bureaucracy is not willing to move on from 
its centralist culture  (Bjork, 2005, 2006a). However, this centralist culture is plausible 
because the study was conducted during the New Order’s reign when the central 
government structure vastly expanded and was still powerful.   
Another study is by Sumintono (2006), who particularly analyses the practice of 
Indonesian school-based management policy (SBM) two years after its official enactment. 
Using the cases of several state secondary schools in Mataram city, the study concludes 
that the policy failed to be locally sensitive. Its tendency to impose a uniform model of 
SBM regardless of the variety of Indonesian schools in term of size, location, type of 
community and public–private distinction, has to some extent put itself out of context 
(Sumintono, 2006). In the case of private schools, Bangay’s study (2005) asserts that the 
government concept of SBM could not be applied to private schools because their 
principals usually have very little to do with school finances and long term planning. This 
kind of authority normally belongs to the patron organisation, called yayasan (Bangay, 
2005). A recent nationwide policy study by Chen (2011), which involves around 400 
public primary schools in Indonesia, has, to a small extent, confirmed the inertia thesis. 
He found that after a decade of reform, parental participation is still in limited 
administrative areas, such as with school facilities, financial contributions and community 
relations. In addition, despite the promotion of more professional control of schools in 
the hands of principals and teachers, the system cannot move from typical governmental 
top-down supervision and monitoring (Chen, 2011). 
Nevertheless, at the local government level, some studies have shown that the inertia 
is not absolute. The study by Kristiansen and Pratikno (2006) concludes that corruption 
and accountability remain the crucial issues at the local government level. However, they 
argue that some local governments have initiated their own education policies, although 
	 	 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
55 
in a trivial manner. The Kutai Kartanegara district, for instance, has what they call a 
‘bottom-up’ program. The program allocates IDR2 billion per village per year 
(approximately USD 200,000), 30 per cent of which is supposed to be used for improving 
local human resources, for example, by awarding scholarships for university study. The 
Bantul district is another case. The government has introduced what they call the 
Babonisasi program. Through the program, every child is given a chicken (babon) to take 
care of. The children benefit by eating the eggs.  Their nutrition improves and so too does 
their ability to concentrate in school (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 2006). Furthermore, what 
concerns many scholars about local government dynamics is that political 
decentralisation has gone beyond the issue of educational decentralisation. Adopting 
Karlsen’s terminology, Sumintono (2006) labels this tendency as a decentralised 
centralism. It means that the lack of institutional capacity at the school level has led local 
governments to become the new centres. As result, education arrangements at the schools 
are highly sensitive to government intervention and its political dynamics (Sumintono, 
2006). Bandur’s study in East Nusa Tenggara found strong intervention from the district 
government in the provision of school textbooks (Bandur, 2009). As such, Amirrachman 
and colleagues show how the ongoing factional politics that segregates governmental 
institutions in the Bintang district has influenced the politics at school level 
(Amirrachman et al., 2008). 
School and government level analyses equally suggest the substantial inertia of 
Indonesian educational decentralisation. There have been many other studies of technical 
policy that critically examine the implementation of this program through more specific 
variables (for example by the World Bank, USAID, UNESCO etc.). Despite their 
importance, what can be argued of these studies is twofold. First, all changes need process, 
and different entities possess a different capacity to go with the process. Over time, the 
Indonesian government has been continuously improving its policy to adjust to current 
dynamics. To cope with teacher problems, as Bjork has noted above, in 2007 the 
government launched a teacher professionalisation program, which enabled  teachers to 
have a better income and thus improve their performance (Chang et al., 2013). Hence, 
while overlooking the natural process of change, these technical policy studies fall into 
what might be classed as micro-events analysis and fail to identify the broader pattern of 
change. A much more recent study by Rosser and Sulistiyanto (2013) helps to fill this 
gap. Drawing upon the case of a universal, free, basic education policy, they show how a 
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local education policy becomes, potentially, a more politicised matter. In this sense, banal 
education programs are used to buy popular support for the sake of local incumbent 
politicians (Rosser and Sulistiyanto, 2013). However, the study lacks an analysis of the 
underlying forces constituting such patterns. 
Second, most studies are too deeply concerned with the technical problems of 
educational decentralisation or greater political decentralisation and fail to recognise the 
contribution of any external pressure. Because the Indonesian education system is 
nationally integrated and globally influenced, the way the educational decentralisation 
policy is adopted should follow particular established external references. Numerous 
studies on Indonesian democratisation exemplify how this gap could be filled. Hadiz 
(2003), for instance, proposes the influence of global neoliberal institutions and local 
predatory elites in the making of decentralisation policy and directing its course. Aspinall 
(2013) traces the origin of Indonesian political fragmentation back to the pervasiveness 
of a patronage culture and the country’s gradual engagement with broader neoliberal 
models of economic, social and cultural life. Although this kind of institutional analysis 
has also been replicated in educational policy studies globally, it is almost negligible in 
the Indonesian case. Studies of education policy in Indonesia, particularly for the K–12 
school sector, have been long dominated by pedagogical and administrative discourses. 
This thesis embarks on the idea that education policy is socially constructed. There 
should be a number of external forces that shape and drive its course. Those pressures 
might take the form of entities like government policy, political contestation, economic 
development or exemplary individuals and organisations. Likewise, they might also 
emerge as a particular mental conduct that possesses regulative, normative or cognitive 
capacities to govern social action. Those pressures will inevitably give particular values 
and affect the way a specific policy is carried out. In this sense, although the dynamics of 
political reform and regional autonomy have been implied as being important material 
pressure for educational decentralisation, it seems that symbolic institutions are absent 
from analysis or at least not clearly elaborated. In another part of this chapter, I will 
discuss how institutional analysis could be used to deal with this problem. As a 
combination of material and symbolic entities, it is argued that institutions serve as 
external pressure to influence social action at individual, organisational, or societal levels. 
The problem of Indonesian educational decentralisation could be analysed in this manner.  
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Assessing Theoretical Arguments on Globalisation and its Relevance to the 
Worldwide Expansion of Educational Decentralisation 
Globalisation is a fuzzy, never-endingly contested concept. Theoretical debates over time 
have shifted across the boundaries of many disciplines and have varied in diverse ways. 
The structuralists see globalisation as either the extensiveness or compression of the 
material world across national borders, disembedding people from their localities and 
making them interconnected with each other (Giddens, 2002). Systems theorists perceive 
globalisation as a system that creates a great distinction between powerful centres and 
powerless peripherals or as the medium of a networked society facilitated by hegemonic 
capitalist institutions (Castells, 2000; Wallerstein, 2004). In the meantime, cultural 
arguments treat globalisation as ‘glocalisation’, that is, the duality of the global and the 
local, between the objective process of material world compression and the subjective 
process of consciousness intensification (Robertson, 1995). Globalisation might affect 
education in terms of how national education adjusts to global education models; a 
distinction between globally standardised and other education systems; or a dialectic 
between local and global influences on education governance (Popkewitz, 2000; Rhoten, 
2000). 
In our discussion of educational decentralisation, the most fundamental question to ask 
is what drives global educational decentralisation and how does it work. The answer to 
such questions has been prevalent: the trend of education reform is commonly grounded 
on economic matters. All education policy documents, produced by international or by 
national bodies, cite economic reasons as the major argument for educational reform. It 
is the economic forces or economic demands that motivate policymakers and parents to 
educate their children. It is argued that national policymakers see the need to ensure that 
their country is strong economically by investing in education for their people. Parents 
are motivated to educate their children to assure their social wellbeing. Such liberal 
arguments have dominated the discourse of education over time. Currently, as Peter 
Drucker (2011) says, we are living in post-capitalist society. ‘The basic economic 
resource … is no longer capital, nor natural resources … nor labour. It is and will be 
knowledge’ (Drucker, 2011: 7). Economic organisation has also been transformed, 
adopting the new post-Fordist mechanism in which the service economy has replaced the 
old economy based on manufacturing industries. It means that low-skilled workers will 
increasingly have fewer opportunities for employment, leaving places only for educated, 
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high-skilled professionals. The fluid characteristic of this new economy makes it easily 
to disperse and to affect the system and structure of the global economy (Amin, 2011; 
Brown and Lauder, 1992; Carter, 1997). 
These facts, therefore, challenge the education system to change, not only its 
curriculum, but also its goals and organisational structure. In this sense, the mutual goals 
of economics and of education are equity and efficiency. This suggests that the 
development of education should be directed to the market ends (McNamara, 2007). More 
realistically, McNamara (2007) stresses that there are two structural realities that 
education policy must face: world market integration and the strong role of international 
institutions. These two realities have led education policy to a global similarity. The 
economic and financial effects that globalisation, supported by those two structural 
realities, will further weaken central governments. On the one hand, supranational 
organisations might reduce national sovereignty; on the other, however, a shift to market-
based decision-making will strengthen local groups. It has become more difficult for 
governments to find the funds for social programs (Welsh and McGinn, 1999). In this 
regard, for all public sectors, including education, the decentralisation of decision-making 
authority would be the only effective governance model that fits such a world economic 
reality. Decentralisation might be conducive to incentive, competition and increased 
quality in education. In addition, through decentralised management, the democratic 
participation of NGOs and local communities would emerge and the accountable 
governance could be maintained (Jones, 2007). 
Against all liberal arguments, critical educational theorists argue that the economic 
globalisation, along with its consequences for education, is more ideological rather than 
theoretical. Historically, they argue, neoliberal economic projects emerged in the initial 
period of neoconservative ascendancy, particularly in USA politics in the 1980s. It was 
in the early years of the Reagan administration that the IMF–World Bank structural 
adjustment program was first launched to encourage the global market ideology into the 
state governance of developing countries’ (Torres, 2009). The program was a loan 
package to assist countries with debt problems. Institutional reforms, including those in 
the education sector, became a major condition for financial help along with public 
spending reduction, price control elimination, domestic to world price adjustment, and 
social service privatisation. The program was intended to adjust developing countries to 
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external shocks, to mobilise the resources needed to develop under new world economic 
conditions and to allocate resources more efficiently. However, as some research has 
confirmed, the program has been identified with increased poverty, greater inequality of 
income and slow economic growth (Carnoy et al., 1999). In addition, critical theorists 
claim that the global NGO boom since the 1990s has not been continued by deliberate 
local initiatives or other voluntary activities. It was rather a donor-driven expansion or 
the pragmatic response to foreign aid overflow in many developing nations (Edwards and 
Hulme, 1996). 
Another advocate of the critical perspective, Michael Apple (2006a), proposes that 
such inequality is rooted in the nature of the market economy itself. With privatisation, 
education is transformed to be considered in the same way as commercial goods and 
commodities whose purchase is subject to individual economic power. This 
commercialisation will also affect how the idea of democracy is realised. Neoliberalism 
has altered democracy from its ‘thick’ version suited to inclusive communities to a ‘thin’ 
version, in a way analogous to the exclusive shopping malls that are open to the public 
(Apple, 2006a), meaning that real participation in democratic governance can take place 
in those exclusive spaces only, preventing common people from taking part. In this sense, 
educational decentralisation is regarded as the new managerialism, that is, the incursion 
of business models into the organisation of education. It provides new opportunities for 
state bureaucrats to be high-salaried, middle-class professionals (Apple, 2006a). In this 
model of governance, so-called community participation is much more motivated by 
individual customer interests than the fulfilment of shared community goals. 
It might be true that the market economy has become the engine of globalisation in all 
sectors and poses some big challenges to the tasks of national governments. However, in 
the real world, such an influence does not have effects as dramatic as has been imagined. 
In our daily life, the nation-states are legitimate organisations and governments still run 
their prescribed courses. In the most prosperous nations or in the poorest, organisations 
of government survive and show mostly similar structures. They have their own economic 
and education systems that may be different but share particular trends. More important, 
those nations do possess different social and cultural traditions, but particular internalised 
and shared mechanisms have made them able to communicate and understand each other 
in a world society. Even before the rise of neoliberal projects in the 1980s, mass education 
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across the globe had shown similarity in terms of enrolment trends, centralised control by 
the ministries of education as the authoritative bodies, particular curricular content and 
age-based class systems. The shared recognition of rationality as modern norms has led 
to the emergence of the rationalised institution or standardised models to which all 
modern organisations would refer. This kind of argument can be traced to the works of 
American sociologists like John W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, John Boli, W. Richard 
Scott and others who claim to be institutional theorists (Baker and LeTendre, 2005; Meyer, 
2000; Ramirez and Boli, 1987)  
Hence, in shaping the global expansion of educational decentralisation, economic 
globalisation must combine with another process called institutional globalisation, that is, 
‘the convergence of formal institutions within and across nations toward similar goals 
and operating structures’ (Astiz et al., 2002: 67). Educational decentralisation transforms 
to become a worldwide legitimate institutional model, shaping the similarity of global 
educational governance. It is adopted by a good number of countries, regardless of their 
political and economic systems and their social and cultural settings. The following part 
will discuss what the new institutional theory has offered to analyse the problem of 
educational decentralisation both as a global movement and as a local practice. 
 
Dancing with Legitimacy: the Institutional Perspective of Educational 
Decentralisation 
Drawing on  Berger and Luckman’s constructivist sociology, institutional theory has its 
central thesis that social order is fundamentally based on a shared social reality, which is 
constructed through social interaction, called institutionalisation. Such a process has three 
stages: when we and others take action (externalisation), then translate such action into 
categories that make us able to respond in a similar fashion so that it becomes an external 
reality separate from ourselves (objectivation) and internalise the objectivated world to 
determine the subjective structure of our consciousness (internalisation) (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1991; Scott, 1987b). This process implies that there are particular institutions 
that reconstitute and frame human actions because of their function as legitimating rules. 
Subsequently, the reference to those institutional rules would lead to some similarities 
and patterns of action. Institutions are not instantaneously constructed, yet they spring up 
through the course of shared historical experiences (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). 
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Rising in the 1970s as a critique of the rational choice and resource dependency 
theories, the sociological institutional theory adopted the constructivist perspective in 
analysing organisational behaviour. For the institutionalists, organisational structures do 
not reflect the exchange rationality of its individual actor interests nor do they depend on 
the resources available within organisations. Rather, they are constructed from their 
external environment by dominating institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987b). These institutions are cognitive, normative and 
regulative, carried out through the interaction of cultures, structures and routines (Scott, 
2008). They emanate from the shared historical process of socialisation that then becomes 
taken-for-granted  and rulelike entities. They define what is and what is not an 
organisation either by means of individuals’ perceived logic of how is it supposed to look 
(cognitive), their shared values on what are the ideal goals it should achieve (normative), 
or restrictive rules on what function  each one makes within the structure (regulative). 
At the heart of this process is the idea of legitimation. Suchman (1995) differentiates 
the strategic from institutional legitimacy. The former serves as an operational resource 
the organisation takes selectively from its cultural environment and employs it in the 
pursuit of its goals, the latter serves as a set of constitutive beliefs that ‘construct and 
penetrate the organisation in every aspect’ (Suchman, 1995: 576). So, rather than 
adopting it selectively, this external institution defines how the organisation is built, run, 
understood and even evaluated. From an organisation’s perspective, the conformity to its 
external environment is critical for its survival. It has to make itself recognisable by the 
general population and in doing so it has to abide by the rules held by this population. 
Once undertaken, organisations will have the legitimacy to run their activities. Hence, 
‘legitimacy and institutionalisation are virtually synonymous’ (Suchman, 1995: 576). It 
means that the whole process of institutionalisation is the process of dancing with 
legitimacy. The question now is how this institutional legitimacy is obtained, preserved, 
and socialised in organisational life. There are three key concepts that have been 
developed within the tradition of institutional theory to elaborate this process: isomorphic 
pressure, decoupling, and structuration-destructuration. 
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Isomorphic Pressure 
As stated earlier, to garner legitimacy, an organisation must conform to its external 
institutional environment. Because of its legitimating power, the pressure of the 
institutional environment would lead to similar practices among the organisational 
population, which is called as isomorphic pressure. This latter concept has been popularly 
used in a wide array of analyses, including in analysing globalisation. Meyer and 
colleagues use the concept to develop a world culture theory contending that the modern 
world system would reach a point of convergence and build a world model by 
internalising particular shared rationalised myths (Meyer, 2010; Meyer, et al., 1997), that 
is, a shared truth whose foundation is built on the ‘rationalised and impersonal 
prescriptions’ as well as ‘taken for granted norms’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Their 
arguments originate from a Weberian concept of rationalisation (particularly in the 
institutional form of bureaucracy and the modern nation-state), which continuously 
shapes the way the modern societies organise and interact with each other. 
They use the theory to explain the global expansion of mass education and the 
similarity of global education governance. They argue that such an expansion is urelated 
to the political or economic development of each nation-state (Meyer et al., 1977; Meyer 
et al., 1992), but rather with the institutionalised myth of the nation-state and education 
as the means to produce rational individuals, which legitimate their full membership in 
the new nation-state (Boli et al., 1985; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). This expansion had also 
come with the isomorphic revolution that affected the configuration of educational 
governance. It drove global nations to share similar governing characteristics, ranging 
from legislation for compulsory education, the establishment of the ministry of education 
as a national education authority, the acceptance of age-based schooling as a single model 
of state education (Boli et.al., 1985; Ramirez and Boli, 1987; Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal, 
1992) and even the adoption of particular subjects in school curricula (Benavot and 
Kamens, 1989). 
Using a similar line of argument, the new generation of institutional theorists,  for 
instance, Baker, Wiseman, Astiz and LeTendre also explain the global expansion of 
educational decentralisation. According to them, world education governance has 
undergone ‘a devolution revolution’ because of the combined pressure of economic and 
institutional globalisation. Economic globalisation is characterised by the intensification 
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of the global market system that forces nation-state education systems to adopt more 
efficient governance. Meanwhile, institutional globalisation is a result of global 
rationalisation, which leads the world-system toward a uniform model of polity (Astiz, et 
al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005). This duality of the economic and institutional is supported 
by global ‘isomorphic actors’ that create standardised models and recipes, and such actors 
are the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and UNESCO so that nation-states around the 
globe follow (Astiz, et al., 2002; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). To this extent, 
decentralisation has become a new rationalised myth. Its goals, such as to lessen financial 
burdens, create organisational effectiveness, improve pedagogical performance and 
promote democracy, have been rationalised as the policy ideals and it is believed that any 
nation decentralising its education governance would arrive at such positions (Derqui, 
2001; Hentic and Bernier, 1999; Rondinelli, 1980; World Bank, 2000). 
Some case studies of the education reform movement have been developed that rely 
on this line of argument. The education reform movement is seen as the change of the 
institutional environment in which the nation-state is no longer the dominant institutional 
actor. Davies and Guppy (1997) propose that the institutional convergence of economic 
globalisation and global rationalisation has driven isomorphic characteristics of education 
reform in Anglo–American nations: Canada, the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Similarly, drawing from the case of the Michigan public 
school reform, Lubienski (2005) highlights the globalisation of marketised environments 
as the condition for the emergence of competitive-oriented reform at the local arena. The 
marketised environment argument is also found in De Boer and colleagues’ analysis of 
the transformation of Dutch higher education organisations. They argue that its 
institutional pressure has changed the organisations from being state institutions to 
become ‘corporate actors’ (De Boer et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, institutional analysis has been widely criticised for its lack of agency. 
Some of its theorists argue that the agency or actorhood of the theory is embedded in the 
way the institutional environment leads to any consequential action (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Meyer, 2010). Nevertheless, the problem of agency within the theory can be relatively 
mediated through the DiMaggio and Powell (1983) classification of three pressure 
mechanisms, as well as Scott and colleagues (2000) classification of three components of 
the institutional environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three mechanisms 
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through which the institutional pressure drives the isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic 
and normative. Coercive isomorphism takes place as organisations get formal and 
informal pressure from more dominant organisations on which they are dependent. 
Coercive pressure also results from cultural expectations within the societal context in 
which those organisations exist. Mimetic isomorphism usually emerges in a situation of 
uncertainty so that modelling, using other organisations’ examples, becomes the most 
strategic option. A best practice experienced by an organisation may become an 
institutional pressure for others to adopt. The democratic governance that has been 
successfully adopted in Western countries may hold powerful legitimation to influence 
other countries to adopt it. In addition to the two, the isomorphic pressure may arise from 
normative discourses offered by professional communities. 
Meanwhile, Scott and colleagues introduce three components of institutional 
environments: institutional logics, institutional actors, and the governance system (Scott, 
et al., 2000). Institutional logics are the socially constructed historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space and provide meaning to 
their social reality (Thornton et al., 2012). Although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have 
introduced the state and the profession as two legitimating institutions, Friedland and 
Alford (1991) propose entities like the state, the market or capitalism, religion, democracy 
and family as important institutional logics in modern society. They elaborate: 
 
The institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation and the commodification of 
human activity. That of the state is rationalisation and the regulation of human 
activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies. That of democracy is participation 
and the extension of legal and popular control over human activity. That of family 
is community and the motivation of human activity by unconditional loyalty to its 
members and their reproductive needs (p. 248). 
 
Furthermore, institutional actors are either organisations or individuals that create, carry 
and promote the institutional logics: universities (profession), government (state), and the 
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private sector (market). However, in highly complex modern society, one institutional 
actor can carry multiple institutional logics. Private Catholic schools, for instance, can be 
associated with the carriers of market and religion institutions (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). Moreover, governance systems are ‘those arrangements which support the 
regularised control—whether by regimes created by mutual agreement, by legitimate 
hierarchical authority or by non-legitimate coercive means—of the actions of one set of 
actors by another’ (Scott, et al., 2000: 21). 
The pressures for countries to adopt the reform strategies might play along with the 
combination of mode and component scenarios. First, education reform might embark on 
the support of global multilateral agencies as its institutional actors, like the World Bank 
and IMF, as part of financial aid conditions (coercive). This has been particularly the case 
with reform in many developing nations and it was evident that from 1992 to 1997 around 
12 per cent of the World Bank’s total budget was allotted for education reform (Bjork, 
2006b; Jones, 2007). The institutional logics introduced by these institutional actors can 
be market and democracy. As Rhoten (2000) argues, the approach the World Bank has 
been adopting in their sponsorship of educational decentralisation reform in the 
developing countries has shifted from neoliberal, market-based reform since the 1970s to 
democratisation since the late 1990s. In addition, state regulations or interest group 
expectations might also become the source of coercive pressure for the implementation 
of educational decentralisation. Many education reforms in South American countries 
were preceded by greater political movement to democracy and a market economy (Hall, 
2003; Torres, 2002). Carolan’s (2007) study of  the New York City’s Department of 
Education reform reveals the role of coercive pressure from the local elite business 
community. 
Second, the source of isomorphic pressure is also likely to come from the justification 
of professional academic discourses (normative). The discourses are disseminated by 
academic institutions and research centres through publications, conferences and media 
opinions. By the 1990s, education reform gained worldwide prominence as an academic 
discourse and thousands of papers have been published that justify the idea. Third, the 
education reform strategy might also arise as the country saw the ideal model being the 
one that has been implemented by the other (mimetic). The US education reform proposal 
document, ‘A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Education Reform’ (The National 
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Comission on Excellence in Education, 1983), for instance, often referred to other 
industrialised countries to describe the practices of excellence that the Americans had 
missed. To cite one of its examples: 
 
In England and other industrialised countries, it is not unusual for academic high 
school students to spend 8 hours a day at school, 220 days per year. In the United 
States, by contrast, the typical school day lasts 6 hours and the school year is 180 
days (The National Comission on Excellence in Education, 1983: 23). 
 
Nevertheless, all types of isomorphic pressure may work interdependently to reinforce 
each other (Carolan, 2007). Multilateral agencies, like UNESCO, the World Bank, OECD 
and the Asian Development Bank sponsored numerous academic researchers in many 
fields to support their reform projects in many countries (Jones, 1990; Jones, 2007). Those 
studies justified the problems the countries have suffered from, so that the policy must be 
reformed. Ogawa’s study (1994) proposes that school-based management became a 
popular reform strategy in the USA during the 1980s because of coercive and normative 
institutional pressures. The strong networking between the government (coercive) and 
academic professional (normative) actors has given the reform much stronger 
legitimating power (Ogawa, 1994). In addition, organisations with a plan to adopt the 
reform often invite professional consultants (normative) from any external organisations 
that have a reputation for success in applying the adopted policy (mimetic). 
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Table 3.1. Models of Institutional Pressure to the Adoption of Educational Decentralisation 
Modes/ 
Components 
Actor Logic 
Governance 
system 
Basis of 
attention 
Coercive 
Multilateral agencies 
Market Management Efficiency 
Democracy Participation Accountability 
State  
Bureaucratic-state Control Equity 
Interest groups Relative Relative Relative 
Normative 
Academic institution  
Profession Expertise Quality 
Professional association 
Mimetic Similar organisation Relative Relative Relative 
 
 
The Duality of External and Internal Pressures 
Despite the concept of external isomorphic pressure being a powerful tool to explain and 
to analyse the process of policy convergence in the global arena and the pressure on the 
nation-state to ceremonially adopt it, it has been criticised as not being adequate for 
analysing profound organisational changes. For instance, Kraatz and Zajac (1996), who 
examined some institutional propositions against the change behaviour of American 
private liberal arts colleges between 1971 and 1986, found that organisational changes 
during that period could not be said to have resulted from the process of institutional 
isomorphism. Rather than becoming more similar over time, the liberal arts colleges had 
increasingly been showing heterogeneity. Greenwood and Hinnings (1996: 1023) also 
argue that because of its weakness in analysing the internal dynamic of organisational 
change, ‘the theory is silent on why some organisations adopt radical change whereas 
others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures’. 
With regard to discussion on educational decentralisation, we can pose a similar 
question: why is it that France, a country with an advanced education system, has 
remained centralised, despite the great pressures for decentralisation from such prominent 
institutional actors as the OECD, the European Union, and even UNESCO, whose 
headquarters are in Paris. For this particular question, Baker et.al. have an answer. 
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The French case of minor decentralization amid a growing trend is a clear example 
of the action of the two factors. Historical choices created a highly centralized 
system, which certain groups (both administrators and teachers) wish to maintain. 
The structure has strong social legitimacy because it satisfies certain expectations 
widely held within the local culture (Baker, et al., 2005: 145). 
 
Hence, external legitimacy is not the only reason why a nation engages with educational 
decentralisation reform. The internal pressure for legitimacy also plays an important role 
for an organisation to adapt or resist the demand for change from its environment. The 
organisation will resist change if it has a strong constellation of internal legitimacy, as the 
case of French education has shown. This implies that the external pressure would easily 
lead to the change were the organisation’s internal legitimacy suffering a crisis. This 
means that the structure does no longer represent the popular will and, if a change is not 
made, the crisis of legitimacy will threaten the organisation’s survival. Here, the internal 
crisis of legitimacy refers to Habermas’ depiction of the crisis of state-led capitalism as 
follows. 
 
After all, the state apparatus does not just see itself in the role of the supreme 
capitalist facing the conflicting interests of the various capital factions. It also has 
to consider the generalizable interests of the population as far as necessary to retain 
mass loyalty and prevent a conflict-ridden withdrawal of legitimation (Habermas, 
1984: 656-7). 
 
The German-American education theorist, Hans Weiler (1990), was the scholar who early 
analysed the relation between educational decentralisation and the need for legitimacy. 
His concept of ‘compensatory legitimation’ clearly indicates the role of ‘the generalizable 
interests of the population’ as the source of the pressure. For him, compensatory 
legitimation means that the national government uses decentralisation as a strategy to 
camouflage its effort to repair its eroded legitimation because of its distance from the 
basis of the political system, its inefficient bureaucracy and its structural inability to 
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attend to variations in the social, cultural, geographical and economic background of the 
society (Weiler, 1990). 
Thus, more than isomorphism, the duality of external and internal pressure for 
legitimacy can promote isomorphism and variation in three ways. First, the strong 
constellation of internal legitimacy might create organisational resistance to adapt to the 
external isomorphic pressure so that the organisational structure becomes ‘an exception 
rather than the norm’ (Baker, et al., 2005). The case of the French education system, as 
illustrated above, is the best example of this. Second, the internal crisis of legitimacy 
might ease the influence of external environmental pressure and the organisation undergo 
structural change and become part of the isomorphic reality. The experience of Latin 
America’s educational decentralisation reform can illustrate this. The external isomorphic 
pressure of decentralisation during the 1980s suited the internal problems of economic 
crisis, political instability and authoritarian ideologies (Derqui, 2001). Third, the 
institutional templates of structural change originating from external and internal 
pressures might be different from each other but the organisation adopts all of them 
ceremonially to obtain external and internal legitimacies but, as a consequence, the 
organisation will face an institutional contradiction. This contradiction is manifested with 
the emergence of two or more dominant institutional logics that guide organisational 
action (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, et al., 2012). 
The institutional contradiction is solved either through maintaining mutual coexistence 
or through amalgamation of institutions to generate a new logic. Competition and 
contradiction among institutions exist not only as they are, but sometimes are politicised 
to produce new logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Many recent studies have tried to 
see the productive aspect of this institutional contradiction. In this sense, two mechanisms 
are elaborated: either redirecting the conflict away from single institution domination 
(Reay and Hinings, 2009) or producing a new logic as a result of a dialectical process of 
contradiction (Seo and Creed, 2002). The study by Reay and Hinnings, for instance, 
shows how two contradictory institutional logics, medical professionalism and business 
market, can coexist in the governance of public health in Alberta province. In this sense, 
medical professionalism still widely operates and legitimates medical practices even after 
the government’s introduction of a market-based health-care system. Both logics share 
the field domination through some collaborative mechanism (Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
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In the meantime, the study by Saito (2010) shows how the institutional contradiction has 
resulted in the rise of a new institutional logic that merges the values of competing 
institutions. After long-run interchanging domination in the post-war Japanese education 
system, nationalist and cosmopolitan logics equally inspired the formulation of Japanese 
education reform in 2000. Saito names this new logic as cosmopolitan nationalism (Saito, 
2010). 
Decoupling 
The idea that legitimation can be achieved only by conforming to institutional pressure 
has made such institutions a rationalised myth. Given its powerful function to maintain 
the stability of an organisation, organisations adopt these myths ceremonially and with 
rituals of confidence and good faith (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). However, the symbolic 
adoption of myths leads to problematic contradiction. This symbolism runs counter to the 
logic of technical efficiency. It is because the myths may arise from different parts of the 
environment so that they cannot fit into particular organisational settings (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). The contradiction between institutional and technical environments is then 
solved by a mechanism called decoupling. Habermas (1973) terms it the separation of 
expressive symbols that influences a universal willingness to follow from the 
instrumental function of administration. The organisation protects the legitimation of its 
institutionalised policy from external evaluation by buffering its technical 
implementation. As result, an organisation may have its practices unchanged but keep its 
institutional legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Decoupling helps organisations avoid 
close inspection, hides the quality under symbolic attributes, protects ritual classification 
schemes from uncertainties arising in the technical core and adjusts to inconsistent and 
conflicting institutional rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1978). 
Earlier institutional theorists used decoupling to characterise the nature of modern 
social organisation as organised anarchy, which is associated with problematic preference, 
unclear technology and fluid participation (Cohen et al., 1972). Schools are a good 
example of the organised anarchy. In contrast to business firms, which have measurable 
goals (for example, making more profit), tangible technologies (for example, production 
machines) and relatively fixed beneficiaries (owners, workers and customers), schools act 
differently. They have an endless and, sometimes, conflicting lists of goals; adopt various 
and, sometimes, personalised teaching methods; and incorporate a wider and, mostly 
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boundless, set of participants, ranging from people who are daily working within schools’ 
physical boundaries (teachers and principals) up to those who are not (parents, unions, 
teacher associations, the government and even political parties). This condition of 
uncertainty leads those diverse participants to exert their influences in defining the goals, 
the standards of excellence and the best teaching methods the schools must adopt (Hanson, 
2001). Schools build a structure with ritual categories whose practices are not necessarily 
connected one to another. The structure encompasses categories such as administrators, 
teachers, students and curriculum with their respective roles. As long as such ritual 
categories exist, schools can retain their legitimacy as educational institutions. And as 
long as the roles within each category function, they are separated from questions of goals 
and outcomes. Decoupling helps organisations avoid close inspection, hides the quality 
under symbolic attributes, protects ritual classification schemes from uncertainties arising 
in the technical core, and adjusts to inconsistent and conflicting institutionalised rules 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1978). 
Recent theorists employ the concept for the cross-organisational context as part of 
world culture analysis. Meyer et al., for instance, use decoupling to describe the 
inconsistencies between the adopted world culture models and the practices at the national 
level (Meyer, et al., 1997). They believe that decoupling is a way to reconcile the 
externally modelled organisations and their different internal settings. The perspective 
has inspired subsequent uses by scholars such as Astiz et al. (2002) and Baker and Le 
Tendre (2005) in analysing the translated national differences of global similarities in 
education policy, because of the nature of cultural, social and political distinctiveness of 
each nation-state. As we can see, even though most educational decentralisation policies 
in Latin America, Africa and Asian countries were virtually stemming from similar World 
Bank structural adjustment recommendations, still they are different in practice and 
outcome. This analysis goes beyond liberal and critical perspectives that always place the 
policy gaps in the discourse of ‘success and failure’. 
In the decentralisation context, decoupling has also been used to analyse the 
decentralisation-centralisation dynamic as a result of local adaptation to the 
institutionalised policy. As many studies have revealed, when it comes to the policy 
adaptation, nation-states tend to make the border between centralisation and 
decentralisation more blurred rather than more clear. . There has been a continuous 
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dialectic between the two poles (Bray, 1999; Dussel et al., 2000; Hawkins, 2006; 
SteinerKhamsi and Stolpe, 2004). In their study on Mongolian education reform, 
Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2004) argue that this problem emerges from the clash 
between international programs and national culture. The long influence of the socialist 
culture of the ‘central value system’ has established some perceptions among government 
officials that schools are state rather than public properties and that the centralist structure 
is the most efficient and effective for managing internationally funded projects. These 
perceptions run counter to the international funding aspiration of more autonomous 
localities (SteinerKhamsi and Stolpe, 2004). The reason is similar to the case of China’s 
decentralisation, which is caught between a centralist, corporatist ideology of Leninism 
on the one hand and an economic market movement to decentralisation on the other 
(Hawkins, 2006). In this sense, the decoupling can be found not only in the context of 
policy–practice discrepancy but also in terms of policy contradiction. 
Furthermore, Bromley and Powell (2012) and Bromley, Hwang, and Powell (2013) 
introduce a more clinical concept of decoupling. They regard decoupling as a symbolic 
practice working in one of two ways: symbolic adoption (policy-practice decoupling) and 
symbolic implementation (means-ends decoupling). The former occurs when the formal 
structure is ceremonially adopted but violated and not implemented in practice; the latter 
takes place when the formal policy is applied but the outcomes do not reflect the original 
intent of the policy. The policy-practice decoupling stems from the legitimacy motivated 
adoption, a weak capacity to implement policies, and the conflicts between adopted 
policies and the interests, beliefs, and current identities and practices of internal parties. 
This type of decoupling is, for instance, implied in Astiz’s study (2004) on the 
implementation of educational decentralisation policy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. She 
argues that the unique characteristic of state–society relations and the interests of political 
elites would determine the way the institutionally scripted policy would be adopted and 
adapted at national and local levels. In the Buenos Aires case, it is evident that the drive 
to democracy and wider public engagement as being universally believed through 
decentralisation is tainted by conflict among the local political elites (Astiz, 2004). 
Another study by Komatsu (2013) employs decoupling to explain local governments’ 
resistance to the implementation of school-based management reform policies in post-
conflict Bosnia. Although major local political parties are not opposing this nationally 
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mandated policy, they can make it less effective in the implementation stage either by 
politicising its adoption into local bylaws or by controlling the appointment of school 
directors which should be independently arranged by the respective school boards 
(Komatsu, 2013). 
As technologies for inspection advance, ceremonial adoption is no longer a common 
practice. Now organisations are audited regularly as a warrant that their daily activities 
are consistent with the institutional policies they adopt. However, a situation arises when 
those activities are institutionalised and become routine so that  the main organisation’s 
concern is to make sure that such activities are implemented with a degree of accuracy 
that is formally measured. If that is so, organisations risk overlooking the original goals. 
As a result, policy implementation tends to defer to ceremonial practices. The means-end 
decoupling is commonly adopted in the market-based, neo-managerial education reforms 
in which, for the sake of efficiency, the bureaucracy of the central or the local government 
withdraws from direct school intervention and provides a school-based management run 
by school managers and professional teachers. However, the government then imposes 
standardised frameworks according to which school personnel play their roles and on the 
basis of which their performances are strictly assessed. Hence, rather than professional 
self-governing, the managerial reforms result in a managed governance, and rather than 
decentralisation they turn out to be centralisation. Managerialism is also held to promote 
the decrease of professional values and the intensification of work over organisational 
goals (Rees and Rodley, 1995). McInerney’s study on Australia’s school-based 
management policy concludes that the managerialist education decentralisation has paved 
the way for schools to enter ‘a dangerous territory’ because it ‘devalues the pedagogical 
attributes of school leadership and reinforces a growing divide between teachers and 
administrators’ (McInerney, 2003: 57). As such, Wong’s study in seven schools in 
Guangdong Province, China, has also shown how decentralisation creates massive 
deskilling for teachers because of an overwhelming government control over curriculum 
and testing in a competitive schooling environment, and increased administrative 
workloads being imposed (Wong, 2006). 
This thesis aims at the restoration of the basic idea of decoupling as a mechanism to 
preserve institutional legitimacy but at the same time to protect the new policies that run 
counter to legitimacy. The emerging discourses of ‘efficiency’ and ‘confidence’ are 
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employed by powerful actors within the organisation as their justification. So, rather than 
seeing decoupling as simply as inevitable in which the institutional-technical environment 
or policy-practice-goal discrepancies are justified, the thesis is rather perceiving the 
concept as an intended strategy of manipulating the formal structure. Formal structure is 
the official structure of a hierarchy and functions on the basis of which any external 
parties can assess the degree of isomorphic pressure received by an organisation. In the 
decentralisation context, the adoption of a legitimate formal structure can be assessed by 
the extent to which the officially adopted structure reflects the regular decentralisation 
templates, such as the withdrawal of the central bureaucratic structure from local 
education management, the implementation of school-based management, the presence 
of school-board organisations, and more. For me, the policy-practice and means-end 
decoupling represent the use of different instruments of power to divert the current 
governing system from the adopted formal structure: one is empirical, the other symbolic. 
The policy-practice decoupling occurs when the authority uses its empirical means of 
power—such as the hierarchy and bureaucracy—to impose a contrary practice that does 
not reflect the formal structure. In the decentralisation context, the decentralised structure 
is present in the form of local government control or of school-based management, but 
this new structure is dysfunctional because the central authority retains its former 
hierarchy to control the education governance. Meanwhile, the means-end decoupling 
occurs when the authority uses symbolic means of power—such as professional 
judgement and standardised procedures—to endorse contrary practices. In the context of 
educational decentralisation, the means-end decoupling occurs when the structure of 
decentralisation is present and the central hierarchy is dissolved, but the way the 
decentralised structure delivers is defined by highly standardised procedures of 
performance control. 
  
	 	 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
75 
Organisational Fields: Structuration and Destructuration 
The extent to which a particular national policy environment affects local practice would 
be heavily reliant on the dynamic of local organisational fields. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) define an organisational field as an aggregate of organisations whose interactions 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life. Organisational fields in the education 
sector may comprise schools, governments (central and local), book publishers, teacher 
associations and even political parties. The most fundamental basis on which the 
organisational field works is the one of relational systems. Earlier field theorists like 
Bourdieu perceive that ‘to think in terms of field is to think relationally’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 96). The organisational field is patterned through relations among its 
participants. These organisations interact with each other forming a network of 
constraints (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Textbooks are written to accommodate school 
curricula whose standards are set by a government agency, after consulting professional 
organisations like universities and teacher associations, and book publishers provide more 
efficient ways of printing and distribution and so forth. 
The relational system among field participants involves the process of structuration, 
which refers to Gidden’s original concept that echoes the duality of structure, that patterns 
human behaviour and action, which reproduces and modifies structure (Giddens, 1984). 
Adapted to organisational analysis, structuration reflects an organisation that is operating 
within a structural context but at the same time its behaviour creates and modifies the 
context (Scott, et al., 2000). In the context of education reform policy, the constraining 
structure manifests in the form of imposed national policies whose purpose is to shape 
the local environment accordingly. Meanwhile, the action manifests in the agency of local 
organisations established by and interacting within that environmental context and, 
through intensive relations, might modify that context. The process of structuration makes 
the field more highly structured in terms of more increased consensus, dense relational 
networks and stable hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic relation among field participants is not always effecting 
mutuality in the form of agreement and contract. Instead, an organisational field also 
constitutes the area of differentiation and fragmentation in which domination and 
resistance might take place (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
In the case where organisational fields end up with disagreement among participants, this 
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would lead to the process of destructuration. Destructuration involves ‘the breakdown of 
traditional organisational forms and patterns of behavior, the dislodging of belief systems 
and the dismantling of governance structure dominant in earlier period’ (Scott, et al., 2000: 
27). The destructuration is normally followed by the process of restructuration through 
which new organisational players, new logics and new governance systems are introduced. 
If the highly structured fields offer stability and solid guidance, the processes of 
destructuration and restructuration in contrast lead to an unstable field in which rules and 
models are contested by its participants (Scott, et al., 2000). 
Moreover, the extent to which structuration, destructuration, or restructuration might 
take place is very much determined by the possession of capital, the most important of 
which is symbolic capital, that is ‘any property (any form of capital whether physical, 
economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with 
categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to give it value’ 
(Bourdieu, et al., 1994: 9). Even though the authors add that the state is the most potential 
site where symbolic capital is concentrated (Bourdieu, et al., 1994), it remains context 
dependent. The symbolic capital creates legitimacy for organisations or institutional 
actors to promote the integration of organisational fields and the field integration is 
essential for its survival (Scott, et al., 2000). 
The policy environment built by upper-layer institutional actors is a determinant in 
defining the type of symbolic capital being relevant in the field. In the market-based 
reform environment, efficiency and performance are the most valuable constituents of 
symbolic capital, which is usually concentrated in private enterprises. In her analysis of 
the effect of the US No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy, Burch (2010) highlights the 
prevalence of private organisations in education governance. Schools and pupils are now 
relying on a number of private organisations to provide supplementary learning services, 
assessment consulting, management quality certification, textbook publication and even 
food catering. In contrast, in his study of Polish educational decentralisation reform, 
Bodine (Bodine, 2006) signifies the presence of a weak, post-socialist, Polish state that 
lacks legitimacy from shared cultural meaning and symbols that has led the reform to the 
destructuration of education. The destructuration is characterised in two ways: the 
diminished legitimacy for state schools and the fragmentation of education governance 
(Bodine, 2006). 
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In the past, the strong agency of Indonesia’s central government authoritarian state 
could enforce direct field structuration because the state controlled the symbolic capital. 
No single organisation was allowed to dissent so that government policies went 
unchallenged. Now, the political decentralisation has buffered local structure from direct 
central intervention. All central government policies cannot always be virtually translated 
into a local context in spite of all the pressure. As the case of Poland has shown, 
Indonesian education reform might also facilitate the fragmentation of education 
governance even though the context is different. Unlike Poland, where the destructuration 
is caused by an illegitimate, weak state, the Indonesian experience of destructuration 
might emerge from the contest between equally strong central and local states for 
legitimacy to control. 
Nevertheless, structuration and destructuration scenarios are also defined through the 
dynamic of relations among local actors or organisations. This is particularly so because 
Indonesian decentralisation is considered to be part of democratic reform (Hadiz, 2004). 
Driven by a massive democratic environment, decentralisation has transformed 
Indonesian localities into new democratic fields where participatory governance has 
expanded. Democratisation has created local organisational fields that involve a multiple 
array of organisations as their participants: local governments, political parties, education 
councils, NGOs, public schools, private schools and school committees. Although these 
organisations are established in almost all localities in response to the ‘structure’ of 
national policy environment, however, the roles that define the relations among 
participants do not always manifest themselves as scripted. The relations among these 
participants would redefine and modify the scripted policy. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed some relevant studies on educational decentralisation and 
offered some theoretical considerations to address the research questions as elaborated in 
Chapter 1. Most studies of educational decentralisation are concerned with the problem 
of technical efficiency and the ideological debates of privatisation and neoliberalism; few 
studies have considered the question of legitimacy. This  theoretical review offers a 
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framework to elaborate that legitimacy issue. The  framework can be summarised as 
follows.  
First, the concept of institutional environment addresses the first research question: 
‘how did the global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the 
implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia?’ In this sense, 
there must be some global and local developments that make the central government 
falling into legitimacy crisis and the adoption of educational decentralisation is seen as 
the only way to resolve. The concept of global institutionalisation is also included into 
this first framework to assess the process of educational decentralisation being a powerful 
global institution and the constant pressure it gave to the centralist governments like 
Indonesia over the long period of time. In addition, Weiler’s concept of compensatory 
legitimacy is also included in this first framework to illuminate the process of internal 
pressure from the local population who feel that the existing governance model is running 
counter to their interests and aspiration. In this sense, adopting the formal structure of 
decentralisation compensates the loss of legitimacy.    
Second, the concept of decoupling is used to address the second research question: 
‘how did the central government preserve its legitimacy while devolving powers to the 
local governments, but also retaining significant powers of its own?’ Despite giving 
legitimacy, the adopted formal structure of decentralisation is not necessarily compatible 
with actual educational problems and organisational resources. Therefore, the decoupling 
mechanism is offered to justify the separation of technical strategies from the formal 
structure of decentralisation to address the real educational problems with the available 
resources. The decoupling is justified by the logics of technical efficiency and 
professional confidence. Through this process, the return of central control in the 
decentralised structure is explained. 
Third, the concepts of structuration and destructuration are used to address the third 
research question:  ‘how is the institutional legitimacy of the educational decentralisation 
policy contested at the local level?’ The extent to which the decoupling strategy is 
effective should be examined in the local field in which the role of local governments 
become central. When the decoupling strategy creates agreement in the field, in the sense 
that the local government follows central rules in managing local education, the expected 
stable governance can be achieved (structuration). However, when the strategy incites 
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disagreement in the field, in the sense that central rules are neglected or violated, the 
fragmented governance and the breakdown of hierarchy might take place 
(destructuration). The scenarios of structuration and destructuration can happen 
simultaneously and, therefore, a comparative analysis of local practices of education 
governance is important to see different responses of the educational decentralisation 
policy at the local level.  
After the discussion of the theory and literature, now I want to turn to the discussion 
of how I propose to study this process. The following chapter will go into the range of 
methodological features espoused by this thesis from the epistemological stance to the 
procedures of data collection.  
  
	

 Chapter IV 
 Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Having described the institutional perspective for the analysis of Indonesia’s education 
reform, this chapter presents the methodology and data collection strategy for the research. 
Drawing on the constructivist nature of institutional theory, this study uses the qualitative 
approach in investigating the problem of educational decentralisation in the Indonesian 
context. By using the qualitative approach, the research is able to provide a more elaborate 
description and in-depth interpretation of the dynamics of educational decentralisation 
practices. This chapter covers the range of methodological discussions: from elucidating 
the epistemological stance of the study; recounting the case study as the methodological 
approach; justifying the choice of particular data acquisition, informant recruitment and 
data analysis strategies; clarifying the issues of reliability and validity; to acknowledging 
the issues of ethics emerged during the fieldwork process. 
 
The Epistemological Stance of the Study 
Scientific research operates not only as a formal process of seeking knowledge but also 
as a philosophical inquiry through which we project ourselves into that knowledge. 
Therefore, as Crotty (1998) argues, the first thing we need to clarify before starting any 
research is our philosophical stance in seeing realities, that is, epistemology. According 
to Maynard (1994: 10), epistemology provides ‘a philosophical grounding for deciding 
what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate 
and legitimate’. Scholars divide social epistemology into at least three paradigms: 
positivism or objectivism, constructivism or interpretivism, and subjectivism or post-
positivism (Crotty, 1998; Kamberelis, 2005; Marvasti, 2003). 
Objectivism argues that reality and its meaning exist apart from a person’s subjective 
consciousness. Social phenomena can be measured and predicted and, in treating reality 
this way, a social researcher is free from any subjective interests. Social reality works 
according to the law of common sense. Such reality is perceived as taken for granted and 
exists naturally in the maintenance of social order. Subjectivism, in contrast, embraces 
the extreme pole of the anti-object. It argues that an object’s existence and meaning are 
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dictated by the subject. The subject defines social reality not from his or her understanding 
but from imported ideals: religious beliefs, primordial archetypes, or even dreams (Crotty, 
1998). Meanwhile, constructivism adopts a rather moderate stance: it ends the ‘subject–
object distinction’ and proposes an interplay between subjects in the meaning-making 
process. Social reality comes into being through the long process of social interaction. As 
active social actors, human beings continually create, interpret and modify their existence 
in response to external influences (Marvasti, 2003). In this sense, ‘different people may 
construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomena’ (Crotty, 
1998: 9). 
Drawing on Berger and Luckmann’s constructivist sociology, the new institutionalism, 
whose philosophical standpoint underlies this study, assumes that social order is 
fundamentally based on a shared social reality that is constructed through the process of 
social interaction, called institutionalisation. The process involves three phases: when we 
and others take action (externalisation), then we translate the action into categories that 
make us able to respond in a similar fashion so that it becomes an external reality separate 
from ourselves (objectivation), and then we internalise that objectivated world to 
determine the subjective structure of our consciousness (internalisation) (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 1987b). In comparison, this study sees decentralisation as being 
constructed by an interplay between external influence and internal interpretation. In this 
regard, educational decentralisation is constructed through the adoption of externally 
prominent models and their adaptation to different cultural settings. Despite the global 
similarities of the policies that are being adopted, these different local settings allow 
different interpretations and therefore different practices. 
Hence, in contrast to objectivism, which is typified by the quantitative approach, and 
to subjectivism, which has inspired the rise of the post-structuralist research agenda, an 
affiliation to the constructivist epistemology becomes the researcher’s grounds for 
adopting a more qualitative approach to social research (Crotty, 1998; Marvasti, 2003). 
Qualitative research seeks to discover the meaning and explanation behind what appears, 
and this is commonly believed as a social reality (Willis et al., 2007). In this sense, this 
study will disclose the way the global policy of educational decentralisation has been 
locally interpreted by investigating the experiences of Indonesian policymakers and 
school managers. 
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Methodological Approach: Case Study 
Methodology is the strategy or plan of action that provides the basis of a researcher’s 
choice and use of particular methods (Crotty, 1998). The researcher’s methodological 
stance is informed largely by the theoretical perspective used to guide the direction of 
knowledge-seeking. Some scholars offer a number of approaches for doing qualitative 
research. Creswell (2007) divides the approaches into five: narrative research, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. Meanwhile, Denzin and 
Lincoln (2008) divide qualitative methods into eight approaches: case study, ethnography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, life history, historical method, action and applied 
research, and clinical research. 
From these two lists, I chose to use case studies as this study’s methodological 
approach. Creswell (2007: 73) regards the case study as a qualitative approach because 
the researcher ‘explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) 
over time, through detailed, in-depth, data collection involving multiple sources of 
information’. The main objective of the case study, as Woodside (2010) suggests, is to 
achieve a ‘deep understanding’ of two important issues: the sense-making process 
produced by individuals, and systems thinking, policy mapping and systems dynamics 
modelling. Meanwhile, Yin (2003) highlights the scope of a case study as investigating 
‘a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003: 13). This scope by 
which the case study approach is limited is relevant to this study, because the researcher 
seeks to explore the contextual realities behind the adoption of the globalising policy of 
educational decentralisation in a particular country on one hand, and the comparative 
responses of such adoption in the country’s localities on the other. 
With regard to the number of cases being investigated, the Case study research (CSR) 
is divided into single and multiple CSR (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003) and with regard to 
the unit of analysis being examined it is divided into holistic and embedded (Yin, 2003). 
Holistic CSR examines only one unit of analysis of single or multiple case studies. 
Embedded CSR studies multiple units of analysis of one or multiple case studies. 
Generally, this study uses the embedded single CSR, that is, it examines the construction 
of educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia in two institutional contexts: national 
and local (see Table 4.1). It examines the process of institutionalisation from the adoption 
nationally by the central government to the enforcement of the policy at the local level. 
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From the perspective of the global trend to decentralisation, Indonesia is a legitimate case 
to study for it has two important reasons needed to justify the use of a single case study: 
it is a typical and an extreme case (Yin, 2003). It represents a typical case because the 
country is one that has experienced decentralisation reforms but has not been studied to 
the extent that others have. It is an extreme case because its reform experience has been 
regarded as ‘one of the most radical decentralisation programs, under which extensive 
powers are being devolved to the district level’ (Aspinall and Fealy, 2003). 
 
Table 4.1. Embedded Single CSR Design: Educational Decentralisation in Indonesia 
Context Units of analysis 
Global–national relations • Global sources of the institutional pressure 
• National/local sources of the institutional pressure 
• Responses to institutional pressure 
Central–local relations • The enactment of decentralisation policy 
• The enforcement of national standards 
• Local responses to central standardisation  
 
However, to follow Scott (2008: 141), institutional codes of decentralisation are not only 
‘carried and reproduced, but also modified and reconstructed, by the interpretations and 
inventions of subordinate actors: individuals, organisations, and fields’. In this sense, the 
decentralisation policy might be applied differently at the local level so that another in-
depth investigation needs to be developed to accommodate different interpretations. This 
study then breaks down the second context of the Indonesian case into two second-layer 
case studies that adopt an embedded multiple-case study approach (see Table 4.2). This 
involves two municipal governments that represent different characteristics in relation to 
the presumed effects of decentralisation. One locality takes more benefit from 
decentralisation by accumulating more symbolic capital than the other. Bourdieu defines 
symbolic capital as ‘any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, 
cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of 
perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to give it value’ (Bourdieu, 
et al., 1994: 9). 
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In this sense, the symbolic capital is the one that helps local governments elevate their 
bargaining power in terms of central–local relations. This symbolic capital is accumulated 
from strong local economic and popular local leadership. The wealthier is a local 
government, the more potential it has to advance its autonomy, and vice versa. As such, 
the presence of a popular leader in the democratic field also garners symbolic capital for 
the local government to influence the people and hence dominate the organisational field. 
The more populist a local government is, the stronger is the democratic legitimacy it 
derives from its constituents. In addition, differences in the possession of symbolic capital 
will cause differences in local governance practices. The more affluent a district 
government is, presumably the more capable it is in producing more policy initiatives and 
in achieving the demands of national standardisation when compared to one less affluent. 
As such, the more popular and democratic the local leadership is, presumably the more 
able it will be, compared to a less democratic one, to facilitate accountability and school 
autonomy. 
Given this logic, the study picked two municipalities to be the subjects of the second 
layer of the case study: Surabaya and Kupang. Surabaya, the capital city of East Java 
Province, has the largest municipal government in Indonesia, and its economic growth is 
among the fastest in the country. In 2013, the statistics agency reported that the city’s 
economic growth was 7.34 per cent, or higher than the national growth, which was 5.78 
per cent (BPS Kota Surabaya, 2014). Following decentralisation, the city now has more 
than 1500 schools, from elementary to senior secondary. Since 2010, the city has been 
receiving much attention because of its very popular mayor, Tri Rismaharini, whose 
social reform projects have been recognised with a number of national and international 
awards. In contrast, Kupang is a small but growing municipality, the capital city of East 
Nusa Tenggara Province. Its local government is responsible for fewer than 250 schools, 
from elementary to senior secondary. Compared with Surabaya, which collects more than 
IDR2.5 trillion in locally generated revenue (Surabaya City Government, 2013), Kupang, 
in 2013, collected less than IDR80 billion from the same sources (Kupang City 
Government, 2013). Surabaya mostly relies on local revenue to fund its educational 
programs, but Kupang, on the other hand, relies mostly on central government subsidies. 
Arguably, the economic capital of Surabaya’s government gives it symbolic capital in 
terms of central–local government relations. It becomes a bargaining point when resisting 
pressure from the central government. 
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Moreover, though not necessarily, economic capital can also create symbolic capital 
by transforming it into popular policies, and the Surabaya government has shown this. 
Since Tri Rismaharini assumed office as the city’s mayor in 2010, a number of populist 
policies have been produced, among which is a policy for free education. She has received 
national and international awards for her policy innovations. In contrast, little has been 
heard about policy initiatives in Kupang, and this is most likely because its financial 
resources are much less than Surabaya’s. The relations among local organisation field 
participants, such as the local education office, schools, education boards and parents are 
influenced by this symbolic capital of government popularity. Hence, because of its 
democratic legitimacy, a government with great popularity will enjoy more influence and 
dominate: in contrast, a government with less popularity risks influence being inadequate 
to ensure that any policy reforms will be fully effective. The contrast in key characteristics 
of both these local governments is the rationale for doing the comparative case studies. 
The second-level CSR project is as displayed in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2. – Embedded Multiple CSR Design: the Local Government Responses to Decentralisation 
Cases Characteristics Units of analysis 
Surabaya • Higher symbolic capital 
• More autonomy from the central 
government 
• More capable of achieving national 
standards 
• Local socio-political 
environment 
• Relational pattern between 
local government 
bureaucracy and schools 
• Local policy initiatives 
• School response to local 
government policy 
Kupang • Lower symbolic capital 
• More dependent on the central 
government 
• Less capable of achieving national 
standards 
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Methods 
Methods are procedures or techniques to acquire, gather and analyse data the researcher needs as 
indicated from the research questions (Crotty, 1998). Travers (2001) suggests there are five 
methods typically associated with the qualitative inquiry: observation, interviewing, ethnographic 
fieldwork, discourse analysis, and textual analysis. For this research, the researcher used in-depth 
interviews and textual analysis or document study as techniques of data collection. 
In-depth Interviews 
The qualitative interview is regarded as ‘a guided conversation’ from which a researcher 
and interviewee interact for a meaning-making purpose (Warren, 2002). It is guided 
because the researcher employs particular variables to frame the context of the 
conversation. However, it is also an interactive process in which the interviewer and 
interviewee build an ‘I–thou’ relation. ‘Thou’ is described as a fellow person close to the 
interviewer but still separate, and this kind of relation means treating the interviewee as 
another live and conscious subject rather than as an object or a type (Seidman, 2012: 95). 
Given this, the interview was framed in a fluid rather than fixed context. The meaning of 
fluid framing here is that ‘the relationship between ideas and data is very likely to change 
during the research’ (Curtis and Curtis, 2011: 29). In this sense, the questions asked of 
the interviewees should be flexible and modifiable, depending on the development of the 
conversation, otherwise the interview would lose its depth (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). 
Based on this reasoning, our in-depth interview used open-ended or semi-structured 
questions rather than highly structured, close-ended ones used by most survey researchers. 
The in-depth interview used structured questions in some limited contexts, for example, 
when asking for demographic information. 
As Warren (2002) suggests, there is one important step the researcher should proceed 
with before designing an interview: thematising. This stage involves organising research 
questions into a number of themes or topics of interest. The researcher normally decides 
which of these particular themes to adopt after reviewing some of the literature. For 
example, to develop the research question: ‘How did the global and local contexts provide 
the institutional legitimacy for the implementation of the educational decentralisation 
policy in Indonesia?’ I have reviewed some theories of globalisation and 
institutionalisation; institutional environment and legitimacy; education decentralisation 
and compensatory legitimation. From those theories, I was enabled to develop further 
some interview topics that deal with ‘legitimacy crisis and decentralisation’; 
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‘democratisation and decentralisation’; and ‘decentralisation and standardisation’. These 
interview topics guided me in setting the following interview questions: 
 
1. What were the government expectations from the Indonesian education 
reform? 
2. Given that decentralised management had been common practice in other 
countries’ education reform programs, what do you think is its importance in 
the Indonesian context? 
3. What is your opinion of the local government capacity to perform the 
decentralised responsibilities? 
4. Why does the central government need to standardise education management 
despite the decentralisation? 
 
In addition to thematising the researcher’s topics of interest, Warren (2002: 86) argues 
that the qualitative interviewer also needs to thematise the respondent’s experience as 
well. I adopted Seidman’s (2012) approach of how the respondent’s experience can be 
thematised, that is, by structuring the in-depth interviews into a series: focused life history, 
the details of experience and reflections on the meaning. The interviews started by asking 
the participants to tell about their past lives until they held the role in the context of the 
topic being discussed. For example, respondents from the local government bureaucracy, 
including school principals, were first asked about their past career and the way they were 
appointed to their current position. At this stage, for getting a more personal narrative 
from the respondent, Seidman (2012: 17) suggests using the ‘how’ and avoiding the ‘why’ 
question (p. 17). Furthermore, in the second stage, the interviewer asked for the details of 
participants’ experiences in their respective roles. For example, we asked about their 
specific role in the arrangement of local education policy. To put their experience in the 
larger social setting we also asked for their and their organisation’s relations with other 
stakeholders: politicians, schools, private providers and so forth. Lastly, the final section 
of the interview was focused on how participants understand the meaning of their 
experience. The meaning-making here involves intellectual and emotional aspects that 
connect participants’ experiences to the larger educational decentralisation discourse. 
The following list shows how the interview of each participant was structured 
according to the three series of questions. 
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1. What is your current position in the local education office? 
2. When and how did you start your career in this office? 
 
3. What is your particular role in this office? 
4. To the best of your knowledge, how is the education policy designed in this 
locality and who is involved in such a process? 
5. How are the relations between stakeholders established? 
 
6. How do you see yourself in the local education making process? Do you see 
yourself and/or your institution as an important actor? 
7. How do you see the local education practice in the context of the ideal design 
of decentralisation? Why do you have such an opinion? 
 
Interview Participants 
Our research participants were selected on the basis of the purposeful sampling strategy. 
This type of sampling may use numerous techniques, such as theoretical sampling, a priori 
research design, opportunistic, snowball or chain, random purposeful, critical case, 
intensity, key informant technique, and many others (Creswell, 2007; Marshall, 1996; 
Warren, 2002). All of these qualitative sampling methods have their respective strategic 
purposes. Theoretical sampling, for instance, is used to elaborate and examine particular 
theoretical constructs, whereas the key informant technique is employed to recruit 
resource persons who, because of their expertise and position within an organisation, ‘are 
able to provide more information and a deeper insight into what is going on around them’ 
(Marshall, 1996: 92). The combination of both exemplified sampling strategies, 
theoretical and key informant, was employed for selecting interview participants in this 
study. In this regard, the participants were recruited from those who were resourceful and 
fit the theoretical construct. However, to protect the qualitative nature of this research, 
the sampling strategy was also made opportunistic so that the researcher could take 
advantage of any unexpected new leads in the course of the interviews (Creswell, 2007). 
The theoretical construct that shaped the criteria used to select interview participants 
was the organisational fields of education: national and local. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) define an organisational field as an aggregate of organisations whose interactions 
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constitute a recognised area of institutional life. Organisational fields in the education 
sector may comprise schools, governments (central and local), book publishers, teacher 
associations and even political parties. Combined with the key informant technique, I 
found the informants, as listed in Table 4.3, along with their respective qualifications. 
Each interview was face-to-face and took from 45 to 90 minutes. All of these interviews 
were recorded. 
 
Table 4.3. List of Interviewees 
No Participants Location Quantity  Key qualification 
1 Central 
Government 
officials 
Jakarta 5 • Knowledgeable and have a good reputation in the 
discourse of education reform 
• Experienced the formulation of education reform and 
served in the ministerial bureaucracy for at least ten 
years 
• At least third echelon officers 
2 Academics  Jakarta 3 • Professors of the Jakarta state teacher-training 
university 
• Former rector of the Surabaya state teacher-training 
university  
 
3 NGOs Jakarta 2 Holding elite position in the association structure (one as 
a secretary-general and the other one as founder and 
advisor) 
4 Local Government 
officials 
Surabaya 
and Kupang  
5 Active senior officers in the municipal education offices 
5 Local education 
board members 
Surabaya 
and Kupang 
2 Served as board members for at least three years 
6 Local 
representative 
councillors 
Surabaya 
and Kupang 
2 Members of a committee of education in the local 
representative councils 
 
7 Senior secondary 
school principals 
Surabaya 
and Kupang 
14 - Represented the institutionalised ‘social status’ of 
Indonesian schools: most favourite, moderate and non-
favourite 
8 Local policy 
observers 
Surabaya 
and Kupang 
5 Academics and NGO activists who had an interest in 
local policy issues 
 Total  38  
 
A particular explanation must be given with regard to the participants who were school 
principals. This study only involved senior secondary school principals. The reason is that 
despite the fact that local governments now have full control over basic and secondary 
school management, the responsibility for senior secondary schools is greater for local 
governments than for the central government. This is in large part because most central 
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government funding in education has been for maintaining basic education enrolment. 
Through the allocation of a school operational grant program (bantuan operasional 
sekolah [BOS]) to all elementary and junior secondary schools, public and private, based 
on unit cost per student, the central government has safeguarded the free compulsory 
basic education system throughout the country. Because such a full BOS scheme has yet 
to be extended to senior secondary education, this has consequently given rise to a sense 
that local government has relatively greater room to control senior secondary institutions 
than it has for elementary and junior secondary schools. 
The Important Role of Formal Gatekeepers 
Being an Indonesian native, and having worked in the Indonesian education field for 
several years, did not ensure that everything was easily set up for me with fieldwork. 
Indeed, for all informants other than school principals, I could rely on my networks and 
other professional connections to obtain mobile phone numbers and make the contacts by 
myself. However, when it came to the school principals, I had to engage with local 
gatekeepers. And, to do this, I needed to engage with more formal gatekeepers, that is, 
those who administratively controlled access to potential participants, rather than use 
informal ones, or those who hold ‘moral persuasion’ to help participants more intensely 
engaged with the project (Seidman, 2012: 43-45). In Indonesia, public schools are local 
government property and their members of staff are part of the local bureaucracy. 
Normally, we can only establish contact with local civil servants once we have official 
consent from their superiors. However, different localities have different policies in the 
way this formal access is granted. 
In Surabaya and Kupang, the local education offices required that all external parties’ 
access to schools and their personnel were to be established only after official consent. In 
Surabaya the rule was stricter than Kupang; a Surabaya local education officer told me 
that his institution needed to ‘regulate’ the flow of information from and about schools to 
protect the school from pointless media controversies. For them to grant access, I had to 
assure the education office that my research was purely academic by providing my 
research proposal (translated into Indonesian) and a reference letter from the Australian 
National University. In Kupang, the process was much easier; I had only to visit the 
education office and make my request to the senior officer responsible for supervising the 
secondary schools. No documentary proof was needed. Despite some administrative 
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procedures in the two cities, there was no further restriction on which school principal I 
could or could not select. This gave me more liberty to apply the designed sampling 
criteria. However, due to the different degree of restriction, I had more flexibility and 
opportunity to pick up more informants in Kupang than in Surabaya.  
Analysing Interview Data 
Transcription is a crucial and indispensable procedure before interview data can be further 
analysed (Kowal and O'Connell, 2014). In order to absorb the context of each interview 
process, I transcribed the interviews myself. To assure confidentiality, the transcribed 
documents were stored in a password-locked folder in my desktop computer and personal 
laptop computer. In analysing the interview data, the transcripts were combined with the 
researcher’s field notes, which largely provided the context and environment of each 
interview. Roulston (2014) offers three practical steps for analysing interview data: 
reducing data to locate and examine phenomena of interest; reorganising, classifying, and 
categorising data; and interpreting and writing up the findings. These steps were used in 
this research and the practicalities are explained as follows. 
In the first step, I reduced the quantity of data by eliminating redundant and irrelevant 
statements. The phenomena of interest were examined by assessing selected data against 
the theoretical construct and research purpose. However, given the qualitative nature of 
this research, the data were given supremacy and were not subsidiary to the theory, so 
that the result of the analysis might yield theoretical advances or modifications. In the 
second stage, I reorganised the data, comparing information and developing codes that 
represent my preliminary concepts or introduce new concepts. Hence, from these codes, 
I reflected on my prior understanding or revised preliminary ideas about the topic of study 
(Roulston, 2014: 305). Later, in the third phase, I started to develop my arguments by 
creating propositions that accord with prior research and theories. To support these 
propositions and assertions, I developed stories that carry main ideas that were developed 
in the previous analytical step. To present the data in the story, I used narratives of 
participants’ experiences and views as well as direct quotations from interview transcripts 
(Roulston, 2014). 
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Document Study 
Not all evidence to answer research questions is obtained from interviews. As Yin (2003) 
contends, unless we are studying preliterate societies, documents are an important source 
for data  in every case study research. Documents can provide empirical data to show the 
context within which the participants operate and from which the researcher can reveal 
meaning, expand understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research (Bowen, 
2009; Merriam, 1998). The combination of interview and document study creates an 
approach called the triangulation method, from which the researcher can derive benefit 
by cross-checking empirical information obtained from each source, and thereby improve 
research validity and reliability. 
The documents used in this research were divided into primary and secondary 
categories. Because this study deals with policy and organisational behaviour, documents 
issued by relevant organisations, such as the literature of the previous studies, legislation, 
government regulations, reports and proceedings, all served as primary sources. Included 
in this first category, for example, were World Bank reports, national legislations, MoEC 
regulations, and local government policy documents. These kinds of documents were 
mostly relevant to support the evidence for the first two research questions, even though 
primary sources, like local policy documents, were relevant to support the third research 
problem also. In addition, the study relied on secondary documents whose main function 
was to add specific details and to corroborate information from the other sources (Yin, 
2003). This kind of document includes newspaper articles, statistical figures, and 
demographic information. These documents were particularly useful to support the third 
research question, even though the researcher also used some statistical figures to support 
the two first research questions. 
In this study, documents were analysed using content analysis, which involved three 
techniques: quantitative measures, thematic analysis, and descriptive narrative (Bowen, 
2009; Coffey, 2014). The first two techniques were used to analyse primary documents 
and the last was for the secondary ones. Using quantitative measures, the researcher 
identified the recurrence of words and phrases to examine the superficial adoption of the 
relevant topic (Coffey, 2014). For example, the extent to which the decentralisation 
approach is strongly adapted in the new education laws can be superficially seen from the 
number of relevant words such as ‘local government’ and ‘school-based management’ 
used in the law. Meanwhile, thematic analysis is related to the construction of qualitative 
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analytical categories from emerging themes obtained through an intense and focused data 
reviewing process (Bowen, 2009). The themes and codes used as analytical categories 
were generated from information contained in the documents and from the interview 
transcripts, particularly because some documents were used to supplement the interviews. 
For the same reason, some documents were just descriptively analysed to add knowledge, 
verify findings, or corroborate evidence from the interview source (Bowen, 2009: 30). 
 
Reliability and Validity 
The issues of reliability and validity are related and prominent in any methodological 
discussion. Reliability emphasises the degree of replicability of research findings by other 
researchers over time, validity underlines the degree of measurement accuracy and the 
extent to which the data exactly measure the intended object (Marvasti, 2003; Willis, et 
al., 2007). In quantitative research, the reliability of its procedures is of utmost importance 
because the research is aimed at the ultimate idea of generalisation, or the extent to which 
the findings reflect the behaviour of the population. However, in qualitative research, the 
issues have raised numerous challenges. This stems from the claim of an epistemological 
difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Whereas the quantitative 
seeks an explanation, the qualitative pursues understanding (Seidman, 2012; Whittemore 
et al., 2001). For that understanding, the researcher should generate from a series of facts 
a conceptually transferable meaning through a relatively non-judgmental method of 
inquiry. 
Thus, for qualitative research, instead of reliability, some scholars use the term 
‘dependability’ and instead of validity they use the terms ‘credibility’ (internal) and 
‘transferability’ (external) (Firestone, 1993; Lincoln and Guba, 1986). Dependability 
assumes that the phenomenon changes naturally and every research process is bound by 
its distinct context. Thus, it is nearly impossible to find an entirely exact replication. Yet, 
qualitative research can be reliable in the sense that its settings and processes are 
exhaustively exposed so that future researchers can repeat the work, although without 
necessarily getting the same result (Shenton, 2004). Meanwhile, like internal validity, 
credibility questions the congruence between research findings and reality. As long as 
external validity is concerned, the qualitative inquiry needs another approach called 
transferability. This is a case-to-case translation or a situation when different groups of 
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people in entirely different settings can benefit from the research findings by becoming 
either critical or appreciative readers who reflect these findings with their own contexts 
(Firestone, 1993; Polit and Beck, 2010). These kinds of finding can be transferable only 
when they are grounded on a thick descriptive analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1986). As 
Creswell and Miller (2000: 129) have eloquently portrayed, the description is thick when 
it produces verisimilitude or a narrative that strikes its readers with the feeling of either 
actual or potential sharing of events being described in the research findings. 
Morse and colleagues (2002) criticise the above trustworthiness criteria as more an 
outcome rather than process-oriented. They contend that all the strategies to attain 
trustworthiness might be useful to evaluate rigour but not to ensure it. Therefore, they 
offer their own verification strategies to ensure the reliability and validity of qualitative 
data, which I adopted for this research. These five strategies are: methodological 
coherence, sampling appropriateness, concurrent data collection and analysis, thinking 
theoretically, and theory development (Morse, et al., 2002: 18-19). First, to attain 
methodological coherence, this study has built correspondence between the research 
question and the method components; from data collection to analytical procedure. 
Second, to achieve an appropriate sample, the researcher guarantees that the participants 
were among the most knowledgeable on the research topic, and that sufficient data to 
explain all aspects of the studied phenomena have been collected. Third, data collection 
and analysis were consistent and have iterative interaction. Fourth, throughout the 
research process, I have engaged continuously in theoretical reflection by constantly 
integrating the macro-micro perspectives and checking and rechecking the data. Fifth, the 
outcome of the research process is at best oriented to create a ‘template for comparison’ 
between different approaches in the new institutional theory. 
 
Situating the Fields and Notes on Ethics 
This study largely relied on field-based experience, most of which was recorded as field 
notes. The sequence of my field trip was designed from the bottom up, from the local to 
the national. Because the official design of Indonesia’s education reform has been written 
in many policy documents, I felt that it was more important to see how they were 
interpreted for local practices and then to confirm how those interpretations corresponded 
to the intentions of the central government. With this in mind, I began my field trip in 
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Surabaya, moved to Kupang and then to Jakarta. Surabaya was visited first because I 
needed to examine the common expectation with a more affluent local government. Many 
studies have confirmed that a number of decentralisation programs have led to regional 
inequalities: localities with a more established economy gain more than others (Galiani 
et al., 2008; Lessmann, 2012; Zhang, 2006). Needless to say, Surabaya offers much 
greater hope than Kupang in that it has the potential to produce more local initiatives. 
The bureaucracy of education from the top to bottom was very much influenced by 
local politics. In Kupang, the appointment and removal of principals could be at any time 
and for any reason, depending on the political wind. Just two days before I left the city, 
for instance, I heard that two principals I had interviewed were dismissed from their 
position for political reasons. The people of Kupang are so frank that I do not have to 
worry about the truth of this story because I heard it from many sources, from government 
officers and lay people. In Surabaya, I cannot say that Surabaya schools were unhappy 
with all the local government reforms that challenged their established behaviours. 
However, it was obvious that many schools were feeling pressure because all school 
programs are subject to a strict budget template that consequently forces schools to have 
‘standardised creativity’. 
For me, this raised some ethical questions: how should the researcher deal with the 
implications of such power relations for the information obtained. On the one hand, the 
researcher has to appreciate that a government officer had kindly granted access to 
schools. Ideally, to maintain trust, the researcher avoids any information that can 
potentially lead to a conflict of interest between him and the officer. On the other hand, 
however, the researcher has to acknowledge that most of the essential and relevant 
information that has been collected from a school community might run counter to the 
interests of that local government office. Normally, people feel annoyed should their 
established authority be questioned, even if in a disinterested academic environment. 
Disinterested academic inquiry is not a tradition always accepted and there is the chance 
that unhappy government officials might adversely affect the careers of, say, school 
principals who do not rank as high as they do. 
However, I anticipated the ‘trickle-down effect’ of the above problem by avoiding any 
discussion of unlawful activities with all participants so that none need reveal another 
person’s unauthorised conduct, nor be afraid of being indicted for particular peccadilloes. 
On top of that, it is important that all participants gave their signed and written consent 
	 	 Research Methodology 
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as an indication that they understood that their participation is voluntary and that their 
information will be kept confidential. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the methodological approaches for the study of educational 
decentralisation reform in Indonesia. A qualitative approach was chosen because it is 
relevant not only to the epistemological underpinning of constructionism but also to the 
theoretical framework used in the study. The research employed two stages of the case 
study: one is a single case study to analyse the Indonesian experience of decentralisation 
in the context of global–national and central–local government relations, and the other is 
a multiple second-level case-study to analyse the local practices of educational 
decentralisation. Sociologically, the selection of two localities for the second level case 
studies was based on differences in the possession of symbolic capital. The research 
employed two data collection techniques: in-depth interviews and document study. The 
research participants were recruited purposely using theoretical sampling and the key 
informant technique. In the end, some strategies of verification to ensure research validity 
and reliability have also been touched upon so that the research process and outcomes are 
of the highest possible quality.  
 

 Chapter V 
Decentralisation and the Legitimacy Project 
 
[School] autonomy and decentralisation were a global domain at that time … a 
global fever (demam dunia). The World Bank came as the forefront to offer the 
idea … in Latin America, Africa, etc. … But the idea was pretty grounded on us, 
so we did not only receive; we also examined what’s relevant and what’s not 
(Participant 32) 
 
Introduction 
Under the New Order regime (1966–1998), Indonesia became one of the most centralised 
nations in the world. During that period, particularly since the late 1970s, a number of 
political and economic transformations had altered the style of education governance in 
many countries to one that was more decentralised. However, the centralist New Order 
government survived. Indonesia’s resilient economy and powerful military control had 
been successful in securing political stability and (real or perceived) mass loyalty in spite 
of the increasing external demands for change. However, the economic crisis and political 
democratisation in the late 1990s caused the regime’s loss of confidence from 
international and local communities. Decentralisation was then embraced to 
accommodate the external pressure of global institutionalisation as well as to compensate 
for the internal crisis of legitimacy. 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the first research question: how did the 
global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the implementation of 
the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia? To explore the problem thoroughly, 
this chapter first places educational decentralisation in the global context. Seeing 
globalisation as global institutionalisation (Astiz, et al., 2002; Baker, et al., 2005), this 
chapter analyses the institutional mechanisms that make decentralisation effect the 
convergence of global education governance. Using this framework, this chapter also 
looks at how this process of global institutionalisation operates at the national government 
level, in this case, in Indonesia. This chapter identifies key institutional actors, the 
mechanisms of institutional pressure associated with these actors, and the national 
government responses to such pressures. 
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Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the significance of internal pressure for 
decentralisation because the external isomorphic pressure of global institutionalisation 
drives effective change at the national level when the existing national structure is 
challenged by an internal legitimation crisis. This rule also works the other way around. 
Even the global expansion of educational decentralisation has its origins in the national 
or regional legitimacy crisis of centralist governance. In other words, the global expansion 
of decentralisation works in parallel with the global delegitimation of centralist regimes. 
The discussion of this will come in the early part of this chapter. 
 
Educational Decentralisation and the Duality of Local and Global Pressures 
The Legitimacy Crisis: From Local to Global Delegitimation of the Centralist 
Governance 
Before the 1970s, the global community was a faithful believer in big government and 
central planning, including for education. Most countries centralised their education 
management. In this sense, ministries of education, either alone or together with other 
central government ministries, controlled the education systems. Some countries, like the 
USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, were traditionally decentralised. In these countries, 
education is the responsibility of state governments. Even today, the federal government 
of Canada does not have a ministry of education. In Asia, Japan was the earliest nation 
that decentralised its education management. Since 1948, after World War II, that country 
devolved education management to the local authorities when Japan was under close US 
scrutiny. A report, issued by the First American Mission on Education, recommended that 
Japan change its centralised system by imitating the American model of school districts 
and school management that involves greater community participation (Muta, 2000). 
Since the 1970s, decentralisation has become a major item on the agenda of the global 
educational reform movement. The trend emerged after the crisis of the centralised 
welfare state in Western societies, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
crises of authoritarian regimes in Asian and African nations, which transformed the 
fundamentals of state governance from governments to the market, and from central to 
local authority (Jessop, 1999). In Western societies, as Habermas contended, the welfare 
state crisis stemmed from ‘the excessive legal regulation and bureaucratisation … and the 
over concentration of “trained professional” and “scientific approaches” in the social 
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services’ (Habermas, 1986: 9). These centralised welfare regimes in Europe had failed to 
reconcile the high cost of democratic legitimacy procedures with the rise of efficiency-
oriented capital that permeated the world economy in the 1970s. 
The effect of such crises, Habermas noted, was the rise of neoconservatism, which was 
characterised by three elements. The first element was policies oriented to capital 
accumulation through the restriction of welfare services. In addition, secondly, 
neoconservatisme was also characterised by the reduced political costs of the legitimating 
institutions, such as a bureaucracy and state-sponsored democratic organisations, by the 
activities of non-state actors, such as business organisations, labour unions and NGOs. 
And, thirdly, the ideology was also epitomised by the promotion of banal cultural policies 
by discrediting intellectuals as members of a non-productive social class and nurturing 
traditional cultural values, such as patriotism, religious morality and folk culture, to 
compensate individuals’ sacrifices for their submission to the pressures of a competitive 
society and accelerated modernism (Habermas, 1986). 
In the 1970s, neoconservatism found its modus operandi in the rise of neoliberal 
regimes in the UK under Thatcher and in the USA under Reagan (Apple, 2006b; Whitaker, 
1987). In these traditionally decentralised nations, the neoliberal reforms manifested 
themselves as the privatisation of public goods. The neoliberal logic is that involving the 
private sector would make education services more competitive and efficient. In 
education, this philosophy was the foundation for a number of policy shifts, such as 
individual subsidies, voucher systems for schools, and service contracting (Gordon and 
Whitty, 1997; Hill, 2010; Hursh, 2007). 
A large number of traditionally centralised countries in Europe, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal were flocking to 
engage with these reforms. Besides the privatisation policies, they started to adopt UK 
and US traditional models of decentralisation, which means leaving the education sector 
to be managed by regional or local governments. However, in countries like Spain, Italy 
and Belgium, the devolution of education to regional governments was also a response to 
their internal problems with secessionist movement (Sorens, 2009). 
The 1970s also witnessed political and economic crises in Latin American countries, 
like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, as well as Eastern European countries, like Hungary, 
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Poland and Yugoslavia. After several reforms, those countries also engaged with 
decentralisation. In these regions, the decentralisation policy came as part of the 
movement to democracy (Przeworski, 1991). In the 1980s, the decentralisation reform 
also spread to Asia and the Pacific with China, New Zealand, South Korea and the 
Philippines as the major cases. In Africa, the movement to decentralisation was 
intensified during the 1990s and 2000s with the emergence of new democracies: South 
Africa, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania (Gershberg and Winkler, 2003). The global 
movement to decentralisation continued until the 2000s, with the likes of Pakistan and 
Indonesia, which became known for their radical decentralisation. In the mid-2000s, the 
world has witnessed the convergence of an education governance model. In these 
countries, central ministries are no longer the single dominant players. They have to 
share—or even completely devolve—managerial responsibility to lower level authorities, 
to schools, private institutions and local communities. 
Isomorphic Pressures: Global Institutionalisation and Its Actors 
New institutional theorists, for example, Baker, Wiseman, Astiz and LeTendre argue that 
world education governance has undergone ‘a devolution revolution’ because of the 
combined processes of economic and institutional globalisation. Economic globalisation 
is characterised by the intensification of global market systems that force nation-state 
education systems to adopt more efficient governance models. Meanwhile, institutional 
globalisation has resulted from global rationalisation, which leads the world’s systems to 
a uniform model of polity (Astiz, et al., 2002; Baker, et al., 2005). Following the global 
delegitimation of centralism, the neoliberal reforms that demanded a much lesser role for 
the state and were first initiated by neoconservative governments in the UK and the USA, 
then came to the fore and were rationalised as a global institutional model. The global 
decentralisation reforms generally imitate the institutional templates of the perceived best 
practices of the US and UK education governance systems, such as local education 
authorities, school boards, school districts and locally managed schools. The question 
now is how this global institutionalisation process takes place and what institutional 
actors are involved in it. 
In this context, I adopt DiMaggio and Powell’s three mechanisms of isomorphic 
pressures (coercive, normative and mimetic) and Scott’s three components of institutional 
environment (institutional logic, institutional actors, and governance systems). The 
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pressures for countries to adopt the reform strategies played along with the combination 
of mode and of component scenarios. First, educational decentralisation has become a 
global norm through coercive pressure from a number of global institutional actors: the 
World Bank, the OECD, the European Union and UNESCO (Moutsios, 2009; Mundy, 
1999). From the 1960s to the late 1970s, UNESCO dominated the global education 
governance, but its role was later overshadowed by the rise of two actors, the World Bank 
and the OECD, when the global economic architecture forced education to be an 
integrated part of the global economy (Mundy, 1999). The OECD plays the dominant role 
in rich countries; the World Bank is more concerned with developing nations (Mundy, 
1999). However, the World Bank is the biggest player in this reform movement. A World 
Bank report published in 1990 concludes: 
 
The World Bank plays a singularly important role in international lending for 
education. Since the 1970s, it has been the largest single provider of external 
funding for educational development, providing approximately 15 percent of all 
official external aid to education. Since bilateral aid is largely for technical 
assistance, the Bank is by far the larger lender for capital investments. In many 
countries, the Bank is the major source of educational policy advice, and other 
agencies increasingly follow the Bank’s lead in such policy and lending. Therefore, 
its experiences and the policy implications of those experiences carry particularly 
significant weight in how educational development and lending proceeds 
worldwide (Haddad, 1990: 37). 
 
Since the early 1980s, the Bank has included decentralised governance reform in its 
financial loan conditions (Heyneman, 2003; Jones, 2007). The World Bank’s enormous 
role is evident by the fact that from 1962 to 2005, no fewer than 129 countries had 
borrowed from the World Bank for education projects, which were valued at USD36.6 
billion (Jones, 2007). During the 1990s, the amount of World Bank loans for education 
increased from the earlier period to be 27 per cent of global external funding on education 
and 40 per cent of the total aid provided for education by international organisations 
(Moutsios, 2009). Those projects were mostly combined with IMF loan programs, such 
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as Structural Adjustment Facilities, Sector Adjustment Loans, Extended Fund Facilities 
and Structural Adjustment Loans. Both organisations even followed the path of DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) coercive mechanism because of the governance reform conditions 
attached to almost all of these financial deals (Moutsios, 2009; Nelson, 1996; Woods, 
2006).  
 
Table 5.1. World Bank Financing of Education (USD million)  
Regions 1990–
1995 
1996–
2000 
2001–
2005 
Africa 1,662 1,108 1,838 
East Asia and the Pacific 2,395 1,972 722 
Europe and Central Asia 421 836 969 
Latin America and the Caribbean 3,458 1,933 2,773 
Middle East and North Africa 632 582 543 
South Asia 1,947 1,362 1,619 
Source: Compiled from (Jones, 2007) 
 
Beck (2005) and Moutsios (2010) call these institutional actors the ‘midwives of the 
global market’ for their roles in causing nation-states and societies to be the instruments 
of capital flows and production–consumption cycles (Moutsios, 2010: 128). Meanwhile, 
Woods names, in particular, the World Bank and the IMF as ‘globalizers’ because ‘they 
have integrated a large number of countries into the world economy by requiring 
governments to open up to global trade, investment, and capital’ (Woods, 2006: 2-3). 
Market-based reforms and economic efficiency had been the general approach that the 
global institutional actors adopted, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Nancy 
Alexander, a former consultant to the New Rules of Global Finance Coalition, a 
Washington DC NGO that advocates financial governance reform within the IMF, 
explains the forms of market-based governance systems that the IMF and the World Bank 
impose on their client countries as follows: 
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To improve resource utilization, the borrowing government should: decentralize by 
establishing school-based management; offer families a choice of schools; involve 
the private sector in financing and service delivery; increase class size; provide 
incentives for teacher achievement; and monitor educational outcomes and 
achievement (Alexander, 2001: 306). 
 
However, since the 1990s, the approach the World Bank and other international donors 
adopted in their sponsorship of decentralisation reform in developing countries shifted 
from neoliberal, market-based reform to democratisation, and from economic to political 
outcomes (Rhoten, 2000; Silver, 2003). Former World Bank official, Steve Berkman, 
wrote that before the 1990s international donors were good friends of many authoritarian 
regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia and were mostly silent about their corrupt 
practices. It was only from the mid-1990s that the World Bank and other donor 
communities became more concerned with undemocratic practices (Berkman, 2008). In 
the education sector, as Rhoten (2000: 603) argues, although the drive for efficiency 
remained, the post-1990s global decentralisation agenda was characterised by the calling 
for ‘a transfer of political power for decision making to citizens or their elected 
representatives’. In addition, the increase in parent and community involvement in 
education was also oriented to ‘offset the power of vested interests’. 
In short, the market and democracy serve as the dominant institutional logics 
introduced by these global institutions. Stephen Heyneman, former senior World Bank 
official, states his impression of the Bank’s development aid during the period 1980–1996 
as follows: 
From my experience, this second period was the birthing ground for other 
assumptions: the virtues of decentralization, private education, private provision 
and financing, targeting public expenditures to the poor, programs for student 
loans … Perhaps nothing more profound occurred in my experience during this 
second era than the collapse of the party/state and the introduction into the World 
Bank of 27 members with new constitutions, new assumptions about democracy, 
economics, freedom of information, travel, trade and nation-building (Heyneman, 
1999: 187-8). 
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Second, the source of isomorphic pressure also came from the justification of professional 
academic discourses (normative). During the period from 1970 to 2009, there had been 
thousands of academic papers produced, and through them, the discourse of educational 
decentralisation possesses strong normative legitimacy. I compare the hit counts recorded 
using the Web of Science, EBSCHOHOST and Google Scholar (academic search engines) 
to show the development of academic discourse on educational decentralisation over that 
period.1 There had been many academic publications on this theme during the 1970s and 
1980s, but this certainly does not reflect the full number because of the development of 
technological record-keeping.   During the 1990s, the number of papers increased 
significantly. EBSCOHOST recorded nearly one thousand peer-reviewed scholarly 
journal papers produced during the 1990s. In the 2000s, helped by the growth of online 
publications, the number of academic publications on the theme increased rapidly. 
 
Figure 5.1. Scholarly Publications that Include the Term ‘Educational Decentralisation’ 
 
 
																																								 																				
1 To retrieve the hit counts, I use common keywords associated with educational decentralisation: 
‘educational decentralization’, ‘school decentralization’, ‘school autonomy’, ‘school-based 
management’, ‘school choice’, and ‘charter school’. I have to acknowledge the different searching 
methods these three engines have, which affected the method I used to retrieve the hit counts. The Web 
of Science and Ebscohost are equipped with one-time multiple searching and filters to elimate the 
repetition, whereas the Google Scholar does not. Hence, for Google Scholar, the retrieval only used two 
keywords: ‘education decentralization’ and its British spelling ‘education decentralisation’ and 
‘educational decentralization’ along with its British spelling ‘educational decentralisation’. 
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Nevertheless, the normative pressure has also been orchestrated by coercive agencies: the 
World Bank, the OECD and UNESCO. In addition to their loans and aid programs that 
influence technical policymaking processes in their client countries, these organisations 
also dispense information about decentralisation through academic forums; seminars, 
research and scholarly publications. They hire professional consultants from some 
universities and fund a large number of policy research projects to incorporate the 
decentralisation and other education reform projects into the realm of academic discourse. 
They publish annual statistics and indicators, seminar proceedings, project reports, policy 
analyses and research findings. Although their statistics and indicators have become the 
references for many countries to review their national education policies (Rubenson, 
2008), their giant information databases have become the reference tool for academic 
communities to conduct many inquiries. Of the three organisations, the World Bank 
appears to be the most comprehensive in this kind of knowledge dissemination. 
 
Figure 5.2. Scholarly Publications by International Agencies, 1970–2015, that Include the Term 
‘Educational Decentralisation’ 
 
Source: Compiled from: documents.worldbank.org; oecd-ilibrary.org and unesco.org  
 
Third, education reform strategies are adopted because nation-states believe the ideal 
model is the one that has been implemented by others so that they introduce this model 
into their sytems (mimetic). The decentralisation models in countries, such as the USA 
and the UK, have been adopted by newly decentralising nations. The models include such 
practices as, for example, the establishment of school district system, local education 
authorities, education vouchers for schools, and locally managed schools or school-based 
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management (Green, 1999; Heyneman, 2009; McGinn and Welsh, 1999; Steiner-Khamsi, 
2002). However, because of the multilateral nature of global education governance, this 
mimetic pressure does not necessarily come through direct imitation, where a newly 
decentralised country borrows the traditionally decentralised country’s policy model. 
This is what Japan did when it first decentralised its education system in the late 1940s 
through the assistance of the First American Mission on Education. Now, those ‘best 
practices’ have been institutionalised as part of the policy recipe offered by international 
organisations. 
 
The Duality of Pressure in Indonesian Educational Decentralisation Reform 
The Global Pressure: From Normative to Coercive 
Indonesia has been intensely engaged with the pressure from global institutions since the 
early years of the New Order, when the country started its massive economic development. 
During the first five-year development plan (1968–1973), which focused on agricultural 
development, the World Bank disbursed its first loan for the rehabilitation of irrigation 
systems in Java and Sumatera (World Bank, 1968). As for education, the first project to 
be supported by the World Bank’s money was the construction and equipment of new 
vocational schools in 1970. However, the World Bank played only a minor role because 
during the 1970s the country’s economy was boosted with the influx of oil money. It is 
this oil revenue, which contributed 70 per cent of total national revenue, that improved 
the economy from the post-1965 catastrophe. This oil bonanza also fuelled the New 
Order’s popularity because the revenue was deployed for massive social welfare projects, 
including thousands of education infrastructure projects. Thanks to this support for 
development, economic growth reached the average rate of 7 per cent during the 1970s 
(Resosudarmo and Kuncoro, 2006). 
The fall of oil prices and the decrease of state investment pressed the country to 
make more radical economic reforms in the mid-1980s, the core of which were 
liberalisation and greater integration with the world economy. These reforms were done 
by increasing competitive exports and encouraging massive private capital inflows. In 
this period, external debt and international institutions played increasingly important roles 
in the country’s economic policies. World Bank consultants were said to be among the 
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most important advocates of the new economic policies (Robison, 1988). Indonesian debt 
before the 1997 crisis was mostly accumulated during the 1980s (Hill, 2000). In 1988, 
the country deregulated the stock market and this was successful in encouraging a massive 
inflow of foreign capital (Hill, 2000). The result of this structural adjustment was 
impressive: during the period 1987 to 1996, the country enjoyed remarkably rapid growth 
(Booth, 2000; Manning, 1997). From 1987 to 1993, the economy grew by 6.7 per cent, 
higher than the period from 1983 to 1987, for which it was only 5 per cent (Manning, 
1997). In the following years, it grew even faster, by 7 per cent, which was considered to 
be among the highest in Asia (Resosudarmo and Kuncoro, 2006). 
As part of this liberalisation, during the 1980s, the international community started its 
call for governance decentralisation and the importance of privatisation. However, 
because of the resilient economy and political stability, the nature of institutional 
pressures for the decentralisation reform was more normative than coercive. In the early 
1980s, an extensive study, titled Management development, was made under the 
sponsorship of multiple international agencies such as: the World Bank, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Labour Organisation 
Overseas Development Administration (UK), the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the Ford Foundation, and the French ministry of external relations. The study 
found that, despite some administrative reforms made in the 1970s, ‘the central 
[Indonesian]  bureaucracy has retained fairly tight control over regional government units’ 
(Hanna and Johnson, 1985: 9). 
From the late 1980s, the management of education came under more serious scrutiny. 
In 1989, the World Bank published another extensive study on basic education, which, 
among other things, highlighted the dual administration of primary education by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). 
Against the government’s claim that this dual administration was the manifestation of 
decentralisation, the report instead argued that ‘it is not, nor should it be, decentralization’ 
(World Bank, 1989: 11). It argued that the MoEC and the MoHA essentially represent 
central government and its bureaucratic culture. The local education offices were 
regarded as ‘little more than post-boxes for channelling data and reports up and down the 
bureaucratic ladder’ (World Bank, 1989: 64). The report blamed this dual administration 
for inefficient governance and poor quality schools. The report recommended the 
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rationalisation of primary education management by ‘giving individual schools greater 
autonomy in designing and carrying out their own educational programs’ (World Bank, 
1989: 99). 
As for secondary education, on 25 January 1990, the Bank approved a USD154.2 
million loan for secondary education management development projects. This loan 
funded numerous programs: sponsoring the ministry’s personnel to earn higher academic 
qualification, providing in-service teachers with upgrading training, strengthening the 
capacity of district education office personnel and introducing curriculum development 
in some particular subjects. One of this project’s objectives was to call for ‘institutional 
reform through greater decentralization’ (World Bank, 1998b: 9). However, this program 
was mostly used for junior secondary schools rather than the senior secondary. Since the 
extension of compulsory education from six to nine years in 1989, junior secondary 
schools were incorporated with the basic education regime. 
The Bank had little to say on the decentralisation issue when it came to senior 
secondary education. However, the demand for institutional reform at the senior 
secondary level was mostly related to its integration with the market economy rather than 
the administrative aspect. Reviews of senior secondary schools had been made earlier in 
1983 and 1984, and management was not the main issue. The 1983 report was about the 
senior secondary school leavers’ performance in the labour market and the 1984 report 
concerned the general audit of secondary education, which emphasised quality. These 
reports were concerned about the loose connection between school teaching and the 
competitive industrial demand (Clark, 1983; World Bank, 1984). To increase the 
competitiveness of senior secondary education, the 1984 report offered some 
recommendations, such as increasing the teaching of English into science and 
mathematics teachers’ training programs. In addition, it also suggested expanding the 
provision of science laboratories and libraries in schools, and developing a national 
examination system for schools that could become a reference for selecting candidates 
for further education and for monitoring school performance (World Bank, 1984). 
The New Order government did respond to such external pressures. Just as in the 
economic sector, where the New Order garnered institutional legitimacy by introducing 
a number of liberal economic policies, so did it in education. Since 1986, the central 
government has initiated some pilot projects dealing with the local content curriculum 
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policy, which granted primary and junior secondary schools some degree of autonomy to 
design their own curriculum. The policy was nationally implemented in 1994 and the 
government allocated 20 per cent of total instructional hours to locally developed subject 
matter (Bjork, 2005). In 1993, the MoEC also started the ‘link and match’ policy for 
senior secondary and higher education. This policy was more closely related to the 
pressures of the global market because it allowed the direct involvement of the private 
sector into school policymaking. For senior secondary schools, the policy required 
cooperation between vocational schools and business, industry and various professional 
associations at the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the curriculum. In 
1995, no fewer than 5000 corporations were involved in this system by becoming training 
centres, offering apprenticeship and providing assistance in curriculum development 
(Djojonegoro, 1996). 
However, neither economic liberalisation nor school decentralisation did alter the 
centralised political decision-making structure. The New Order decoupled the liberal and 
decentralisation policies from the political structure to retain the regime’s domination. As 
Robison (1988) notes, rather than creating a competitive market environment, the 
neoliberal economic reforms resulted in extending the practice of patronage capitalism, 
or crony capitalism, where bureaucrats became patrons for their capitalist clients who 
sought government business licences. Despite some initial efforts for decentralisation, in 
1989, the New Order issued the new law of the national education system through which 
the MoEC regained almost all responsibilities that previously rested in the (MoHA-
controlled) local bureaucracies. In his study on local responses to the Local Content 
Curriculum (LCC) policy, Bjork contends that the deeply institutionalised ‘civil service 
culture’ on the schoolteachers’ side and the entrenched centralist mentality on the central 
officials’ side were  some of the contributing factors to the policy’s ineffectiveness (Bjork, 
2005). To this, I can add that both factors emerged from the unchanged centralised 
structure itself. 
Despite some resistance, the adoption of LCC and the link and match policies shows 
that global pressure did have an effect on changing some centralist practices in education 
governance. That these reforms happened during the 1990s was closely related to the 
changing political environment during that period. Some internal developments, 
particularly regarding issues of democracy and human rights, which put the New Order 
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regime under criticism from its own supporters, gradually tarnished its image in the eyes 
of global communities as well. I shall describe these developments later in this chapter, 
but here I shall show that, in this period, the global pressure for decentralisation became 
more coercive than normative. The decrease in the regime’s internal popularity had 
otherwise strengthened the ‘coercive stand’ of the global isomorphic actors. We can see 
this when assessing two of the World Bank’s documents on the textbook-project loans 
and the report on the Indonesian education crisis. 
Like many developing countries, textbook production in Indonesia used to be highly 
centralised (Heyneman et al., 1981). Leigh (1991) argues that the centralised control over 
school textbooks in Indonesia was essential for the New Order because it helped the 
regime promote national unity and legitimise its rule. The MoEC controlled textbook 
production from design to distribution. The Jakarta-based government printing and 
publishing office, Balai Pustaka, handled alone the massive volume of book printing. 
Private sector firms were involved in developing and publishing non-core course 
curricular materials only after they won a contract through the government bidding 
scheme and met the assessment criteria (Theisen et al., 1990). This centralisation had 
created problems: a textbook could take four years until it was published, and there were 
production inefficiencies and ineffective distribution, particularly for remote and isolated 
areas (Theisen, et al., 1990; World Bank, 1995). The Bank, with UNESCO assistance, 
launched three textbook projects in 1973, 1982 and 1995, and had encouraged the 
involvement of private sector printers and publishers in the production of school 
textbooks. However, it was the latest loan-proposal appraisal report that the pressure for 
private involvement became stronger: 
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In recent years, the private book industry has become more competent and 
aggressive in their marketing strategies, but the school book market is still 
hampered by time-consuming and, thus, costly Government policies and 
procedures … The private book industry must be allowed to play a major role in 
the production and provision of schoolbooks. Eventually, all textbooks and other 
school books should be published and distributed by private firms (World Bank, 
1995: 1-3, bolds added). 
 
This project was planned to end in 2001 but in 1997 textbook production was successfully 
privatised. Since then, private companies play the central role in the school textbook 
business. 
 
Table 5.2. Textbook Production Policy Before and After 1997 
Activities 
Before After 
G P S G P S 
Draft preparation       
Draft assessment       
Publication and printing       
Marketing       
Book selection       
Book purchase       
Distribution to schools       
Book use       
Supervision       
Funding       
G = Government, P = Private publishers, S = Schools 
Source: (Sitepu, 2005) 
 
In August 1997, Indonesia, whose economy was believed to be resilient, despite the 
monetary crises that affected other Asian countries (Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan), 
eventually succumbed to the economic crisis. The 1997 crisis was much more dire than 
the crisis of the 1980s. After struggling for some two months, in October 1997, the New 
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Order government officially called on international institutions to help with its economic 
problem. The World Bank and its twin organisation, the IMF, and a regional partner, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), were the organisations early involved in this attempt 
at economic recovery. This left the New Order government no choice but to follow all of 
these international institutions’ coercive measures. The IMF, for instance, forced the 
government to accept a number of policies as conditions of their financial assistance, 
conditions such as the adoption of tighter fiscal measures, the abolition of state 
monopolies in agricultural products, tariff reduction and the liquidation of under-
performing banks (Robison and Rosser, 1998). The number of international donors then 
proliferated and, as Edi and Setianingtias (2007) recorded, in the period from 2000 to 
2005, there were twenty-two international donors involved in the Indonesia governance 
reforms: eight multilaterals, eleven bilateral organisations and three NGOs. 
In the education sector, internationally accepted measures for deregulation mostly 
came from the World Bank. The Bank was particularly concerned to mitigate the crisis’ 
effects on school enrolments. The Bank sponsored the government’s social safety-net 
programs, among which were those that provided scholarships and block grants. As Jones 
and Hagul (2001) recounted, the enrolment rates before and after the crisis did show some 
falls, but they were easily remedied, thanks to this World Bank program (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3. Age-specific Enrolment Rates by Expenditure Quintile before the Crisis (1996–97), 
During the First Year of Crisis (1997–98), and After the Social Safety Net Intervention (1998–99)  
(percent) 
Age and quintile 
School Years 
1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 
5–6 years 22.5 22.2 21.2 
Poorest 16.7 16.0 16.4 
Second 20.4 20.9 19.2 
Third 23.1 22.4 20.9 
Fourth 25.8 25.5 24.6 
Richest 31.0 31.1 28.6 
7–12 years 95.3 95.0 95.3 
Poorest 91.9 91.5 92.1 
Second 95.2 94.8 94.8 
Third 96.1 96.0 96.1 
Fourth 97.2 96.7 97.4 
Richest 97.8 97.9 98.0 
13–15 years 77.5 77.1 79.0 
Poorest 65.6 66.3 68.7 
Second 74.7 74.0 76.7 
Third 79.7 79.2 80.5 
Fourth 83.4 82.6 85.0 
Richest 87.5 87.1 87.6 
16–18 years 48.6 49.2 51.1 
Poorest 32.2 31.5 34.9 
Second 42.6 42.1 45.2 
Third 49.4 49.9 52.9 
Fourth 56.3 57.9 58.9 
Richest 62.4 68.7 64.2 
Source: (Jones and Hagul, 2001: 217) 
 
In September 1998, the World Bank published its report, Education in Indonesia: from 
crisis to recovery. The report was the revised version of the earlier report, Indonesia: 
suggested priorities for education, which was published in August 1997, the same month 
as the country was first affected by the Asian monetary crisis. This report was the most 
important source of pressure for the implementation of Indonesia’s educational 
decentralisation. It showed that the structure of Indonesian education governance was no 
longer reliable to run the education system and it therefore lost its legitimacy. The 
structural problem of basic education (primary and junior secondary schools), the Bank 
believed, stemmed from its highly convoluted bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was 
characterised by four elements: first, the complexity of organisational structure (more 
than one government department had authority over education matters for primary 
schools); second, the overly centralised administration of junior secondary schools, where 
every issue needed approval from Jakarta; third, the strict and fragmented budgeting 
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mechanism where planning and funding allocations were made in stages that involved 
strict bureaucratic structures; and fourth. less effective school management because very 
limited autonomy was given to public-school principals (World Bank, 1998a). As with 
senior secondary education, the Bank contended that the lack of response to market 
demand was its crucial problem. This problem was exacerbated by inefficient investment 
and inflexible management (World Bank, 1998a). 
The Bank had suggestions for addressing these governance problems. For the basic 
education problems, the Bank called its recommendation an ‘institutional arrangement 
and decentralisation in basic education’. It is at this basic educational level that 
decentralisation terminology is extensively employed. The recommendation was that the 
MoEC should limit its authority to curriculum and assessment, and the other 
responsibilities go to local district governments. In addition, school principals should be 
given a degree of autonomy, and parents and the community should be involved in 
education management. The recommendations are summarised in Table 5.4. 
However, the term ‘decentralisation’ was never used in discussing post-basic 
education. Even though it suggested increasing school autonomy, the Bank tended to put 
senior secondary schools under central government control. If the decentralisation 
solution were to be attached to the senior secondary school issue, so it must be related to 
privatisation. According to the Bank, the business of post-basic education should be 
greatly devolved to the private sector. The government had to put more focus and 
investment on the achievement of universal basic education and reduce its spending as 
much as possible on senior secondary and higher education. The more that private 
institutions were involved, the more efficient would be the government’s budget. In 
addition, the involvement of the private sector would more easily facilitate the instituting 
of a strong alliance between education, the labour market and industry, so that a 
curriculum more responsive to economic and commercial needs could be developed 
(World Bank, 1998a). 
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Table 5.4. Summary of the World Bank Recommendations on Institutional Arrangements and 
Decentralisation in Basic Education 
Policy Changes Implementation Steps 
A. Redefining responsibilities over the long term 
Reassign functions so that responsibilities at 
the junior secondary level would be the same 
as at the primary level, so the structure of basic 
education would be streamlined 
• Consolidate and shift responsibility for basic 
education to local government. Virtually all 
functions would be carried out by the dinas (local 
education office), school, or school cluster: all 
reporting to the bupati (district head). 
• MoEC to continue its responsibility for 
curriculum, testing, and assessment and 
evaluation. 
B. Building institutional capacity 
 • Facilitate the secondment of qualified MoEC staff 
to fill key roles in local agencies. Develop detailed 
arrangements and incentives to encourage such 
secondment and clarify career paths and re-
entry/promotion criteria. 
• Strengthen capacity of line ministries (MoEC and 
MoRA) to carry out quality control and 
monitoring and evaluation of programs 
implemented by local government. 
C. Fostering greater autonomy with accountability in school management 
• Institute improved mechanisms for selecting 
principals and for rewarding good ones and 
replacing weak ones. 
• Develop modular training programs for 
principals where specific deficiencies in 
management skills exist in light of their new 
responsibilities and increased autonomy in a 
decentralised structure. 
• Grant greater autonomy to school principals in 
deciding on resource use and developing school-
based strategies in line with local conditions 
D. Introducing funding mechanisms that promote equity and efficiency 
• Develop funding mechanisms that promote 
efficiency and equity and that balance 
autonomy and accountability. 
• Over time, as local administrators gain 
experience working with performance-
based grants, introduce a funding 
mechanism of unrestricted grants to 
kabupaten based on number of students 
enrolled. 
• Over time, as schools, communities and 
administrators gain experience with use of 
block grants, channel more funds directly to 
schools on a matching basis 
• Implement performance-based grants to districts 
and/or schools. 
• Increase the role of the community and parents in 
diagnosing education problems, following models 
already developed in Indonesia such as 
COPLANER 
Source: (World Bank, 1998a: xx) 
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From the National Crisis of Legitimacy to International Delegitimation 
Barker (1991: 11) defines state legitimacy as ‘the belief in the rightfulness of a state in its 
authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or 
self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority’. The New Order state 
and its practices had been institutionalised and for three decades it was known for its 
centralist and authoritarian character. However, the social and political changes 
developing in the 1990s progressively corroded the regime’s legitimacy. The 1990s was 
a period when external and internal pressures to the centralised regime came to a head. 
Democratisation movements that swept up neighbouring regions, such as the Philippines, 
South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s, added new external pressure to the centralist 
authoritarian regime. Since then, discourses on demokrasi (democracy), keterbukaan 
(openness) and hak asasi manusia (human rights) had become standard themes of the 
regime’s critics (Aspinall, 1996). People were becoming aware that the state was not 
organised ideally. To all of these developments, the New Order responded with repression. 
During that period, the regime closed 16 mass media organisations, and arrested and 
detained many pro-democracy activists. 
The other critical challenge to the New Order’s legitimacy was the massive discontent 
in the provinces, which was generally caused by the regional discrepancies. The major 
reason for these discrepancies dated back to the regime’s centralised economic policy that 
made the island of Java, where the national capital of Jakarta is located, the pivot of major 
economic activities. It was reported that, from a total of 4696 investment projects during 
the period 1968 to 1982, 3113 (66.3 per cent) were in Java and the rest were in the other 
islands. Most of the investment projects in the other areas were related to natural resource 
exploitation, such as mining, logging and plantations, but projects in Java were mostly 
related to infrastructure development and the production of import substitution goods 
(Ramli, 2005). The organisation of natural resource exploitation was by the Jakarta-based 
ministry (law 11 of 1967) and the regions often felt that they only served Jakarta as ‘dairy 
cattle’ with only small benefits in return (Trajano, 2010). The centralised development 
policies forced massive migration to Java, leaving the outer islands with a population loss. 
All of these created the vast developmental disparity between Java and other islands (see 
Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5. Regional Distribution of GDP and Population (%), 1996 
Region GDP Population 
Jakarta 16.0 4.7 
Java–Bali 45.5 55.4 
Mining four* 14.1 6.3 
Sumatera 13.7 17.1 
Kalimantan 4.1 4.2 
Sulawesi 4.3 7.1 
Eastern islands** 2.3 5.2 
Indonesia 100 100 
Source: (Booth, 2000) 
* Provinces of Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua 
** Provinces of West and East Nusa Tenggara, East Timor and Maluku 
 
The central–regional development differential had led to the formation of a number of 
regional anti-Jakarta movements. Aceh, Papua and East Timor were areas where 
separatist movements were strongest. Aceh and Papua were two of four prominent 
provinces with the largest mining industries. Later, in the late 1990s, separatist aspirations 
also appeared in other ‘mining’ regions, such as Riau, East Kalimantan and South Maluku. 
Some separatist movements, particularly those of Aceh, East Timor and Papua, had 
started in the 1960s and 1970s, but the regime’s repressive treatment of them drew more 
international attention in the 1990s. In 1993, Amnesty International reported that 2000 to 
10,000 people had been killed in Aceh during the military operations from 1990 to 1992 
(Ross, 2005). The New Order regime was also in the international spotlight when two 
East Timorese separatist leaders, José Ramos-Horta, and the Roman Catholic bishop, 
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. 
All these developments were a severe challenge to the New Order’s legitimacy and 
when the unforeseen 1997 Asian financial crisis shook the regime’s economic structure, 
the deinstitutionalisation process of the New Order centralist regime was accomplished. 
The state was seen to be technically dysfunctional because it failed to control its economy. 
The local currency, the rupiah, was continuously depreciating against the US dollar, from 
around 2000 rising to 16,000 to the dollar. Repayments of billions of dollars of external 
debts were overdue with very little foreign exchange reserves available. Inflation 
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skyrocketed and prices rose beyond people’s reach. The social distrust of the regime and 
its institutional order was widespread. Demonstrations took place all over the country, the 
demonstrators chanting only one word, reformasi (reform). A number of ethnic conflicts 
broke out followed by widespread destruction of property. The culmination of social 
unrest was the 12 to 15 May riots in Jakarta in which thousands of people flooded the city 
and took part in uncontrolled destruction. The rioters plundered Chinese businesses and 
attacked their owners. 
Eventually, the regime lost its political legitimacy and its supporters were routed. On 
20 May 1998, fourteen of Suharto’s ministers resigned: this left no choice but for the 
president to resign, which he did the following day. As quoted by one of his loyalists, 
Fuad Bawazier, the president made the decision because, as he said, ‘I felt the public no 
longer trusted me and some of my ministers no longer wanted to help me’ (CNN 
Indonesia, 2015). 
 
Decentralisation and the Central Government Response to the Pressure 
Decentralisation as a Compensatory Legitimation 
The fall of Suharto facilitated the arrival of a new era, the era of Reformasi, when all 
institutions were co-opted to restore legitimacy. Indeed, the environmental setting for 
Reformasi was anything but the New Order’s centralist and authoritarian structure. 
Thousands of narratives from mass demonstrations, public seminars, academic 
publications, mass media op-eds, even casual conversations in cafes, were dominated by 
one theme: democracy (Schwarz, 1999). Millions of dollars of foreign funds went to local 
NGOs for the democratisation campaign (Hadiwinata, 2003). International loans to help 
the government restructure the economy also encouraged conditions for the government 
to enable democratic and transparent governance (Grenville, 2004). 
The situation left no choice for the new government but to conform to the new political 
environment. Suharto’s successor, his former loyalist and vice-president, BJ Habibie, 
soon showed his government’s commitment to change by issuing a number of strategic 
policies to promote democratic institutions. Habibie needed to prove that his government 
was not intending to prolong his former political patron’s regime. In early 1999, he issued 
three fundamental regulations: on political parties (law 2 of 1999), on elections (law 3 of 
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1999) and on parliamentary arrangements (law 5 of 1999). These regulations enabled the 
establishment of political parties, assured transparent elections and empowered the 
parliament. Habibie also made himself transitional president and reduced his presidential 
term from the remaining four years to a year and a half, that is, until the next election. 
The campaign for democracy resumed. In October 1999, the parliament started more 
fundamental constitutional amendments, which were completed in 2002. In 2000, a 
parliamentary joint session (MPR) enacted laws to separate the administration of the 
police force from the army and to reduce the political roles of both organisations. The 
complete abolition of military representation in the parliament came later, in 2004. 
With democracy being offered to replace the previous authoritarian practices, a more 
fundamental question arose: how would the new democracy deal with the threat of 
secession? Bertrand (2004) argues that another fundamental problem following the 
institutional transformation in Indonesia was the renegotiation of the previously 
established national model. Thus, soon after the reform, this involved such questions as 
the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative importance of the central and the 
regional governments, the access to and representation of ethnic groups in the state’s 
institutions and the rights to local resources (Bertrand, 2004). The challenge for the new 
democratic arrangement was how to ensure these aspirations would not lead to another 
crisis of legitimacy. 
Indonesia was unfortunate because, in addition to the continuing separatist aspirations 
in East Timor, Papua and Aceh, such renegotiations had to contend with the deadly ethnic 
conflicts in the eastern regions of the country: Maluku, Central Sulawesi and in East and 
Central Kalimantan. These conflicts centred on competition for resources between the 
natives of the regions and immigrants. Those conflicts were unresolved for more than a 
decade. They revealed a state weakened after the dismantling of military power in the 
new democratic arrangement. Unlike Suharto’s repressive but effective model, the supply 
of civilian security units from Jakarta was not adequate to effect a resolution. The reduced 
authority of the state was also shown when, in May 1999, President Habibie arranged for 
a referendum to determine the status of East Timor. The voting took place on 30 August 
1999; only 21.5 per cent of the votes were for accepting the Indonesian government’s 
proposal of special autonomy. This result initiated the separation of East Timor from 
Indonesia (Schulze, 2001). 
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Hence, all these regional developments increased the urgency to be rid of the aims, 
methods and ambitions of the New Order’s centralist policies. In May 1999, President 
Habibie enacted two decentralisation laws that gave autonomy to provincial, district and 
municipal governments with greater autonomy for the latter two; law 22 of 1999 on local 
governance, and law 25 of 1999 on central–local government fiscal balance. The 
significant degree of district and municipal autonomy reflects the way that the law 22 of 
1999 provided more liberty for local parliaments to select regents and mayors, requiring 
neither provincial nor central government approval. But the selection of provincial 
governors is different; the provincial legislatures still must consult the president (GoI, 
1999c). Another decentralisation law, dealing with central–regional finances, rearranged 
the allocation of local revenue, particularly taking into account the availability of local 
natural resources. Except for oil and gas, local governments are allowed a 60 to 80 per 
cent share from the benefits of their natural resource exploitation (GoI, 1999a). This is 
different from the previous arrangement in which the central government took a greater 
share of the revenue from the exploitation of natural resources in all regions. 
The laws, however, had drawn criticism from those NGOs and political parties that 
preferred federalism or advocated that more autonomy be devolved to the provinces. 
Prominent politicians, like Amien Rais and Yusril Ihza Mahendra, indicated their 
preference for provincial autonomy. However, the dominant Golkar party and the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [PDI-
P]) were reluctant to accept the idea, they claimed that it was counter to the nature of the 
unitary system of the state (Ferrazzi, 2000). The pressure for federalism escalated when 
Habibie was succeeded by Abdurrahman Wahid. Early in Wahid’s term, the East 
Kalimantan legislature sent their official lobbyists to the national parliament to promote 
federalism. Legislators from South Sulawesi also issued a proposal for federalism to 
negotiate with local student demonstrators in their demands for independence. The same 
proposal also came from Riau province. Nevertheless, those supporting either district or 
provincial autonomy were arguing that their respective ideas be adopted to prevent 
separatist aspirations and to protect national unity. Prominent social activist, Romo 
Mangunwijaya, claimed that federalism was favoured by Mohammad Hatta, Soekarno’s 
partner in declaring independence, and was needed to discourage civil unrest. Ryaas 
Rasyid, the main drafter of the decentralisation law, argued that giving the provinces 
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greater autonomy would make it easier for them to consolidate and organise separatism, 
something that the districts could not possibly do (Ferrazzi, 2000). 
The decentralisation policy had proven to be successful in blocking separatist efforts. 
Until recently, East Timor was the only province to split from the Indonesian Republic. 
Special treatment, however, was given to two other provinces with historic separatist 
aspirations: Aceh and Papua. In 2001, the national legislature passed, and the central 
government promulgated, two different laws on special autonomy: one for Papua, the 
other for Aceh. Unlike other provinces, Aceh and Papua were granted provincial 
autonomy. The law was amended in 2006 for Aceh after the Helsinki agreement, and in 
2008 for Papua, after the establishment of the new province of West Papua. 
 
The Task Force for Education Reform 
The World Bank report and the promulgation of the decentralisation law became an 
institutional pressure for the education sector’s governance arrangement. The inclusion 
of education management as part of the authority transferred to the local district 
government was in line with the World Bank’s recommendation. However, there was no 
exact understanding of how this school management would look like in the new 
decentralised structure. The law itself would be effectively implemented in 2001, so there 
were still two years to prepare. A few months after the publication of the 1998 World 
Bank report, the central government commissioned what they called Kelompok Kerja 
untuk Reformasi Pendidikan (Task Force for Education Reform [TFER]). The task force 
comprised a great many professionals: university academics, education specialists and 
high-ranking policy makers. The Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of 
National Planning became its sponsoring organisations.2 However, all task force activities 
																																								 																				
2 As education came to be decentralised, in 1999, the Wahid government changed the department’s name 
from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). 
This was to differentiate the central education department from the regional education offices. Another 
reason for the change was President Wahid’s own philosophical position; he understood that culture is 
too universal to be technically administered by a particular bureaucratic organisation. After this change, 
the Directorate General of Culture was then removed from the Ministry of Education and, later, under 
the Megawati government, was subsumed under the Ministry of Tourism. However, in 2011, President 
Yudhoyono restored the Directorate General of Culture to be part of the central Education Department 
and the Ministry was officially renamed its old label: the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC). 
The thesis uses MoEC in all contexts because the study was conducted after 2011. 
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were jointly funded by the Indonesian government, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The TFER was expected to develop more comprehensive 
recommendations for Indonesia’s education reform (Jalal and Supriadi, 2001). In 1999 
and 2000, the TFER held two national conferences to garner more inputs from larger 
professional communities and then followed with several meetings to formulate 
recommendations. The first conference, ‘Indonesian Education: Overcoming the Crisis, 
Calling to the Reform’ was in February 1999; the second, ‘Education Reform in the 
Context of Local Autonomy’, was one year later, in July 2000. 
If we look at the TFER documents compiled by Jalal and Supriadi (2001), it appears 
that all the TFER activities were to respond officially and to endorse the World Bank’s 
recommendations. Their task was to find a way those recommendations could be adjusted 
to the new decentralised structure. The TFER ratified the World Bank strategy to fully 
devolve the administration of basic education to the local governments. It meant that the 
jurisdiction of primary schools and junior secondary schools would be transferred to the 
district and municipal governments. The committee also designed a strategy to reach that 
goal, which involved the merger of local offices of the (central government) Department 
of Education and local government education offices; and the control of the merged 
offices would be by the local government. Under the direction of local government, a new 
organisation would be also founded, to be known as the Board of Education Research and 
Consultation, whose members would consist of more professionals that are independent. 
The board would provide the local education offices with professional support on policy 
research as well as recording the aspirations of the public on education matters. This kind 
of independent institution is seen to be important, given that many local career 
bureaucrats assigned to run the local education offices, without being supervised by the 
central MoEC, were believed to lack technical capability. The design of this 
decentralisation framework, however, still left room for the central government’s 
involvement, particularly in curricular development and guideline setting. 
In addition, the TFER also adopted the World Bank’s recommendation to provide 
more autonomy to schools through the school-based management (SBM) program. The 
TFER document states that ‘educational decentralisation would eventually disembogue 
into SBM’ (Jalal and Supriadi, 2001: 141). The SBM was designed to organise 
community participation in school management in the form of school committees. In the 
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long run, such community participation was hoped to reduce public school reliance on 
government funding, particularly from the central government. And, once full autonomy 
was achieved, the school committee would be given a greater role in school governance, 
such as appointing principals, evaluating teacher performance, overseeing finance 
management and taking part in curriculum development. However, given the diverse 
characteristics of schools and their environments, SBM was to be gradually implemented. 
According to TFER, Indonesian schools can be classified into developed (maju), average 
(sedang) and less developed (kurang maju). The developed schools were usually in a 
supportive environment, such as a highly educated community whose degree of 
participation is presumed to be high and with a well-funded local government that is less 
reliant for revenue from the central government. Similar logic applies to the average and 
less developed schools. Therefore, the TFER classified three models of SBM 
implementation: minimum, medium and full. 
There were some other ideas developing during the TFER discussions with regard to 
decentralisation, for example, the adoption of American-style school boards. The 
organisations would consist of independent members politically appointed by the local 
community. The school committees were to operate at individual schools, the school 
boards would supervise a number of schools in an area. Responsibilities of this 
organisation range from preparing selection criteria for teachers and students; selecting 
independent institutions to conduct school performance audits; and deciding the subsidy 
allocation to schools and its recipients (Gardiner, 2000). 
The decentralisation policy, however, was designed to be initiated with a transition 
period in which the ministry of education would still provide supervision to those new 
local education offices until the time when full decentralisation would be implemented. 
As such, the SBM implementation was to be gradual; in short, there would be medium 
and long-term implementation. All of these decentralisation strategies were intended to 
apply to basic education (primary and junior secondary school). As with the senior 
secondary education, the focus was on how to make their curriculum suited to the needs 
of the labour market. To address the issue of inequality, the TFER adopted the World 
Bank suggestion of keeping the investment priority to basic education and increasing 
parent and community participation in financing secondary education by continuing the 
scholarship assistance for the poor (Jalal and Supriadi, 2001: 109). 
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Managing the Institutional Contradiction 
Decentralisation and the Rise of Local States 
Regional decentralisation was effectively implemented in January 2001. Following the 
decentralisation, district governments were authorised to take all administrative 
responsibilities, except in six areas: foreign policy, defence and security, the justice 
system, monetary and fiscal matters, religion and other responsibilities that are subject to 
the national interest. The local government responsibilities comprised public works, 
health, education and culture, agriculture, transport, trade and industry, investment, 
environment, land, cooperation and manpower (GoI, 1999c). The Weberian theory of the 
state says that ‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 2009: 77). From this 
perspective, it appears that although the new local governments own the legitimate source 
of territorial claim (land, agriculture and environment), the source of physical force, 
which is defence and security, remains centralised. 
However, as civilisation develops and sociological theories advance, physical force is 
no longer seen as the only means of power today. For example, Dahl (1957) 
conceptualises ‘determination of behaviour’, Bacharach and Lawler (1976) claim 
‘offensive and defensive tactics to manipulate outcomes’, Foucault (1980) theorises 
‘knowledge’, and Bourdieu (2011) offers ‘the accumulation of capital’ as the means of 
power. In reality, the list of decentralised responsibilities has given the local governments 
enough capacity to accumulate capital (economic, cultural and symbolic), create different 
bureaucratic behaviours away from the central agenda and pose resistance to 
manipulative central influence. For the local governments, decentralisation was a 
celebration. In 2001, hundreds of regional by-laws were issued to initiate bureaucratic 
consolidation: the dissolution of central government department offices in localities by 
merging them with local offices. In the education sector, it meant the closing of 27 
provincial offices and 306 district offices of the central MoEC. All publicschool teachers 
had their employment status transferred to district and municipal governments. 
The expansion of local states was also evident in the way these new local governments 
responded to the democratisation agenda. As Hadiz (2004: 711) witnessed in his 
fieldwork in North Sumatera and East Java in the early days of decentralisation, the 
process of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia ‘has been characterised by 
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the rise of new patterns of highly diffuse and decentralised corruption, rule by predatory 
local officials, the rise of money politics and the consolidation of political gangsterism’. 
Democratic procedures were co-opted by the entrenched interests of local patronage. He 
also reported that many local business people complained because the local government 
started imposing heavy levies on the ground that ‘they [business people] have to give 
back to society some of the profits they have enjoyed’ (Hadiz, 2004: 709). 
However, this radical decentralisation raised serious concerns among international 
communities. It was reported that major donor institutions, naamely the IMF, USAID and 
the World Bank, expressed their concern about the extensive local district autonomy. The 
IMF was worried about the potential expansion of Indonesia’s debt if the localities were 
not exempted from borrowing separately from the central government (Silver, 2003). 
USAID suggested amending the law to give more autonomy to provincial rather than 
district governments, though knowing that it would provoke resistance from district 
regents and mayors (Hadiz, 2004). Meanwhile, the World Bank was concerned with the 
absence of detailed guidelines and called for more reviews. The World Bank described 
its impression as follows: 
 
The ministry is still under-prepared for decentralization and is uncertain about how 
to execute obligations determined by law 22. Whether or not the degree of initial 
ministry inaction reflected a ‘digging-in’ against and resistance to decentralization, 
an unawareness of what is ‘around the corner’ in terms of the turmoil that 
decentralization may cause, or any other factor is unclear (World Bank, 2001: 4). 
 
The central government did attempt to respond to such mixed reactions to 
decentralisation. In January 2002, only one year after the decentralisation implementation, 
a proposal to revise the decentralisation law was made by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Among the most important provisions in this proposal was an article that gives the 
president the power to dissolve a regional legislature and another provision for 
withdrawal of regional powers if a region fails to perform its obligatory functions (King, 
2004). However, an official I interviewed in Jakarta said it was difficult to set new 
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limitations once the freedom has been given. The revised draft provoked local resistance 
and was attacked as an attempt to recentralise and a return to authoritarianism. The central 
government then decided to postpone the revision until the local resistance settled down 
(King, 2004). 
Local State-based Decentralisation versus School-Community-based Decentralisation 
Different responses to the early implementation of decentralisation reflected the 
greater contradiction of institutional logics brought by the external and internal pressures 
for decentralisation. On one hand, the internal pressure arose from the local élite’s 
discontent with the Jakarta-centred governance and aspired to a more local state-oriented 
decentralisation. The euphoria that followed regional decentralisation has taken the 
implementation of educational decentralisation for granted. It was seen as a ‘gift’ from 
the political process, despite many reform programs being planned. By then district and 
municipal governments held unchallenged control over all school levels, including senior 
secondary schools whose decentralisation was not planned for. In the previous design, 
secondary and higher education were to have remained centralised because they prepared 
students for tough competition in the labour market and local governments were reputed 
to lack the technical capacity to do this. All was justified because, despite the massive 
structural change, there was no regulatory guide to show how this new arrangement would 
fit into the current education system, which still referred to the central government 1989 
education law. 
Rather than democratisation, this local state-oriented decentralisation tends to lean 
towards the consolidation of local bureaucracies. In this sense, the education sector has a 
potential to be co-opted in two ways: structural and cultural. First, political 
decentralisation has placed education and school personnel (principals, teachers and 
administrative staff) in the structure of the local district government bureaucracy, so that 
local government élites would strive to retain their new privileges in controlling their new 
asset. Second, as some studies have shown (for example, Bjork, 2005; Sumintono, 2006; 
Chang et al., 2013), Indonesian teachers have a long, deep-seated self-image drawn from 
a civil service patrimonial culture rather than professional tradition. This established 
culture becomes fertile ground for the growth of local bureaucratic intervention. 
On the other hand, the external institutional pressure, whose ideas were crystallised in 
the World Bank report and the TFER recommendations, tended to the more liberal 
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democratic platform of decentralisation where schools are empowered and the state 
intervention at all levels is regulated. The district-level decentralisation was also part of 
the plan but only for the district government to facilitate school autonomy and community 
participation. International institutions were worried that excessive power rested in the 
hands of local district governments and wished the central government to regulate some 
limitations (Blunt et al., 2012; World Bank, 2003). The 2001, a World Bank document, 
titled ‘Strengthening local education capacity’, explicates that Indonesia’s educational 
decentralisation should be oriented to 
 
… (i) strengthening districts’ capacity to plan, budget, manage and monitor basic 
education programs and to support school-based management; (ii) strengthening 
and supporting schools’ capacities to plan, budget and monitor school improvement; 
and (iii) enhancing the role of the community in school governance (World Bank, 
2001: 5-6) 
 
The legal basis of educational decentralisation had been introduced earlier in 2000 when 
the government issued the law on national development programs for the period 2000–
2004 (GoI, 2000). It says that educational decentralisation would involve: 
 
The realisation of school/community-based management by introducing the 
concept and initiating the establishment of a School Board in each 
district/municipality as well as the empowerment or establishment of School 
Committees in all schools (GoI, 2000). 
 
Yet, the absence of an implementing guideline for this provision when political 
decentralisation started in 2001 allowed the idea of school-based decentralisation to be 
overlooked. 
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Managing the Contradiction 
Thornton et al. (2012) suggest that the institutional contradiction would lead to either 
transformational or developmental changes. The former takes on one of three strategies 
(replacement, blending and segregation); the latter adopts one of four strategies 
(assimilation, elaboration, expansion and contraction). I argue that in the case of 
Indonesian educational decentralisation, the central government has adopted the 
assimilation strategy, that is, the incorporation of elements of the less dominant logic into 
the more prevalent one (Thornton, et al., 2012). In this sense, the local district-oriented 
decentralisation becomes the prevailing logic because it originates from internal 
aspirations, whereas the school-based decentralisation, which is imported from an 
external environment, would have its ‘practices and symbols made part of the prevalent 
logic’ (Thornton, et al., 2012: 165). However, assimilation does not necessarily lead to 
passive acceptance. Assimilation could also become the strategy of resistance and counter 
the dominant institution (Thornton, et al., 2012). 
The Indonesian government had to maintain its legitimacy by allowing the two 
contradictory institutional logics to coexist as an integrated decentralisation structure. 
When decentralisation was first implemented in 2001, the education governance was 
caught up by the local state-oriented decentralisation system. This means that district 
governments along with their attached political structure (executive and legislative) 
became the only local education authority that controls basic and secondary education. 
The legitimate justification of this came not from educational regulations but from the 
1999 decentralisation law. This was mainly because of the absence of technical guidelines 
that defined the real intention and design of educational decentralisation. When the central 
officials realised the problem, it was already too late. A former senior official of the 
MoEC and the TFER initiator explained the situation. 
 
At first, I did not expect that the decentralisation could be realised. But, as the 
reform happened, it turned out that it did happen and was too overwhelming. The 
frameworks were yet to be set up but everything had been suddenly assigned [to the 
districts]. At that time we began to falter. The central government was hesitant in 
designing the rules. The freedom has already been given and it is no longer easy to 
establish any limitations … (Participant 32). 
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Therefore, rather than creating limitations to the district power on education, the ministry 
opted to legitimate the centrality of the district government role in education. Later, in 
2003, the new education system law officially endorsed this principle. However, to obtain 
the external legitimacy, the ministry also promoted the school and community-based 
decentralisation by adopting symbols and practices popularly used in educationally 
decentralised countries: school-based management and school boards. After an intensive 
campaign in 2001, in April 2002, MoEC issued ministerial decree 044/u/2002 on 
education boards and school committees. The ministry developed and upgraded the 
regulation later, in 2007 and in 2010. The regulation and its revisions were provided to 
balance district powers in education but without necessarily extending its given authority. 
The result is a rather different structural form of community and school decentralisation 
from what had been planned by the TFER. 
Unlike similar organisations in traditionally decentralised societies like the USA and 
Canada, where education board members are democratically elected and the organisation 
has more control over education resources (Brown, 1990), members of Indonesian 
education boards are selected by a government-appointed committee for their particular 
technical and political qualifications. And, unlike the initial TFER proposal that equipped 
the organisation with some decision-making powers, the current education boards have a 
non-binding, consultative function only. They do not have control over schools in their 
localities, nor may they impose any policy initiative. Rather, they are set to be the 
governments ‘partners’ at every administrative level. They serve as independent 
organisations to collect and to pool thoughts and aspirations in education matters that may 
then be channelled to the government or the parliament at respective administrative levels. 
They may propose or recommend policies but the central or local governments are not 
bound to implement them. This form of education board was the best the central 
government could set up to complement the school-based and local state-oriented 
decentralisation structure. Giving more decision-making power to the education boards 
would be resisted by local governments. 
As such, the vocabulary of school-based management is also introduced with school 
committees becoming the symbol of autonomy and participation. The school-based 
management (SBM) policy allows schools to manage some administrative tasks 
independently, such as planning school programs, setting school budgets, creating extra-
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curricular activities and evaluating staff performance. In executing this role, school 
principals and teachers are assisted by the school committee. The democratic kernel of 
the school committee is that they were designed primarily to represent parents. But, 
school committees may also include other representatives: teachers, government officials, 
business organisations, local community leaders and education specialists (GoI, 2010b; 
MoEC, 2002). Yet, to adjust to the district autonomy, the role of school committees was 
made slightly different from what was designed before. According to the earlier design, 
for instance, a school committee might have had more influence and authority in the long 
term for, inter alia, hiring teachers and nominating principals (Jalal and Supriadi, 2001). 
In this current structure, the recruitment of permanent staff and the appointment of 
principals remains under the local government authority. 
The design of school and community-based decentralisation structures has raised 
criticisms among Indonesian education professionals. One respected education professor 
and former chair of the Indonesian education scholars association (Ikatan Sarjana 
Pendidikan Indonesia) whom I interviewed in Jakarta said that an education board is 
nothing more than another name for the New Order’s education consultative council 
(Majelis Pertimbangan Pendidikan), which gave non-binding advice only. Because of 
their lack of decision-making power, many education boards are ineffectual. He said that 
an organisation of national education boards has not been formed because the MoEC 
officials themselves know that such a board would not have any substantial influence on 
education. With regard to school committees, he believed from the beginning that school 
committees could not work effectively in most Indonesian schools, which are 
predominantly rural. Either parents or community leaders who become school committee 
members would be patronised by school bureaucrats because they are not well educated. 
Another former senior official of MoEC and the president of a prominent teacher-
training university whom I interviewed in Surabaya said that despite their more extended 
role, school committees could not escape the shadow of their predecessor, BP3. BP3 is 
the Indonesian abbreviation for Board of Education Assistance, whose members comprise 
parents and teachers. Despite its formal role to bridge school-community-parents 
relations, BP3s had the pragmatic task of legitimising and collecting school fees 
(Kristiansen and Pratikno, 2006). He said that he had observed that many school 
committees behave as the BP3s did, that is, as fundraisers. He added: 
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Our school committees are established only for the sake of fulfilling the required 
organisational structure. They function more as a parent representative bodies to 
validate this and that. Not many engage in more substantial matters (Participant 34). 
 
Nevertheless, as the former vice-minister argued, the central government had more 
strategic reasons for establishing the structure beyond the issue of technical contribution 
to education. He said that education boards and school committees were to contain the 
potential of local bureaucratic intervention. He said that for the sake of constructive 
education policy, education boards should play a balancing role and mediate the relations 
between the bureaucracy and schools. 
 
We hoped that local education boards would serve as the anchor for school 
committees. If there are frictions between schools and school committees or if there 
are problems between schools along with their school committees and the Dinas 
bureaucracy, they can go to the education board seeking backup … (But) the 
education board can also collaborate with the local government to endorse what is 
best from the legislative agendas for education … Or if the government has no 
initiative, it (may) collaborate with the local parliament to push the government (to 
come up with better policy) … So, in this triangle it should be more dynamic 
(Participant 32). 
 
As such, the inclusion of various elements into school committees was hoped to reinforce 
the school-based decentralisation structure against local bureaucratic interference. The 
former vice-minister of education admitted: 
 
We imagined that the SBM would become an umbrella or a kind of shield to prevent 
local bureaucratic intervention from being too deep into the school. With SBM, 
apart from [having a] good budget plan and its spending for maximum learning 
quality purposes, [we also hoped that] professional dialogues could be strengthened 
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in the school … We hoped that the existing [local bureaucratic] influences could be 
tamed because the school already has a strong constellation (Participant 32). 
 
Having maintained the two logics of educational decentralisation, the central government 
has its compensatory legitimacy secured. And, as the problem of institutional legitimacy 
has been resolved, the next step is to set up the technical guidelines for this new structure 
that, effectively, is running the whole education governance. However, the concern with 
the technical strategy would risk the central government’s legitimacy. Transferring power 
to localities has, on the one hand, given the central government a compensatory 
legitimacy because, for Indonesia, decentralisation was a ‘make or break’ game. By 
keeping the distance from decision-making power and giving more autonomy to localities, 
the central state has survived the legitimacy crisis that threatened its survival. But, on the 
other hand, decentralisation also means losing the political legitimacy in particular 
decentralised areas so that any central government’s steps to return to influence in those 
territories must be taken carefully, because it might ignite a challenge to legitimacy. This 
tension between institutional legitimacy and the demand for technical efficiency is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
Educational decentralisation has come as the result of global institutionalisation. From 
fewer than ten countries associated with its implementation before the 1970s, educational 
decentralisation has now become a global norm with almost all nations in the world 
engaging with it. The process of global institutionalisation of educational decentralisation 
emerged from the legitimacy crisis of centralised regimes in individual nation-states and 
the external institutional pressures played by isomorphic actors through coercive, 
normative and mimetic mechanisms. The most important institutional actors in global 
education governance are the World Bank, the OECD and UNESCO. The duality of 
external (global) and internal (local-national) pressure becomes the model that fits the 
process of the educational decentralisation reform in Indonesia. 
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In Indonesia, decentralisation had been adopted in education governance from the time 
of the establishment of the Indonesian nation-state. However, as the World Bank 
contended in the 1980s, it was not a real decentralisation because the local authorities that 
ran education were branches of two central ministerial bureaucracies and this system 
created a highly fragmented and bureaucratised education governance. The global 
pressure for the adoption of ‘real’ decentralisation in Indonesia commenced since the late 
1970s when the economic crisis affected the severe legitimacy crisis of the centralised 
system in many countries, and decentralisation emerged as a global panacea. However, 
the internal legitimacy of the Indonesian centralised regime reached its peak at that time, 
so that external pressure met no local acceptance. It was in the 1990s, when the centralised 
regime started to lose its legitimacy due to political and economic crises, that the 
decentralisation could be fully embraced. 
Nevertheless, because of this legitimacy project, educational decentralisation was 
placed not within the environment of education policy, that is, to meet the technical needs 
of education, but rather to adjust to the greater institutional order of new political 
arrangements, the political decentralisation. For the sake of garnering internal and 
external legitimacy, the central government must embrace this structural reality by 
subsuming the much awaited and externally adopted plan of school and community-based 
decentralisation into the local government autonomy framework. The result of this 
institutional assimilation was an imbalanced structure; the local state overpowering the 
institutionalised community participation. Even though this decentralised structure has 
given the central government its legitimacy, the further question is how this legitimacy 
could be preserved. When the central government has to go further with more technical 
intervention to make sure that the decentralised structure can effectively address the real 
educational problems, another question of legitimacy might arise because of the 
conflicting interests from this act of intervention. The following chapter will further 
discuss this problem. 
 
 

 Chapter VI 
Manipulating the Legitimacy:  
The Centralised Standards in the Decentralised Structure 
 
Back then, in the early 2000s, I expected that the central ministry would be just a 
small [organisation] because it has no more left [to control]. In the future, it would 
be only a place where people are doing research and making policy. But it is not 
the case now, is it? Even when a school is damaged, the minister reacts ... Now they 
even create a directorate general of teacher, whereas they no longer own the 
teacher. Teachers belong to the district, don’t they? ... The central government does 
not trust the district and the district does not trust the school (Participant 34). 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explained that Indonesian educational decentralisation was more 
politically than educationally constructed. The educational decentralisation reform’s 
initial presence as a legitimacy project owed more to political decentralisation than to a 
concept of a professionally planned education reform. After surviving the legitimacy 
crisis, however, the central government started tinkering with more technical aspects of 
education reform. As this ensued, the debates about educational decentralisation became 
no longer important and the politicians entrusted every technical detail of decentralisation 
implementation to be handled by the MoEC. MoEC officials had to create a system of 
education management that accommodates local differences and, at the same time, 
become globally competitive. However, the decentralised structure must be strongly 
highlighted here because it was the structure that kept the central state legitimate. For this 
reason, the central government could not reprise its old paradigm where regional 
autonomy was seen more as the local ‘obligation’ to participate in the national 
development process  rather than the local ‘right’ (Bünte, 2004). Nor could it repeat its 
old trials of decentralisation where district governments and schools were given the 
responsibilities but central government structures continued to expand and interfere with 
local administrations. In other words, the central government needed to preserve its 
legitimacy by retaining the decentralised structure, but at the same time make its reform 
agendas address educational problems effectively. 
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Employing the concept of decoupling, this chapter elaborates the central government’s 
strategies to cope with this dilemma. Through the means–end decoupling, the 
decentralised structure was reinforced; the central-government structure in localities was 
left as an historical narrative, but the central government’s control was restored in a 
different, non-interventionist way called standardisation. This chapter discusses how the 
central project of standardisation was justified, organised and enforced in the educational 
decentralisation framework. In the final part, this chapter also provides an analysis of how 
the enforcement of the central government’s standards gave effect to the arrangement of 
education nationally and locally. This later analysis also becomes the brief introduction 
to the two case studies of local governance practices that will be elaborated in Chapters 
VII and VIII. 
 
The Decoupling Justified 
The Discourse of Local Incompetence 
In his conceptualisation of compensatory legitimation, Weiler argues that decentralisation 
is not about giving authority to the local, but about ‘appearing to be committed to 
decentralisation and thus reaping the benefits in legitimation to be derived from that 
appearance’ (Weiler, 1990: 442). In this sense, the government’s commitment to 
decentralisation can be seen from the appearance of the formal structure of its education 
governance. Formal structure is the official structure of a hierarchy and functions on the 
basis that any external party can assess the degree of isomorphic pressure—and I would 
also include the degree of internal pressure—received by an organisation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). In the decentralisation context, the adoption of a legitimate formal 
structure can be assessed by the extent to which the officially adopted structure reflects 
the regular decentralisation templates, such as the withdrawal of the central bureaucratic 
structure from local education management, the transfer of authority to district 
government, the implementation of school-based management, and the establishment of 
school committees and education boards as new democratic institutions. Only one year 
after political decentralisation, the formal structure of Indonesian education had adopted 
these templates. The adoption of the decentralised structure had satisfied local aspirations 
and freed the country from international spotlight. 
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Nevertheless, once legitimacy is obtained, the ideal structure does not always translate 
into practice but it can always be renegotiated for strategic and practical considerations. 
In this process, the decentralised structure might remain but the way it is implemented is 
decoupled from the question of legitimacy, and rather follows the justification of technical 
efficiency (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Since the early 
days of decentralisation, the MoEC itself appeared to be unsatisfied with decentralisation 
because it had discharged many of its previous responsibilities. As the national education 
regulator, the MoEC saw that the education governance following decentralisation had 
gone against its primary interest of having coordinated policy. Using the arguments of 
efficiency and competence, the central government justified the return of its central role 
in education governance. 
As one of the MoEC officials acknowledged, initially, when political decentralisation 
was introduced and legalised through a new law in 1999 (law 22 of 1999), the central 
government ministry did not expect that local governments would be really autonomous. 
Given the strong centralist tradition, the central government would, it was thought, 
naturally remain in control despite decentralisation. Therefore, the MoEC did not rush to 
amend the centralist 1989 education law. But as the real transfer of power to localities got 
under way in 2001, MoEC officials realised that they were wrong. They were wrong 
because it turned out that local governments enjoyed a greater political autonomy with 
less influence from Jakarta. The MoEC was then worried by the perception that the 
regional areas were not ready to administer education because of their lack of experience 
and technical expertise. 
MoEC officials played down the capacity of the education Dinas bureaucracy because 
of its historical background as an administrative organisation that handled clerical jobs 
only, generally known as 3-M (manpower, materials and money). From administering 
basic education only, this office is now responsible for all the K–12 education systems. 
And, because it is subject to the discretion of each local government head, the Dinas 
personnel are also appointed from among the local career bureaucrats, most of whom 
have been accustomed to such clerical jobs. This fact concerns the central government 
the most, particularly with regard to the question of whether the Dinas personnel can be 
trusted to provide good quality education. For MoEC officials, the quality could be 
maintained in the past because Kandep (the district branch of the MoEC) and Kanwil (the 
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provincial branch of the MoEC) were present to assist the Dinas with quality assurance. 
One of the MoEC officials recounted his perception of local education Dinas as follows: 
 
So, these Dinases, because they used to limitedly handle the 3-M, [I suppose] they 
know nothing of what quality is … And, this same Dinas, that was also used to 
manage elementary schools (SD), now have to manage junior (SMP) and senior 
secondary schools (SMA) … Organising SD is different from SMP and SMA 
(Participant 32) 
 
In addition to the problem of local bureaucratic capacity, MoEC officials were also 
concerned with teacher quality. Until the 1990s, most Indonesian teachers, particularly 
those teaching in elementary schools, held senior-secondary-school qualifications only. 
Leaving this situation to be handled by inexperienced local officials would undermine the 
effort to improve teacher professionalism and also put at risk the future quality of 
education at large. Hence, MoEC officials demanded that local government authority 
should be limited in this matter. Allowance for central intervention should be provided to 
guide the way education decentralisation is administered. 
Despite those perceived local problems, central government officials were aware that 
decentralisation would not allow the return of the central interventionist structure. To 
preserve the legitimacy and at the same time retain control, the central government used 
the symbolic power of professional-legitimated standardisation. As Brunson and 
colleagues (2012: 612) put it, ‘standards are instrumental in organising institutional 
change, as they are a powerful tool for challenging and altering institutionalised behaviour 
and identities’. In this sense, local governments and schools are left politically self-
governing but—for the efficient and professional performance’s sake—technically 
confined by the centrally standardised rules and routines. This standardisation is the way 
the means–end decoupling strategy works. 
The Means–End Decoupling Approach 
Bromley and Powell  (2012) and Bromley, Hwang, and Powell (2013) introduce a more 
clinical conceptualisation of decoupling. They regard decoupling as a symbolic practice 
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working in either of two ways: symbolic adoption (policy–practice decoupling) and 
symbolic implementation (means–ends decoupling). The former occurs when the formal 
structure is ceremonially adopted but neglected in practice; the latter takes place when 
the formal policy is applied but the outcomes do not reflect the original intent of the policy. 
However, I reinterpret the policy–practice and means–end decoupling to represent the use 
of different instruments of control to divert the governing system from the adopted formal 
structure: one is empiric, the other symbolic. 
The policy–practice decoupling occurs when the authority uses its empirical 
instruments of power—such as the hierarchy and bureaucracy—to impose a contrary 
practice that does not reflect the formal structure. In the decentralisation context, the 
decentralised structure is present in the form of local government control or of school-
based management, but this new structure is dysfunctional because the central authority 
retains its former hierarchy to control the education governance. Meanwhile, the means–
end decoupling occurs when the authority uses symbolic means of power—such as 
professional judgement and standardised procedures—to endorse contrary practices. In 
the context of educational decentralisation, the means–end decoupling occurs when the 
structure of decentralisation is present and the central hierarchy is dissolved, but the way 
the decentralised structure delivers is defined by highly standardised procedures of 
performance control. 
In Indonesia’s case of decentralisation, the policy–practice decoupling occurred when 
the central government imposed the local content curriculum policy in the mid-1990s. 
Despite the new responsibility of schools, the MoEC, through its district and even sub-
district representative offices, inspected and guided the way schools carried out the policy 
(Bjork, 2005). However, in the context of decentralisation that is being studied here, the 
means–end decoupling is considered to be more valid because the central government has 
dissolved all of its local bureaucracies and let the local governments and, to some extent, 
schools, manage education. Nevertheless, justified by the arguments of technical 
inefficiency or of local incompetence, the central government arranged another way of 
asserting power, that is, by instituting extra-bureaucratic agencies and imposing national 
standards legitimated by the community of the professional. 
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The 2003 National Education System Law 
Following the indefinite role in the politically pressured decentralisation reform, in 2003, 
the central government passed a new education law to replace the previous education law 
of 1989. MoEC officials described the promulgation of this law as the ‘recovery’ from 
the ‘disoriented decentralisation’ (Participants 30 and 32). The most striking aspect that 
differentiates the new law from the old, however, is education management. Claiming 
that it has to make adjustments to the policy environment of political decentralisation and 
democratisation, the new law acknowledged the local government as the new governing 
authority in education on the one hand, and school-based management as the new 
principle of basic and secondary education management on the other. The formal structure 
of decentralisation found its official recognition in this new law where it stated  that ‘the 
district and municipal government shall manage basic and secondary education’ (GoI, 
2003: article 50[5]) and that ‘the management of early childhood education, basic 
education, and secondary education should be conducted on the basis of minimum 
delivery standards and the principle of school-based management’ (GoI, 2003). 
The message of decentralisation appears much more obvious when we see that the 
term ‘local government’ (pemerintah daerah) is mentioned 31 times in this new law, but 
not at all in the previous law. Apart from the general management, as stated in article 
50[5], local governments are also specifically designated to be responsible in many areas, 
such as funding their schools, monitoring performance, developing education personnel 
and issuing operational permits. In addition, as decentralisation is categorised as part of 
the new public management (NPM) regime (Gruening, 2001), the law also adopted  
several terms associated with NPM such as manajemen (management [four times]), 
efisiensi (efficiency [two times]), transparansi (transparency [four times]) and 
akuntabilitas (accountability [six times]). 
Nevertheless, the message of ‘decentralisation’ looks ambiguous as we learn that, 
excepting that one article (50[5]), all responsibilities that involve local government also 
involve the central government. We can look at the following clauses: 
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The central and local governments are entitled to guide, lead, assist and supervise 
the management of education in accordance with relevant regulations (GoI, 2003: 
article 10) 
The central and local governments are obliged to provide the service and facilities 
and ensure the realisation of quality education for every citizen without 
discrimination (GoI, 2003: article 11[1]) 
The central and local governments are obliged to ensure the availability of funds 
for the realisation of education for every seven-to-fifteen-years-old citizen (GoI, 
2003: article 11[2]) 
 
The term ‘central government’ is mentioned 85 times and, on top of everything, the law 
stated that ‘the management of the national education system is the Minister’s 
responsibility’ (GoI, 2003: article 50[1]). In addition, despite the clear statement of the 
delegation of basic and secondary education management to local governments, the law 
acknowledges schools termed lembaga pendidikan pemerintah (central government 
school), which implies that the central government may itself own and manage schools. 
In other words, the enactment of the new education law not only legalized the adoption 
of decentralisation in the Indonesia education system, but also legitimized   the return and 
redefinition of the central government’s role in education. 
And, it is interesting that, despite the centrality of decentralisation in the education 
reform agenda, the reformulation of the central government’s role in the context of this 
decentralised structure became a minor topic during the discussion of the bill. The 
discussion of educational decentralisation was marginalised during the lawmaking 
process. Musa (2009) lists the five most debated topics during the discussion of the 
education bill in the parliament: none dealt with decentralisation. Those topics that were 
considered important were the teaching of religious education in secular schools; 
university authority to confer honorary degrees; university funding and its management; 
the age limit for compulsory education; and preschool education (Musa, 2009). The most 
debated topic was whether every school should provide religious education for its 
students. The public was divided for and against with regard to the proposed clause 
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dealing with religious teaching, and it provoked many demonstrations throughout the 
country. These debates clouded the discussion about educational decentralisation, which 
had been the central topic in an earlier phase of the reform. 
This confirms the arguments for technical efficiency as the justification for decoupling. 
The lawmakers acknowledged that they knew little about the technicalities of education 
and they left them for the MoEC bureaucrats whom they trusted to have the expertise. 
The former chair of the Education Bill Working Committee in the parliament explained 
why many were silent on educational decentralisation during the debate on the bill. 
 
Educational decentralisation was a consequence of the regional autonomy law. 
Everyone agreed on that and there was no question about it. We left further 
elaboration on that matter to the government, in this case, the Department of 
Education ... They are professional bureaucrats who we trusted, knew more 
technical things about education. We were more concerned about how the education 
system would promote and protect our national culture from secularism and 
liberalism ... [as much as] we were concerned about our education competitiveness 
(Participant 33). 
 
The return of the central government’s role in the new law confirms the compensatory 
legitimation theory, that it is no longer important whether real decentralisation is achieved. 
The most important outcome is whether the system appears to be decentralised (Weiler, 
1990). Because direct intervention and the use of bureaucratic instruments are not 
effective in preventing the excessive political influences in decentralised education, the 
use of symbolic control can be a more strategic option. Following Bernstein (2001: 30):  
 
Symbolic control refers to the direct application of specialised discourses entailed 
in the shaping, evaluating, regulating and distributing the forms of consciousness, 
disposition, desire and relations, intrinsic to the control of individuals or groups... 
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The imposition of symbolic control was  relatively unchallenged because it regulated  the 
consciousness and controlled  the knowledge, using a specialised agency that dominated  
the particular discourse (Au, 2008; Bernstein, 2001). The new important role assigned to 
the central government was setting up the national standards of education. These 
standards then became a new, symbolic means of centralisation. Standardisation is part 
of this symbolic control strategy because standards represent the presence of discursive 
authority whose influence is received more as cultural than political (Higgins and Larner, 
2010). The 2003 education law introduced the national standards of education as the 
institutional framework that legitimated and integrated the whole education arrangement 
across the country. The law also introduced a new specialised and extra-bureaucratic 
agency to develop these standards and monitor their implementation. By regulating 
standards, the central government coukd  control everything it wanted  without sacrificing 
its legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Werle and Iversen, 2006). Now, the question is, how was 
this standardisation strategy organised. 
 
Three Standardisation Regimes 
Having been outlined in the education law, the national education system was  set to 
‘ensure equal opportunity, improved quality, and relevant and efficient management of 
education in order to address challenges from the local, national, and global changes’ 
(GoI, 2003). For the national education system to adjust to local, national, and global 
needs, the central policymakers introduced three regimes of standards: minimum service 
standards (SPM), national standards (SNP) and international standards (SI). Despite the 
education law’s stating that the standards are minimum criteria, the three regimes of 
standardisation instead represent the standard hierarchy. They were intended to address 
the immediate effects of decentralisation, that is, differences in local capacity. Thus, these 
three regimes cluster the local governments and schools based on their capacity so 
everyone was accommodated and bound by the national system. This left the localities 
with no justification for being uncompliant with the system. 
SPM have the most basic status because they provide the least restrictive standard and, 
therefore, become the direct ‘measurement of local government performance in education 
service’  (MoEC, 2004: article 1 [1]). The first SPM regulation was issued in 2004 and 
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covered all education levels and types but not for higher education. In 2010, the MoEC 
issued a separate SPM provision for basic education (primary and junior secondary 
schools), which was again revised in 2013. The SPM regulations mostly addressed the 
management education. Given its very minimum standards, SPM also functioned to 
affirm the great number of disadvantaged local governments and of schools that had 
limited resources to manage their education. SPM criteria were less stringent than those 
of SNP. For example, the SNP required schools to employ only teachers with at least a 
four-year university degree, but under the requirements of SPM, a primary school might 
operate if 70 per cent of the teachers were qualified. In special regions, the proportion 
tolerated was  40 per cent (MoEC, 2013). For senior secondary schools, the proportion 
was  higher, 90 per cent (MoEC, 2004). The MoEC official I interviewed said that 
meeting the requirements of SPM is a step on the way to reaching SNP. 
SNP constitutes the second tier of standards and their core. Most of the discussion on 
standardisation in this chapter refers to these criteria. What is meant here by SNP is ‘the 
minimum criteria of the education system in the whole legal territory of the unitary state 
of Indonesia’ (GoI, 2005a: article 1 [1]). Thus, despite their difference in status, the SPM 
and SNP regimes claim to deal with the ‘minimum criteria’. But, broader than SPM, SNP 
had eight items to standardise, that is, eight technical aspects of education: academic 
competence, content, process, evaluation, personnel, facilities, financing and 
management. The central government designed a national curriculum, defined education 
personnel qualifications, and set up school accreditation measurement based on the SNP. 
Upon meeting the SNP criteria, a school would be classed as a national standard school 
(SSN). SNP was first introduced in 2005 through government regulation (GR) 19 of 2005, 
but was later revised by GR 32 of 2013 to accommodate new developments.3 
The most controversial standardisation was the international standard. The imperative 
for the setting of this standard came from a single clause in the 2003 education law, which 
required  ‘the central and/or local governments to prepare at least one education institution 
																																								 																				
3 Among these new developments was the need to legalise the adoption of a new curriculum (K–13) in 
2013. The curriculum was first implemented in 6221 schools and was to be extended to others in the 
following years. However, it caused a large national controversy and the new education minister 
asserted it to be ill-prepared and, in December 2014, he instructed that its implementation be suspended 
(Kompas, 2014). In addition, the amendment of GR 19 of 2005 was made as a response to some 
developments in the national examination policy, which are discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
The revision, however, did not replace the original regulation. It only changed some relevant provisions. 
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to be developed as an international standard school’ (GoI, 2003). In 2006, the MoEC 
initiated a project called International Standard Schools (SBI) and whose comprehensive 
regulating guidelines were issued later, in 2009. A number of élite schools, private and 
public, were selected to be ‘a national school that has met the whole SNP criteria enriched 
by particular qualities borrowed from an OECD or another developed country’ (MoEC, 
2009: article 1 [8]). The central government set exceptionally high standards for these 
schools to differentiate them from ordinary schools: English to be the medium of 
instruction and all students must pass the ‘TOEFL with a score of at least 7.5’; an 
international curriculum, such as the International Baccalaureate or Cambridge, was to be 
followed; strict selection of students for admission; and allowing parents to contribute 
school fees, even for basic education (MoEC, 2009). 4  However, the policy was 
extensively criticised for its poor design, and the public was concerned that it would create 
social stratification in the education system. An evaluation published by the MoEC itself 
showed that many SBI schools appeared to perform below the SNP. This was exacerbated 
by the fact that many SBI schools quoted high tuition fees (Noor, 2011). Hence, in 
January 2013, the Constitutional Court accepted a public petition and set the policy aside. 
To comply with the verdict, the MoEC abolished the SBI system and ordered all SBI 
schools to return to the regular national school system. 
 
Standardisation and the Regulatory Governance 
The decentralisation policy has removed many of the central government roles in the 
education sector. Losing its long-running, extensive bureaucratic structures in regional 
localities has reduced its capacity to coordinate the implementation of national policies. 
In such a scenario, the state needs to move from ‘interventionist’ to a ‘regulatory’ type of 
control. The former attempts to assure the effectiveness of national policy through 
‘planning and centralised administration’, the latter is by ‘reliance on regulation ... [where] 
political accountability can be ensured by a variety of substantive and procedural controls’ 
(Majone, 1994: 77). With authority to set up and enforce those standards remaining at its 
disposal, the central government has made this regulatory control even more important 
																																								 																				
4 The TOEFL score of 7.5 was officially mentioned in the ministerial regulation and because the TOEFL 
does not use single digit scoring (the IELTS does), this showed that the policy had been poorly prepared.  
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and influential. These standards keep Indonesian education as a single and integrated 
national system with the MoEC its central authority, in spite of the managerial 
decentralisation.  
Figure 6.1. Numbers of MoEC Standardising Regulations (2001–2014) 
 
Source: Compiled by author from hukumonline.com and kemdikbud.go.id 
 
The 2003 education law had opened a Pandora’s Box that spilled out hundreds of 
standardising regulations. From 2001 to 2014 there have been nearly 200 ministerial 
regulations on basic and secondary education governance. The GR 19 of 2005 itself had 
delivered 28 core ministerial regulations to fine-tune its technical guidelines. These 
ministerial rules do not include sixteen presidential decrees, eight government regulations 
and two pieces of legislation. As Figure 6.1 shows among those regulated items, it is 
interesting that education management has been the most highly regulated, despite the 
massive managerial decentralisation. Hence, apart from more substantial matters, like 
curriculum and teacher qualifications, the central government now also regulates every 
small administrative matter: school establishments, procedures for appointing principals, 
school admissions, the use of government funds, user-fee collection and many others. The 
number of regulations on education management overcomes the regulations of other 
aspects which were traditionally under the central government control like curriculum 
and assessment. 
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According to Majone (1997), the regulatory state is characterised by ‘the rise of a new 
breed of specialised agencies or commissions operating at arm’s length from the central 
government’. Hence, to legitimate its regulatory role, the central government avoided a 
‘bureaucratised’ and ‘interventionist’ appearance; it introduced specialised, extra-
bureaucratic agencies to perform a number of its education responsibilities. In 2005, the 
government established BSNP, the Board of the National Standards of Education. The 
BSNP’s official statement declared that the board is to develop national standards; run 
the national examinations; provide recommendations for the central and local 
governments on quality assurance and control; formulate the graduation criteria for 
schools; and assess school textbooks (BNSP, 2016). In addition, the government also 
decreed another agency, the Board of National Accreditation (BAN). The BSNP 
developed and improved standards and organised national examinations; the BAN 
conducted regular assessments at schools of the implementation of those national 
standards. The members of BSNP and BAN are education experts and professionals, 
mostly recruited from reputable universities. In addition, the government has assigned the 
university-based Institute for Teachers and Education Personnel (LPTK) to operate 
teacher certification programs. 
Nevertheless, despite its claimed extra-bureaucratic nature, we can see that decoupling 
occurred in the organisational structure of the so-called independent agencies themselves. 
Rather than being independently managed, the organisation of BSNP and BAN is under 
the coordination of the MoEC bureaucracy because their members are politically 
appointed by the minister. As such, despite its institutional autonomy as part of the higher 
education system, LPTKs are using the similar, centrally developed, certification 
assessment instrument (Jalal, et al., 2009). This creates much overlapping of functions 
between the agencies and the MoEC. The BSNP, for instance, has an overlapping role 
with the MoEC’s Centre for Educational Evaluation (Puspendik) in organising the 
national examinations. The official company profile of Puspendik claims that it is 
technically more responsible for organising national examinations despite that function 
being assigned to BSNP. The former organisation, Puspendik, is responsible for almost 
the whole of the examination system; from developing the materials, preparing the exam 
documents, coordinating with relevant authorities, monitoring the exam document 
publication and distribution, and analysing and reporting the results (Puspendik, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the BSNP plays a ceremonial role only, providing the sense of professional, 
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extra-bureaucratic legitimacy. For example, in the composition of the 2015 national 
examination committee appointed by the Minister of Education and Culture, three BSNP 
representatives were the only non-bureaucratic members among the other 60 government 
officials (MoEC, 2015). 
 
The Audit Culture 
In spite of their ceremonial function, the presence of specialised independent agencies 
provides a symbolic legitimacy; the return of the central state’s role in education is not 
anymore a matter of power legitimacy but of professional judgement (Ball, 2000). This 
allows the central government to go much further in imposing particular measures in the 
name of national standards attainment. These independent organisations are, on behalf of 
the state, running an auditing service to measure and evaluate performances. Quoting 
Leys (2003: 70), these ‘inspection agencies were charged with “naming and shaming”, 
“failing” individual teachers, schools …’. With regard to the effects of this auditing 
practice or audit culture on educational decentralisation, Apple (2005) maintains: 
 
The ultimate result of an auditing culture of this kind is not the promised 
decentralisation that plays such a significant role rhetorically…, but what seems to 
be a massive re-centralisation and what is best seen as a process of de-
democratisation (p. 15). 
 
The central government delegates to these regulatory agencies the responsibilities to 
‘control and ensure that education quality meets the SNP’ through the acts of ‘evaluation, 
accreditation, and certification’ (GoI, 2005a: article 2 [2]). BSNP organises national 
evaluation for students, BAN conducts school accreditation, and LPTK trains and 
assesses teachers before they are granted their professional certificate. The discussion of 
each audit practice will show not only how the practice has diverted the education 
management to centralisation, but also how the auditing practice itself has been 
inconsistently implemented and therefore decoupled from its original goal. 
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School Accreditation 
The accreditation policy has been in effect since the time of the New Order, but it 
‘discriminatively’ affected private schools only. Traditionally, public schools were the 
most sought after and relatively competitive schools because the government regularly 
monitored them and supported their quality. In contrast, except for the Catholic and 
Protestant institutions, Indonesian private schools greatly varied in quality, and most were 
below average (Bedi and Garg, 2000). Even though the government imposed a laissez-
faire policy on school admissions, it meant almost nothing for private schools because 
the competitive advantage always went to public schools. Therefore, the highest grade of 
accreditation was disamakan (equalised), to indicate that the assessed private school was 
comparable to the public school system. The other grades were diakui (recognised) and 
terdaftar (registered) (MoEC, 1983). 
The accreditation system changed after the introduction of new national education 
standards. A more radical laissez-faire policy is employed through which all schools, 
public and private, are similarly assessed. Grades of accreditation are made in a more 
neutral hierarchy, that is, A (for the highest), B (for the average) and C (for the lowest). 
All schools are motivated to reach the highest grade because of its central role in attracting 
enrolments. Such competition has demolished not only the barrier between private and 
public schools but also the established stratification between more and less-favoured 
public schools. Particular public schools that were deemed to perform less well but with 
much effort were able to achieve a higher accreditation ranking and to enjoy a more 
favourable reputation. 
However, accreditation also brings pressure that is quite challenging for schools. All 
schools must be accredited and renew their accreditation every five years. Only accredited 
schools whose certificates have the government’s authorisation are eligible for admission 
to the next education level (GoI, 2003). All government offices and many private 
companies would reject job applicants holding education certificates issued by 
unaccredited schools. Accreditation itself is a very complex process. Assessors are 
equipped with very detailed instruments, evaluating every single indicator of the degree 
of implementation of eight national standards. For senior secondary schools, for instance, 
there are 165 questions with four indicators for each question. In responding to those 
questions, schools have to be prepared with documentations or other physical evidence. 
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In time, this complex process of accreditation has been taken less seriously: the 
accreditation ends up as a ritual of ‘list ticking’ without being concerned whether meeting 
mandated standards correlates with practice. Some schools manipulate the accreditation 
by hiring supporting evidence. A teacher illustrates this matter as follows: 
 
A school health-service room that was normally dormant, does not even have any 
single equipment but a label on the door could be magically transformed to be 
having all the required tools for the sake of accreditation. Once the accreditation 
passes, it soon turns back as before with no equipment and even becomes a spider 
house. This is because all tools and equipment were rented (Kartono, 2009: 15). 
 
In addition, the centralised management of accreditation creates some complications and 
ambiguities. The implementation of accreditation by BAN is not need-based but quota-
based. Even though a school’s accreditation might have expired, the BAN or BAP might 
not assess that school for accreditation if the quota, which is set by the central government 
for a given period and area has been fully allocated. For example, in January 2016, there 
were 13,662 schools in the East Java Province whose accreditation had expired but the 
BAN could only assess 9400 of them and left the remainder, 4262, unaccredited 
(Bisnis.com, 2016). To some extent, this makes the strict rule on accreditation no more 
than a paper tiger because of the failed enforcement from the central government itself. 
Teacher Certification 
The second practice of audit culture in Indonesian education reform is manifested in the 
teacher professionalisation policy. Traditionally, Indonesian teachers were considered to 
be obedient civil servants who were not valued for their pedagogic expertise or 
commitment to their profession, but rather for their respect and compliance with their 
superiors’ orders (Bjork, 2006a). This culture is seen as dangerous for teachers who are 
now under the supervision of a highly politicised, local government bureaucracy. This 
culture was a consequence of the low education qualifications and poor salary for teaching 
(Jalal, et al., 2009). In 2005, the central government passed the teacher law whose central 
premise was to improve teacher management and quality. The law upgraded teachers’ 
status to that of specialist civil servant and with a professional label. As part of this 
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professionalisation, the government upgraded the status of those teachers who had at least 
a four-year university qualification, completed professional training and had met the 
requirements of the professional certification program (GoI, 2005b). Aware that most 
teachers were underqualified, in 2007, the central government launched a massive 
certification program, which was aimed primarily at in-service teachers and was fully 
central-government funded and was the most rapid certification program any education 
system has ever had. In-service teachers can simply earn a professional certificate in 
either of two ways: their portfolio assessment and the 90-hour training program of PLPG. 
The important part of this certification program, however, is not the certification itself; 
it is rather what comes after certification. The central government grants, to those who 
acquire certification, a professional allowance; an amount twice their regular salary. This 
allowance does not replace other stipends, such as functional services and meals. This 
makes teachers the highest paid civil servants in the country. This incentive scheme not 
only has driven the massive certification movement after 2007 but also encouraged 
colossal qualification upgrading and has caused greatly increased enrolments at teacher-
training institutions. In 2006, before the certification program, only 17 per cent of teachers 
qualified for the four-year post-secondary degree but, in 2011 the proportion doubled to 
35 per cent (Chang, et al., 2013). Following the certification policy, the trend for students 
to enrol in education programs in Indonesian universities also increased from 200,000 in 
2005 to over 1,000,000 in 2010 (Chang, et al., 2013). The former vice-minister of 
education and culture, who was also the initiator of this teacher reform, acknowledged 
that the motivation for this reform is more of a welfare increase than for 
professionalisation. 
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I was the team leader from the government side when discussing the teacher bill 
with the parliament. [The main reason was that] we were actually fed up with all 
the efforts we had tried to increase the teacher welfare ... We then agreed to escape 
from the rigidity of the teacher payment system. Because if not, first, they will never 
be well-off; and, second, people will always underestimate teachers. Whatever 
training given will be useless and whatever books you give [are the same] because 
they are not proud of their job and people do not respect them. So, my offer at that 
time was how, if we create a new stratum, a layer above the ordinary teacher who 
already has a functional allowance. Those who are able to reach that stratum will 
be rewarded; we call it a professional allowance because they have shown their 
professionalism (Participant 32). 
 
However, with a great bonus comes great onus. And, at this point, the very idea of 
professionalism meets its contradiction. Goodson and Hargreaves (1996) characterise 
professionalism as self-regulating autonomy in practice and committal to an endless 
development of knowledge and practice. The professionalisation project has otherwise 
diverted teachers from these professional ethics. The project facilitates the rise of 
managed professionalism, that is ‘where professional goals and standards would become 
closely aligned to current policy concerns of the government’ (Furlong, 2008: 731). In 
this sense, teacher performance is no longer seen from their own individual or school 
objectives but simply through a completion of a quantified indicator called working hours. 
The regulation stipulates that teachers with professional status must teach at least 24 
periods (18 hours) per week. Otherwise, their entitlement to professional allowances 
might be suspended or even abolished (GoI, 2008b: article 63 [02]). 
In the Indonesian case, where education resources are not yet evenly distributed across 
the regions, the regulation has become an unfairly restrictive performative regime. For 
some teachers, the new regulation is seen as a light responsibility, but for others it is a 
heavy burden. And, the teachers working in secondary schools face much greater burdens 
than those in primary schools because the former are mostly subject teachers, but the latter 
are classroom-based. 
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For junior and senior secondary teachers employed in urban schools, working a 24-
hour week is a light responsibility. With most schools increasing their student population 
each year, schools can easily rearrange classrooms to adjust to the available teachers. In 
this sense, teachers could teach more than for 30 hours a week in a school. Even teachers 
of special, rarely taught subjects, whose teaching hours are fewer in their home school, 
could manage to fill the gap by teaching in the many other schools in their neighbourhood. 
Unfortunately, such a privilege is not available to rural-school teachers, particularly in 
senior secondary schools. With the fluctuating enrolment rates, many schools have a 
limited number of students and classrooms, which give less chance for teachers to meet 
the required workload. As a result, teachers have to find other schools in those areas where 
the population density is less and there are fewer schools than in the cities. As well, there 
is the issue of travel distance, which adds to the effort teachers must make (Participant 
01). 
In addition, the strict enforcement of the workload rule has affected teaching 
performance and learning quality. As more teachers seek to pursue or maintain the 
certification allowance, their motivation is more to comply with the rule than to provide 
quality teaching. Because they have to travel to other schools to ensure they work the 
required hours, teachers have to spend more energy coping with travel time and other 
physical burdens (Chang, et al., 2013). 
National Examination 
The audit regime also has a strong effect on students who take the high-risk examination. 
Similar to many other nations, like China, Singapore, South Korea and even the USA 
(Kang, 2012; Liu et al., 2009), standardised testing is a feature of the Indonesian school 
system. The national examination (ujian nasional [UN]) introduced at the time of the 
country’s independence, had been used as the only way to decide school completion until 
the early 1970s. The policy was re-implemented in the early 1990s but made little 
contribution to school completion decisions, and then it was rejuvenated, in 2000, as a 
test to determine the successful completion of secondary education (Firman and Tola, 
2008). Despite constant modifications, the UN system has long been the central 
motivation for all educational activities throughout the school year (Leigh, 1999). It is the 
measure for the central government to control performance, not only of the students and 
schools, but also local governments. This causes education governance to become a 
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hierarchy of pressures. As a national indicator of education achievement, the national 
examination forces local governments to compete with each other in gaining higher 
completion rates. As a result, they force school principals to achieve particular completion 
rates or they risk their position. The pressure then is applied to teachers and eventually to 
students and parents. These final-year students, along with their parents and teachers, are 
stressed by their preparation for the judgement day. Some high school principals in 
Kupang and Surabaya admitted that the normal learning plans never work for final year 
students and their teachers because, during the whole academic year, their focuses are 
given to UN preparation. In preparation of the UN, teachers spend some time, almost 
every day, in or after school hours, to drill their students with many practice examinations. 
At home, parents have to find some extra funds for their children’s supplementary lessons 
with private tutors (Participant 5 and Participant 21). 
In Indonesia, UN days have also caused a number of dramatic events. There have been 
many occasions before the test days where students and their parents have taken part in 
massed assemblies led by local religious leaders making religious supplications. Some 
schools hire prominent personages to deliver motivational speeches to their students.5 
Among other preparations, the Indonesian military has an essential role, unrelated to war 
and defence, that is, delivering and safeguarding the centrally distributed exam 
documents to remote areas. For places easier to reach, the delivery of documents ‘only’ 
needs police assistance. The UN papers are regarded as highly confidential state 
documents, so much so that law-enforcing units should ensure their safety. One of the 
sights during the test days is uniformed police officers standing guard in almost every 
school neighbourhood to maintain ‘security’ and ‘noiselessness’. 6  Because of some 
criticism, however, the police changed their policy on uniforms for this particular task; in 
																																								 																				
5 A number of journalistic reports have covered the events during the national exams (UN) days such as: 
‘6 ritual unik para pelajar jelang Ujian Nasional’ [6 unique student rituals ahead of UN] (Merdeka, 
2013); ‘Ratusan Siswa SMA Yogya Gelar Doa Bersama Jelang UN’ [Hundreds of senior secondary 
school students in Yogyakarta gathered for prayer ahead of UN] (Republika, 2013); and ‘Jelang UN 
ribuan pelajar Bengkulu gelar istighasah’ [Ahead of UN, thousands of students in Bengkulu hold mass 
praying] (Liputan6, 2014). 
6 Among the media coverage of this issue are: ‘Soal UN Bali diamankan di markas TNI’ [UN documents 
in Bali are in safe keeping at a military base] (Kompas, 2012b); ‘90 tentara di Jogja ikut awasi UN’ [90 
soldiers in Jogja joined UN supervision] (Suara Merdeka, 2015); and ‘Soal UN tiba di Jakarta dengan 
kawalan Brimob’ [UN documents arrived in Jakarta with a Mobile Brigade Corps escort] (Kompas, 
2015b). 
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2015, when guarding the examinations, they began wearing batik, the Indonesian 
traditional fabric, instead of their regular uniforms (Kompas, 2015a). 
Indeed, the UN policy has had much criticism. It has been blamed for instigating vast 
stress and anxiety among students and parents (Arifin, 2012). It is also deemed an unfair 
policy, given the great gaps remaining in education quality between regions. In addition, 
the policy was also held to be responsible for the spread of cheating and corruption 
(Widiatmo, 2012). In 2006, the first lawsuit was raised in the Central Jakarta district court 
by a number of citizens who claimed to be ‘victims of the national examination’. The 
district, provincial and then the supreme court heard the petitioners from 2007 to 2009. 
The Supreme Court instructed the government to improve teacher quality, develop school 
infrastructure and remove regional gaps before the UN policy be enacted. However, none 
of the court verdicts instructed that the government should discontinue the policy (Rosser, 
2015). Therefore, the central government, with parliamentary support, continued to apply 
the policy with some modifications. Since 2011, the national examination has not 
continued to be the sole tool for judging student academic achievement; rather, school-
based examination results make a 40 per cent contribution. The effect of these 
developments is the amendment of the national standards of education regulation in 2013. 
The new regulation, inter alia, removed the UN from being implemented in primary 
schools. But it remains compulsory and is a school completion prerequisite for junior and 
senior secondary school students. 
The audit culture does not have an immediate effect on the arrangement of local 
education governance, which is also subject to standardisation. In this sense, another way 
of enforcement must be adopted by the central government so that national education runs 
on a standardised course. 
 
Redistributive Policy and the Return of Interventionism 
In spite of the decentralised management, the central government has little confidence in 
the capabilities of the new autonomous local organisations. Therefore, standardisation 
regimes are endorsed and local governments and schools must refer to these standards in 
meeting their responsibilities. To date, there are 67 ministerial regulations about the way 
education should be managed locally. The regulations govern almost everything; such as 
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school establishment, principal appointments, student admissions and tuition-fee 
collection. As the keeper of national standards, the central government needs to ensure 
that all stakeholders comply with those standards and any externalities that impede the 
application of those standards must be addressed. And, when those standards have been 
used to coerce compliance with state regulation, there is always a justification to enforce 
regulations by means of intervention. In other words, regulations by themselves come 
with a legitimacy to enforce interventionism. However, there must be an institutional 
rationale for the central government to justify such interventionism so its legitimacy 
would not be challenged. 
Potterba (1996) argues that there are two economic reasons by which  the government’s 
intervention in education can be  justified: market imperfection and the potential for 
inequality. The same argument applies for the central government intervention to the local 
education governance. The local governance imperfection in terms of the lack of technical 
capability becomes the rationale for the use of centralised regulatory agencies and 
standardisation. As such, the potential of inequality, because of the differences in local 
resources, becomes the reason for the redistributive policy to support the enforcement of 
those standards. One MoEC official confirmed this, saying that these standards are not 
aimed at promoting uniformity, but at dealing with regional inequalities. He explained: 
 
Some NGOs misunderstood the national standard as an effort for uniformity, but 
we meant it (as an effort) so that inequalities that exist between regions subside. 
Our duty is to enforce those standards … and this has become our constant struggle 
(Participant 30). 
 
Besides, as previously discussed, the central government’s control remains pervasive in 
the 2003 law despite the managerial decentralisation. The central government remains 
authorised to take similar responsibilities to those of the local governments, such as for 
financing, monitoring, issuing permits, controlling performance and more. In this sense, 
the central government can take any measure it sees necessary. Through this authority 
and, especially, in the name of enforcing national standards, the central government has 
	 Manipulating the Legitimacy: The Centralised Standards in the Decentralised Structure 
159 
tried to return to its former interventionist role. This is what the Indonesian central 
government has adopted. 
 
Figure 6.2. Sources of Basic and Secondary Education Budget, 2010–2013 (USD billion)7 
	
Source: Compiled from (Ministry of Finance, 2015) 
 
The use of an extensive redistributive policy is one that characterises an interventionist 
state (Poterba, 1996) and in education the redistribution mostly translates into school 
subsidies (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995). Despite decentralisation, the central 
government spends more for education than do all local district and provincial 
governments combined. Figure 6.2 shows that the proportion of central government 
spending on education compared with local governments is greater over time. Since 2005, 
the central government has funded the operation of public and private schools through a 
per-pupil subsidy scheme, called school operational assistance (BOS). In this regard, 
basic education receives the full standard cost and secondary education earns half of the 
standard cost. The central government also shoulders the monthly salaries of public-
school teachers along with allowances for professionally certified teachers. In 2012, the 
World Bank estimated that this professional allowance will consume almost three-
quarters of the total national education spending in years to come (Chang, et al., 2013). 
																																								 																				
7 Converted from IDR values on the basis of the average exchange rate of December 2013, USD 1 = 
IDR 12,021, see: http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=USD&to=IDR&amount=1&year=2013  
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In addition to routine allocations, the central government also funds non-routine needs 
through two schemes: Special Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus [DAK]) and 
social aid grants (Bansos). These funds are distributed to those local governments and 
education institutions that need to accelerate the growth of infrastructure and personnel 
development to attain the minimum standards of education service. 
The redistributive function has two important effects for centralisation. First, it allows 
the MoEC to maintain all its Jakartan bureaucratic structures even after education has 
been decentralised. A respected university professor who was also a former MoEC senior 
official said that in the early days after decentralisation, he believed that the MoEC would 
lose most of its giant bureaucracy. Some technical directorates that used to have an 
immense bureaucratic staff at the provincial and district level, such as directorates general 
of basic and secondary education, would be cut off, leaving the central ministry’s 
organisation with only policy research and development functions. He recalled that in the 
early days of decentralisation, he once asked some staff in the directorate of basic 
education of the MoEC to leave their positions and soon look for new ones in local 
education offices in Jakarta’s surrounding districts (Participant 34). But, now because the 
central government still has to spend large amounts of money for all the sector resources, 
it needs an optimally sized organisation to handle this. Thus, except for the provincial 
(Kanwil) and district–municipal offices (Kandep), the rest of MoEC’s directorates remain 
and have been extended. The former MoEC official cynically asserted that the MoEC still 
retains the core directorate general for primary and secondary schools ‘as if they still have 
the authority over schools’ (Participant 34). These MoEC organisations govern not only 
technical matters, as was intended after decentralisation, but also administrative. For 
example, the MoEC’s directorate generals regulate not only the technicalities of 
curriculum implementation but also some managerial aspects, for instance, who may 
receive DAK and Bansos funding and how the funds should be used in schools. 
In addition, teacher management is highly influenced by the redistributive policy. 
Because the central government makes the larger investments, local responsibilities are 
not entirely free from central intervention. For example, a local government can hire 
contract teachers on its own but needs to seek approval from the central government in 
recruiting the permanent teachers. In 2011, for example, the central government delayed 
the recruitment nationally of civil servants, including teachers, for 16 months. This caused 
	 Manipulating the Legitimacy: The Centralised Standards in the Decentralised Structure 
161 
problems for schools that needed new teachers. Surabaya, which claimed a deficit of 800 
teaching personnel, could do nothing to respond to the policy except transfer teachers 
from some schools to those schools whose needs were more dire. The central government 
also maintains control over teachers’ career development. As part of the civil service 
system, a teacher’s career is subject to highly fragmented management involving central 
and local institutions.8 In addition, a former MoEC official and president of a teacher 
training university argued that the 2007 certification program has become the central 
government’s statement to recentralise teacher management. This was officially 
confirmed when, late in 2014, the MoEC established the new directorate general of 
teacher management (Participant 34). On this, a MoEC senior official defended it, saying 
that ‘there has been a constant aspiration that teachers are to be recentralised because of 
the incapability of local governments’ (Participant 30). 
Second, the redistributive policy allows the central bureaucracy to extend its direct 
influence to localities, that is, to local governments and to schools. For local governments, 
the policy is used to buy local commitment to the central government’s programs. In 2008, 
three years after the implementation of BOS, the central government promulgated the 
regulation on compulsory education in the basic and junior secondary schools, that 
students should be charged no fees (GoI, 2008a). This program became one that President 
Yudhoyono campaigned strongly for when he stood for his second term in the 2009 
election. The central government urged local governments to ensure free basic education 
in their territories and supported BOS by providing additional funds called BOSDA or 
local BOS (Rosser and Joshi, 2013). Although not all local governments have abolished 
fees for their elementary and junior secondary schools, the central government’s BOS 
funding and its free compulsory education policy have generated public pressure on local 
governments and schools. Free education has become among the most popular topics 
campaigned for by politicians in many local leadership elections. As such, mass media 
																																								 																				
8 Central institutions include the MOEC, the Department of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform 
(KEMENPAN-RB) and the National Civil Service Agency (BKN). In local government administrative 
areas, it involves the school bureaucracy, the education Dinas and Local Civil Service Agency (BKD). 
The KEMENPAN-RB is the regulator for all career development. To obtain promotion to a higher rank 
in the civil service, teachers have first to claim their credit points assessed through a number of 
hierarchies up to the MOEC office. With the required credit points, the BKD can propose a teacher’s 
promotion to the BKN, which may grant the candidate a suitable title and rank. Hence, the local 
government is left only as the local registrar. 
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began scrutinising local government and public schools’ policy on school fees and are 
constantly critical when schools impose fees or charge unreasonable amounts to parents. 
Nevertheless, rather than creating central intervention, the former vice-minister argued 
that the BOS funds were distributed to schools to support the implementation of school-
based management. He claimed that in the case of BOS, the funds were given to protect 
school managements from being overly controlled by local bureaucracy because the 
schools did not have to rely on local government assistance to cover daily school 
operations. In addition, the BOS was also aimed at empowering school committees as 
part of school management (Participant 32). In this, the central government has 
maintained that all the BOS-related school documents are deemed invalid unless signed 
by the chair of a school committee. This might be true because, since the period 2005 to 
2010, the BOS funds were directly transferred from Jakarta to individual schools’ 
accounts. However, in 2011 the National Ombudsman released a report saying that most 
schools generally had only a small role for their school committee in the BOS 
management. Some schools even tried to remove entirely the role of school committees 
from the BOS funds management (Kompas, 2011a). The loosely controlled school 
management allowed widespread corruption. The National Board of Financial Audit, for 
instance, found that BOS funds were misappropriated in 2054 of 3237 sampled schools 
during the financial year 2007–2008. Indonesian Corruption Watch also reported that 
from 2004 to 2009, the police and prosecutors had investigated 33 BOS-related corruption 
cases, which resulted in many school principals and local education officials going to jail 
(Hendri, 2011). 
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Figure 6.3. Education DAK and Bansos Allocation, 2011–2013 (USD million) 
 
Source: Compiled from (DPR RI, 2013; Ministry of Finance, 2016)  
Because of criticism that the principle of local government autonomy was being 
encroached, in 2011 the central government changed the transfer method: funds from 
Jakarta were transferred to district government accounts before being transferred to 
schools. But this was a short-lived experiment. One year later, for reasons of efficiency, 
the method of transfer was again changed and, since 2012, the BOS funds have been 
transferred to the provincial governments (that is, from Jakarta to provincial governments 
to schools). The central government also established BOS committees (Tim BOS) whose 
members were drawn from central, provincial and district governments and from schools. 
And this has made the BOS system highly bureaucratic. 
In addition to BOS, the second function of the redistributive policy also works with 
DAK and Bansos. But, Bansos is worth noting because its funding amount is, on average, 
higher than DAK and BOS (see Figure 6.3) and, in contrast to the two other schemes that 
the central government entrusts local governments or schools to manage autonomously, 
the Bansos program is entirely organised by technical directorates within the MoEC. This 
means that for schools to receive these funds, they have to directly register their proposal 
to relevant affiliated technical directorates. For example, a senior secondary school would 
have to address its proposal to the MoEC’s Directorate of Senior Secondary Schools. 
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Bansos has made these schools highly reliant on central government assistance. Some 
senior-secondary-school principals in Kupang, for instance, said that they frequently fly 
to Jakarta to deliver their proposals and to lobby Jakarta officials. They even said that the 
central government is more responsive to their proposals than are their superiors in the 
Dinas bureaucracy. For central government officials, it provides them with the sense of 
power. It is at this directorate’s discretion to assess and approve proposals and distribute 
the funds. Later, the directorate officials will also evaluate whether the funds are being 
used appropriately. The MoEC member of staff who was responsible for organising 
Bansos funds told me: 
 
After decentralisation it was not easy for any MoEC staff to access the schools 
without local government official’s consent. But when you come as a member of 
the Bansos team, everything is much easier. You can come any time you like, 
sometimes without any notification. (It was because) you offer them fresh cash 
(Participant 29) 
 
The redistributive policy is expected to compensate the central demand of the 
implementation of standardised governance by the local authorities. However, the result 
does not always come that way. Or even such defined results might never exist. As 
Brunson and colleagues (2012) argue, rather than leading to stability and sameness, 
standards and standardisation are a dynamic phenomenon. This dynamism occurs because, 
according to Braa and Herdberg (2002), standardisation involves a number of linked and 
overlapping networks and structures. In this case, it involves the dynamic relations 
between the central and local actors, which in the new Indonesian democratic 
environment become more fluid and interpenetrating. It also involves the degree of 
localisation, that is, the flexibility of local adaptation based on its internal dynamic of 
relations. 
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The Standardisation Effect: Structuration and Destructuration 
The dynamic process of standardisation can be seen as the process of structuration (Braa 
and Hedberg, 2002). In this sense, standardisation provides the structure that constrains 
action but inherently contains the opportunity to change that structure because of internal 
conflict and resistance. From the central government perspective, the standardising rules 
should have given the structuration power, that is, the ability to generate structural 
convergence and consensus in the organisational fields of education. In this sense, the 
enforcement of standards through regulative and interventionist strategies is expected to 
end up in the routinisation of behaviours and practices in education governance. However, 
the structuration process does not always result in the construction of patterned relations 
and structural convergence, but might also cause a breakdown of structure or 
destructuration when the organisational field is filled with domination and resistance 
(Clegg, 2010; Scott, 2013). 
The Structuration Effect 
The audit culture has facilitated a smooth transition to the resumption of centralisation. It 
has successfully structured the technical aspects of education. With the centralised school 
accreditation, teacher certification and student examinations, it looks probable that the 
education system has converged as a single national system. There have been isomorphic 
behavioural effects taking place to follow this central pressure: the similarity of responses 
to the central policy. In this sense, regardless of the goals and outcomes, schools are 
competing for accreditation, teachers are chasing professional certification and students 
are struggling for success in the national examination. This act of standardisation has a 
stronger basis of legitimacy because it is believed to incorporate educational actors not 
only in the national state project of political integration, but also in the larger cultural 
project of empowerment to survive in what Randal Collins (1979) has termed the 
credential society. The national examination, school accreditation, and teacher 
certification, are the only legitimate institutions providing credential authorisation and 
there is no other way to survive in social and economic competition but by engaging with 
them. 
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The Destructuration Effect 
Nevertheless, the enforcement of national standards in the managerial aspect tends to 
result in destructuration. The breakdown of bureaucratic hierarchy following the 
decentralisation has created a structural barrier for the central–local relations so that the 
central structure can no longer impose obedience to the locals (Rasyid, 2002). It means 
that, although it sets national standards, the central government does not automatically 
have all its policies effective at the local level. Hence, unlike the audit culture that 
generates nearly isomorphic responses in the regions, the standardisation effort in 
managerial aspects came with different and sometimes contradictory local practices. 
Some local governments are pursuing and are committed to meeting the standards—many 
are not. The implementation of the central government rules would be dependent on 
meeting both sides’ interests. Because some local governments found that central 
government rules are either irrelevant in the local context or contradictory to their 
interests, they use their discretion to disregard the rules. It means, in cases where the local 
government does not comply with the national rules, that the local education governance 
can still claim legitimacy to carry on. The central government cannot impose any measure 
to the detriment of national standards and there are many inconsistencies between central 
programs and local practices. 
 
Figure 6.4. Population of Local Government Civil Servants (National Data), 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from (BPS, 2015)  
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The central government’s vision of developing the teachers’ professional culture, so that 
they become more independent of direct state intervention, sometimes contradicts local 
government interests in having teachers as members of the local government 
administration. The number of government teachers is greater than the number of their 
non-teacher colleagues in the local public service (see Figure 6.4). Thanks to the 
professionalisation policy, which requires teachers to have a four-year university degree 
at least, these government teachers are, as a group, the most resourceful of local 
government employees. For a local government, this means a great deal. On the one hand, 
seeing teachers as bureaucrats who maintain the old patrimonial culture is important for 
local politicians because public servants can be mobilised for political support. On the 
other hand, teachers being the most qualified public servants in terms of their higher 
education qualifications, have the potential, as civil servants, to fill positions in the 
bureaucracy. Should they engage in the political process, teachers have opportunities for 
particular benefits: either promotion to school principal; positions in the Dinas 
bureaucracy; or, for those without permanency, to be granted a permanent position. On 
this matter, the former vice-minister of education explained: 
 
The locals were taking benefit from this [decentralisation] and even abused it 
because [its effect on] the economic resource is big and its leverage to local politics 
is also big. [We are talking about controlling] all schools and teachers! Eventually 
[the education personnel] started to engage in local leadership elections… So, 
educational decentralisation has been coloured more by the potential of the political 
role of education personnel themselves… (Participant 32) 
 
Another MoEC official I met in Jakarta was concerned about the massive violation of 
national standards in the recruitment of education personnel. He, for instance, frequently 
found that teacher recruitment was the local politicians’ means to reward their political 
loyalists. The MoEC official acknowledged that his office frequently had to deal with an 
unreasonable number of nominees in the local government’s teacher recruitment program. 
Politicians put all of their loyalists on the lists proposed to the central government 
regardless of the professional competence of those nominated, of the number of local 
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vacancies, and of the distribution strategy. The burden is passed to the central government 
because it pays the teacher salaries. This, according to the official, also explains 
Indonesia’s ideal low teacher–pupil ratio, one to sixteen, which matches that of OECD 
members and exceeds other developed countries like UK, Japan and France (see Figure 
6.5), but the distribution is highly uneven (Participant 30). The local governments 
regularly recruit teachers every year but these teachers are concentrated mostly in urban 
areas. A survey report in 2005 showed that 55 per cent of Indonesian primary schools 
were overstaffed and 34 per cent were understaffed. The situation has not significantly 
improved despite several teacher reform programs in the past decade. In 2012, using a 
similar research method, a World Bank report showed that 30 per cent of primary schools 
remained understaffed and, worse, 59 per cent were kept overstaffed (Chang, et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 6.5. Teacher–Pupil Ratios by Country and Region, 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from (World Bank, 2013) 
The evasion of national standards also occurs in the case of the central government’s 
compulsory, free, basic education program. Not all local governments ensure their 
schools comply with this program and its related regulations. All public elementary 
schools in Kupang, for example, still ask for monthly fees from parents. Local 
government officials were blaming local resource scarcity and choosing to overlook the 
practice. The local authority did not issue any regulation to arrange regular monthly fee 
collection. Without this government regulation in place, public schools freely quoted non-
standard fee amounts. However, resource scarcity is not the only reason for this practice. 
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Even in better-off localities, where governments have provided additional BOSDA, fee 
collection still persists. As Rosser and Joshi (2013) reported, despite the presence of 
BOSDA, some public schools in Jakarta still quote user fees to parents. Some schools 
establish formal user fees, for example, for building costs; others set informal fees for, 
say, private lessons, excursions and books (Rosser and Joshi, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the violation of central standards does not represent the whole of local 
practices. There is always some other extreme set of circumstances. In Surabaya, for 
instance, the national standards are enforced and provide an institutional legitimacy for 
the local education reform initiatives. Not only adopted, those standards are even 
expanded. For example, to avoid political intervention, the city government added to the 
central government’s principal appointment procedures some new techniques of selection, 
such as employing independent consultants and using an online recruitment system. 
Furthermore, even though the central government’s free education policy applies only to 
elementary and junior secondary schools, the Surabaya city government took the initiative 
to abolish fees for senior secondary education. In addition, after distributing a set amount 
of BOSDA funding, the city government imposes very tight restrictions for all public 
schools on collecting contributions from parents. The policy created problems for some 
schools, particularly the élite schools, because it limited  their innovation and creativity, 
but the local education officials insisted that the schools had to do so to eradicate illegal 
fees collection. 
Despite some impressive local responses to national standards, in my interviews with 
MoEC officials in Jakarta, I understood there to be more disappointment than 
contentment with the general performance of local governments. They felt that the big 
investment the central government had made to enforce national standards of education 
did not trigger constructive policies from the local authorities. One official even claimed 
that the country had over-invested for this educational decentralisation project and called 
for the involvement of other central departments in enforcing the rules. 
 
You know, there is nothing we can do with the situation. We have done our part … 
[Eventually], we can only suggest and we cannot force them to do whatever we ask 
(Participant 30). 
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The Department of Home Affairs should have taken part in guiding [this process], 
because ... so far there is hardly any disincentive for the heads of local governments 
who do not comply with the central government regulations. We have set 
everything: how the good management should look like, we have mapped carefully 
when someone could become a school inspector; when he or she could become a 
principal; how long it takes until a teacher is eligible [to become principal] … 
Everything is regulated. But if not implemented with no sanction attached, then 
what are all of these meant for? ... We paid too much for this decentralisation 
(Participant 32). 
 
Conclusion 
To preserve the legitimacy and restore its authority over education governance, the central 
government employs the means–end decoupling approach. This strategy involves the 
strengthening of decentralised structures and the use of symbolic, professional-
legitimated control of standardisation at the expense of the dissolution of central 
government structure in localities. The standards are enforced by imposing regulatory 
governance, an audit culture, and redistributive policies. The central government believes 
that national standards and their enforcement can help anticipate the side effect of 
decentralisation, that is, the inter-regional discrepancies. For this standardisation project, 
the MoEC has produced hundreds of regulations and invested trillions of rupiah to make 
all stakeholders support the standardised national education system. 
The dynamic process of standardisation has led to structuration and destructuration. 
The audit culture has delivered the structuration effect in the sense that it leads to 
convergence and similarity of educational practices. The audits have made known the real 
and legitimate presence of the central government in local areas: students feel the pressure 
of the UN, schools cannot escape accreditation and teachers are striving to teach as 
required by the certification scheme. That sense of pressure, however, did not affect the 
standardisation efforts that demand the local governments’ responses, which is the 
managerial aspect. The enforcement of managerial standards leads to destructuration, 
which is characterised by the breakdown of structure and coordination systems. Many 
central rules in education management are violated because of interest differences 
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between the central and local governments. Thus, rather than combating inequalities, 
standardisation is challenged by different and contradicting local agendas in education. 
However, the destructuration not only comes from the different interests of between 
central and local governments. It also emerges from the dynamic relations within 
respective local organisational fields. In the next two chapters, drawing from the two local 
case studies of the Kupang and Surabaya city governments, I will present a more detailed 
discussion on how such local organisational fields affect the particular arrangement of 
education governance in localities. 
 

 Chapter VII 
Educational Decentralisation 
and the Rise of the Neo-patrimonial State: 
the Case of Kupang City 
	
The Mayor is the king here. His power overcomes the governor and even the 
minister (Participant 01) 
	
Introduction 
In these two analytical chapters (Chapters VII and VIII) I look at how educational 
decentralisation works in the context of greater political decentralisation. In Chapter V, it 
was mentioned that political decentralisation has facilitated the expansion of Weberian 
states in the local arenas.  That is why, as I touched upon in Chapter V, we have also 
learnt how standardisation has resulted in destructuration in terms of the breakdown of 
coordination systems between the central and local governments. The final two chapters 
will further discuss local sources of destructuration, that is, how the different practices of 
local state consolidation provided different responses to the pressure of national standards 
and gave effect to the formation of different local education governance. The discussion 
starts with the case of Kupang in Chapter VII, and is followed by a discussion of the case 
of Surabaya in Chapter VIII. 
In Kupang, political decentralisation has facilitated the consolidation of neo-
patrimonial regimes centred on the city mayor and bureaucratic élites. This patronage is 
managed not in the old-fashioned manner when clients served their patrons for cultural 
reasons or simply for existential protection. Rather, it works on the basis of exchange. As 
Khan describes it, this new patrimonialism works as ‘clients agree to provide political 
support to the patron in exchange for pay-offs that the patron can deliver by using political 
power to capture public resources’ (Khan, 2005: 714). This neo-patrimonialism also 
assumes that the control of public resources, including those in the education sector, are 
centrally and exclusively in the hands of the patron. This logic runs counter to the national 
standards of education that introduce some elements of professionalism, which promote 
more autonomous schools and education personnel. 
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This chapter is in two general parts. The first part discusses the construction of neo-
patrimonial structures in Kupang following the implementation of political 
decentralisation; the second part elaborates the local practices of education governance 
as the response of this neo-patrimonial structure to the pressure from national standards. 
In the last part, there is discussion of some internal resistance to the neo-patrimonial 
structure as part of the dynamics of structuration. 
 
The Political Construction of Kupang’s Patrimonial Bureaucracy 
Decentralisation and the Politicisation of Local Bureaucracy 
In his classical exposition of bureaucracy, Weber (1952) characterises this entity with at 
least three features: hierarchy, competency and rules. Bureaucracy is coordinated through 
interactions between leaders and their staffs, where the latter take orders from the former. 
All members of a bureaucracy are recruited on the basis of required skills and capacity 
for particular allocated jobs, and their careers are also determined by organisational 
assumptions of their credentials and capacity. Finally, bureaucracy is organised by strict 
rules that apply to anyone associated with the organisation. These rules protect the 
bureaucracy from any external influences and thus make its members more focused on 
their instrumental function. In the latter development, these ideals of bureaucracy are seen 
as problematic. Weber himself warned of the potential of the ‘overtowering’ power of the 
bureaucracy as its apparatus grows vastly and becomes increasingly immune to public 
control (Wilson, 1975). This has inevitably caused the gathering of political power into 
bureaucratic hands (Wilson, 1975). As such, in the consolidated bureaucratic state it has 
also become increasingly less possible to separate administration from policy (La 
Palombara, 2006; Whitford, 2002) or, as Egeberg (2007: 78) puts it, ‘the structure can 
therefore never be neutral, it always represents a mobilisation of bias in preparation for 
action’. 
Following the implementation of the 2001 political decentralisation, Jakarta is no 
longer the sole representation of meaningful power in Indonesia. Political decentralisation 
has transferred power to the district level. Local governments are authorised to manage 
their affairs with no more intervention from Jakarta. The old structure that politically and 
administratively incorporated the local government into the central government’s 
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bureaucratic body has been abolished. This institutional environment allows the 
reorganisation of power where local élites have become its centres (Hadiz, 2010). Since 
2005, when the first elections (pilkada) for local leaders were held, the district regents 
(bupati) and city mayors received an additional source of legitimacy, that is, they were 
elected by popular vote. Although the organisation of political parties remains centrally 
controlled and politicians standing for local leadership must obtain a party’s central 
committee consent in Jakarta, individual leadership of the bupati or mayor still is the most 
important factor. Elected, popular leaders would then overcome a political party’s 
influence and establish their domination over bureaucracy. 
What effect has this new institutional environment had on the bureaucracy? Since the 
bureaucracy itself cannot claim popular representation, it can no longer control politicians. 
Rather, politicians now control the bureaucrats. The effect is that, on the one hand, it 
enables bureaucracies to become more sensitive to public aspirations as its programs and 
performance are tested through public opinion and popularity ratings. The more popular 
the program, the more likely the government and its bureaucracy are to retain power 
(Gormley and Balla, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, it means that a democratic 
bureaucracy is prone to politicisation. Ståhlberg defines politicisation as the degree of 
administrative autonomy: ‘the less autonomous the administration is with regard to the 
political power, the more politicised it is’ (Ståhlberg, 1987: 365). This is reasonable 
because, by controlling the bureaucracy, politicians are able to control what their 
governments do (Peters and Pierre, 2004). As Peters and Pierre (2004) argue, there are at 
least two ways that the politicisation of the civil service might work. First, ‘marrying the 
natives’, that is, when politicians assign new people from among their loyalists to fill 
leadership positions in the bureaucratic machinery. Second, by mobilising public servants 
to influence their behaviour using political leadership and ideology, or through 
manufacturing ‘fear’. Normally, career bureaucrats are afraid of losing their job, being 
demoted, or being transferred to less favourable positions (Peters and Pierre, 2004). 
The politicisation of local bureaucracy starts as early as the local election processes 
commence. Because of the scarcity of popular leaders at the local scene, it has been 
common that some senior bureaucrats, either active or retired, try their luck to become 
politicians and stand for election. In that sense, even when they are not incumbent, 
because they retain an influence over bureaucracy through the remaining old patronage 
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culture, they can mobilise local public servants as part of their political campaign. If 
successful, they reward those who take part with promotion and replace those who don’t. 
Yet, if a rival competitor were to win the election the rewards and punishments go the 
other way. For incumbents, moves of bureaucratic positions might even be started before 
the election. They have to make sure that they have loyalists only in their team so that 
their political campaign can run smoothly. Besides, this is also a warning for those who 
might cross to the other side (Hidayat, 2009; Prayudi, 2013). 
What is important, from the elaboration of the bureaucratic consolidation, for our 
analysis of educational decentralisation in Kupang is related to the position of teachers. 
As described in Chapter VI, after decentralisation the management of schools and 
teachers became a local government responsibility; all schoolteachers with permanent 
civil service (PNS) status are official members of the local bureaucracy. In Kupang, those 
teachers comprise the dominant element in the local bureaucratic structure (see Figure 
7.1). And, as Chapter VI has briefly discussed, the patrimonial civil service culture has 
also been a tradition accepted by Indonesian teachers for decades. Hence, when the 
bureaucracy is politicised, this affects employment conditions for teachers and other 
school personnel. The following discussion will reveal how the politicisation of 
bureaucracy took place in Kupang and how it affected the governance of education in that 
city. To understand how the local bureaucracy has been politicised we should start with 
an understanding of the structure of local patronage. 
Figure 7.1. Composition of the Kupang Bureaucracy, 2013 
	
Source: (BPS Kota Kupang, 2014) 
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The Reproduction of Patronage in Kupang’s Bureaucracy 
The formal political structure of Kupang has been long dominated by the Golkar party. 
This party always secured the local representative council (DPRD) leadership until the 
takeover by the PDI-P party after the 2014 election. Nevertheless, since direct mayoral 
elections were introduced in Kupang in 2007, the political structure of the DPRD has 
never been reflected in mayoral elections. In the previous two mayoral elections, in 2007 
and 2012, Golkar candidates failed to win. Though political parties became increasingly 
influential in post-reform Indonesian politics, in elections they tend to function more as 
political vehicles than aspirational aggregators. Rather than promoting their long-serving 
cadres, many parties tend to recruit popular figures as candidates for election to DPRD or 
government leadership. Because there are no strong  or binding ties, politicians can easily 
move from one to another party (Choi, 2011). In the 2007 mayoral election, the elected 
mayor was Daniel Adoe, a former vice-mayor, whose candidacy was supported by a 
number of small parties (partai gurem). In the 2012 election, Adoe stood for his second 
term confidently with the support of the giant Golkar and other small parties. 
Unfortunately, he lost to his old rival, Jonas Salean, who stood as an independent, non-
partisan candidate. Upon his triumph, Salean led the government without any formal 
political party backup in the DPRD. 
Nevertheless, in Kupang, the real political power resides not in formally recognised 
political organisations, the political parties. Rather, it resides in the bureaucratic élites. 
These élites serve as incumbent actors who survive all pressures of external institutional 
change. To some extent, they even become the real skilled social actors (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012) or institutional entrepreneurs (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), who are 
able to seek opportunities within the contrary institutional logics in the field. For more 
than two decades, from 1986 to 2007, Kupang had one mayor only, Samuel Kristian Lerik. 
He was the second mayor of Kupang since the inauguration of the city in 1978. He was a 
fine example of a typical New Order strongman: an army officer, a Golkar leader, and a 
bureaucrat (Malo and Nas, 1991). He survived all regime changes from the heyday of 
New Order until its collapse in 1998, and went through four presidential reigns during the 
Reform era. 
Despite the institutional change to a more democratic government and the fierce 
patronage rivalry, the patronage of Lerik’s bureaucratic circle survives even today. The 
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rivalry of Adoe and Salean signifies the centrality of this circle in local politics. Adoe and 
Salean are both former Lerik’s men who were rivals from the time they both served the 
patron and gained top positions in his last period of power, from 2002 to 2007. At that 
time, while Adoe was the vice-mayor, Salean was the city government secretary. 
However, during this period the public saw that Lerik showed he had more confidence in 
Salean and gave to his deputy, Adoe, assignments more ceremonial than influential. As 
Lerik was by law denied standing for another term, the two rivals competed in the first 
direct mayoral election in 2007, and then at the second one in 2012. In the first election, 
won by Adoe, the Lerik family through its Golkar machine backed Salean, but Adoe 
picked up a number of small parties as his political vehicle. Later, although Adoe had 
successfully taken over the Golkar leadership from Lerik’s family, he and his powerful 
party backer failed to win favour with the voters who in 2012 endorsed Salean. 
Adoe and Salean both have had a strong influence over the bureaucracy because of 
their previous roles in the Lerik regime. And, certainly their rivalry affects the 
bureaucracy. When Adoe won the first local election in 2007, he dismissed all Lerik (and 
Salean) loyalists in the bureaucracy and made himself the new patron. In the first month 
after his inauguration he replaced Gabriel Kahan, Salean’s successor as government 
secretary. His term was marked by bad relations with the DPRD dominated by Lerik 
loyalists. The speaker was Lerik’s son, Viki Lerik, who also chaired the local Golkar 
party. However, in 2011, Adoe successfully overthrew Viki Lerik from his parliamentary 
and party leaderships. The mayor then became the new Golkar chairman, a position that 
gave Adoe more confidence to take control of Kupang’s political realm. 
As such, after his dramatic victory in the 2012 mayoral election, Salean retooled the 
bureaucracy and removed his predecessor’s allies. In his first year, he faced many 
criticisms for his five waves of official mutations. In late October 2012, two months after 
his mayoral inauguration, he recast the bureaucracy, filling 224 third and fourth-echelon 
posts with new officials (Pos Kupang, 26 October 2012). Five months later, 27 prestigious 
second-echelon positions had new incumbents. The consensus in élite circles held that 
these mutations were no more than balas dendam (retaliation) and balas jasa 
(redemption). Indeed, the most affected group from this mutation process were from the 
education sector because teachers constitute the largest occupation group in the public 
service (see Figure 7.1). 
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Although having no political backup in DPRD, Salean built good relations with local 
politicians. He benefited from Adoe’s political career coming to a complete end. In 19 
December 2013, the Nusa Tenggara Timur high prosecutor arrested the ex-mayor for 
alleged corruption involving school textbooks. He and his former head of education Dinas 
were accused of unlawfully giving direct appointments to the winning bidder. On 10 July 
2014, the court sentenced Adoe to two and a half years imprisonment (Antaranews, 2014). 
This meant that the Golkar leadership had to be changed and Salean had publicly 
announced his interest. On 4 March 2016, Salean officially took over the party leadership 
after a unanimous vote of support at the party’s conference. 
The Structure of Local Education and the Policy Initiatives 
The city government of Kupang has 238 schools; elementary to senior secondary. 
Generally, there are more public schools than private, but the number of private secondary 
schools (junior and senior) is greater than the number of public secondary schools (see 
Table 7.1). This public to private school ratio is part of a national trend. The great increase 
in the number of public schools in Indonesia started in the 1980s when the country was 
flooded with oil boom money (Christano and Cummings, 2007). At the secondary level, 
there were numerically more private schools, however, public schools teach many more 
students than do private schools. Public schools have to struggle with higher student to 
teacher ratios than do private schools. However, just like the national trend, private 
schools in Kupang are generally less competitive except for a very small number of élite 
schools. The admission competition is always tight for getting seats in public schools, 
particularly the élite ones, or what have been locally known as sekolah favorit (favoured 
schools). 
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Table 7.1. Education Figures for Kupang, 2014 
Level/Status 
Public Private 
Schools Students Teachers School Students Teachers 
Elementary 81 28,020 1,623 54 11,115 639 
Junior Secondary 21 11,543 1,033 33 2,442 372 
Senior Secondary 12 10,736 599 14 2,996 332 
Vocational 8 2,800 499 15 755 199 
Total 122 53,099 3,754 116 17,308 1,542 
Source: (MoEC, 2014) 
	
Despite the problems that might affect education quality, the access to education in 
Kupang shows a relatively good trend. From 2011 to 2013, gross and net enrolments at 
all educational levels increased gradually. The positive trend in enrolments more 
fundamentally is a result of the national program of nine years of compulsory education 
rather than any local program. Through BOS, the central government covers all costs for 
elementary and junior secondary education and all elementary and junior secondary 
public schools ought to be free. In the meantime, for senior secondary schools, the central 
government covers only half of the standardised operational cost (see Table 7.3) and 
therefore the provincial and city governments must share the burden of the remaining 
balance; two-thirds each. Yet, because of the poor locally generated revenue (PAD) of 
provincial and city governments, hardly any additional funding has been allocated for 
senior secondary education in Kupang. This makes the central government the most 
generous funding resource. 
Table 7.2. School Enrolments in Kupang 
Level 
2011 2012 2013 
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net 
Primary 126,18 103,25 126,43 103,25 126,67  105,5 
Junior Secondary 116,99 80,7 117,58 81,31 118,18 81,93 
Senior and Vocational 
Secondary 
94,54 60,72 97,51 62,17 100,56 63,64 
Source: (Bappeda Kota Kupang, 2013)  
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In 2014, the education sector in Kupang was allocated as much as IDR380 billion 
(USD31.6 million) or more than four times Kupang’s PAD. Most of the amount came 
from a central government transfer. According to a local education office (Dinas) officer, 
because most of the budget was spent on routine salaries, the amount was not enough to 
cover all other schemes. Therefore, although the central government has made elementary 
and junior secondary education free, the mayor did not ban Kupang schools from 
collecting tuition fees. The amount of school tuition fees at all school levels in Kupang 
ranges from USD 0.83 to USD 16.6 per month. The officer contended that such a funding 
constraint has limited the room for infrastructure expansion and policy innovation. Even 
with more and more public schools exceeding capacity because of rapid urbanisation, 
opening new schools is difficult. Central government schemes are available to fund 
renovation only, rather than building new schools. There is a classroom surplus in private 
schools but most parents are reluctant to send their children to those schools for economic 
or educational reasons. Public and private schools both charge fees, but public schools 
are seen as better than private schools in general. There are a small number of good private 
schools, but only well-off parents can afford their fees. 
 
Table 7.3. The Comparison of the Central and Local Governments’ Per pupil Non-Personnel 
Operational Grants to Schools in Kupang, 2013  
School level 
The 
standardised 
unit cost per 
pupil per year* 
Grants (USD) 9 
CG BOS LG BOSDA Shortfall 
Primary 48.2 48.2 0 0 
Junior Secondary 59.1 59.1 0 0 
Senior Secondary 81.9 46.6 0 -35.3 
* Based on MoEC Regulation 69 of 2009 
	
The official also blamed the limited budget for the lack of local policy initiatives. The 
education sector in Kupang is organised more through a random than systemic 
																																								 																				
9 The conversion is based on the USD to IDR exchange value rate as of December 2013, USD1 = 
IDR12,021 
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arrangement. There are no policy documents in terms of government regulation or 
guidelines for either general or particular education agendas. All programs are those jotted 
down on annual budget lists of activities. Some local policy observers I interviewed said 
that they frequently raised the problem of why education legislation has not been 
produced ever since. And, to such questions, government and DPRD have replied that the 
discussion is still taking place. 
Hence, there are hardly any local policies on education except for a small number of 
social aid programs. The city government, for instance, provides scholarships for selected 
students from poor families. The policy was initiated by Adoe’s administration (2007–
2012). Under Mayor Salean, other redistributive policies have also been introduced. In 
2013, he provided scholarships for a university education for 1000 recent school 
graduates from poor families. Other scholarships are for underqualified teachers to obtain 
a standard university degree with university fees shared, half by the student and half by 
the government. 
In addition, it had been a common talk among civil service élites that those social aid 
programs were used for political campaigns. The local government usually exploits the 
leverage of such redistributive programs as the end of their term in office is approaching. 
In August 2011, for instance, Mayor Adoe announced what he called Dana Kesejahteraan 
Guru (teachers’ welfare funds), which is granted to all teachers of public and private 
schools, to start from January 2012. This was to prepare for the mayoral election that 
would be held in June 2012. With similar intentions, on October 2015, Mayor Salean also 
promised that his government would provide extra incentives to 2312 non-permanent 
teachers, starting from 2016. Some people related this is as preparation for the 2017 
mayoral election. In the next part, I will discuss further the way politicisation was 
organised in the local neo-patrimonial system and has shaped the education bureaucracy. 
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Neo-patrimonialism and the Politicisation of Local Education Governance 
Most Indonesian teachers are civil servants or Pegawai Negeri Sipil (PNS). Others are 
either contract teachers or private school teachers whose combined proportion is 38.2 per 
cent of total teacher population (MoEC, 2012). PNS is a lifetime occupation that provides 
not only economic security but, more important, social status in the community 
(Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006). Therefore, it is the ultimate dream of most Indonesian 
teachers to gain permanent PNS status. They will do anything possible to obtain the 
permanency and once achieved they will make every effort to preserve it. Decentralisation 
has integrated the administration of schools with the local bureaucracy. This is reinforced 
by the transfer of all PNS teachers to local government employment. Although the central 
government still has the final say on PNS teachers’ recruitment and dismissal, the local 
government has full control of their placement and promotion. In addition, local 
government is fully authorised to hire contract teachers whose numbers significantly 
expanded after decentralisation. Cited in the Jakarta post (2016), the minister claimed 
that the number of contract teachers had been boosted by 860 per cent over the previous 
15 years, from 84,600 in 1999 to 812,064 in 2015. Thanks to this policy environment, 
schools are placed at the base of the Dinas bureaucracy and school personnel (principals, 
teachers and administration staff) would normally serve as members of staff of the head 
of the Dinas. As PNS, teachers and principals are bound by strict bureaucratic rules and 
hierarchy. As members of the Dinas bureaucracy, their careers depend on this office’s 
evaluation of them. In the Kupang context, the structure has established a patron–client 
relation between local government bureaucrats and all school personnel. 
However, the central government has introduced another institutional means to limit 
local government’s excessive intervention in schools. The 2003 Education Law stipulates 
that schools be organised on the basis of a school-based management (SBM) model. 
Government regulation 17 of 2010 defines this SBM as ‘a form of school autonomy … 
in which principals and teachers are running the school with the assistance of a school 
committee’ (GoI, 2010a: Commentary article 10[4]). The government also introduced 
many other regulations to standardise the management of education, particularly in areas, 
such as the appointment of principals and student admissions. Some of these regulations 
reduce particular privileges of the local government and endorse the involvement of 
professional elements, in terms of content and control. Although content is related to the 
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possession of relevant knowledge and expertise, control concerns an ‘institutionalised or 
disciplinary control of professional practice by professionals’ (Noordegraaf, 2007: 767). 
In terms of content, for instance, the school must follow four principles: objectivity, 
transparency, accountability and non-discrimination (MoEC and MoRA, 2011). In terms 
of control, for instance, the process of appointing principals must involve other parties 
ranging from fellow principals, school inspectors, training institutions and an independent 
committee (MoEC, 2010). 
In the education sector, the adoption of national standards is the only way for the local 
government to obtain institutional legitimacy so that its policy outcomes are 
administratively and professionally justified. This is to consider the common perception 
that local government officials are incapable in dealing with technical education matters. 
Nevertheless, this runs counter to the established neo-patrimonial logic that safeguards 
the entrenched interests of local institutional actors; politicians and government élites. To 
solve the contradiction, rather than totally rejecting the national standards that cost them 
the institutional legitimacy, Kupang local government officials performed an institutional 
assimilation by ‘combining one logic’s elements into the most prevalent one’ (Thornton, 
et al., 2012: 165). In this sense, the professional logic that underlies the regime of national 
standards was manipulated to become more adaptable to the patrimonial system. In this 
case, the assimilation process then ended up as the politicisation of professional discourse 
in two ways. First, by introducing a ceremonial professionalisation policy that decouples 
professionals from their core professional skills. Through this, the patrimonial local 
government garners professional legitimacy simply by creating a teacher regime in the 
bureaucracy in which teachers are granted some administrative positions but whose 
responsibilities are irrelevant to their professional work. Second, moving the professional 
control, not just from an autonomous to heteronomous organisation (Scott, 1965), but also 
from the heteronomous to a fully state-coopted bureaucracy.10 The local government uses 
its own definition of professional and continues the intervention in school governance 
regardless of the central government’s standards. 
	
																																								 																				
10 A professional organisation is autonomous when the organisation and control of all professional 
activities within the organisation are handled by the professional staff and heteronomous when those 
activities are organised and controlled by the administration (Scott, 1965). 
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The Ceremonial Professionalisation of Local Education Office 
The integration of schools into the local government bureaucracy has affected not only 
the schools but also the bureaucracy. In the past, only elementary school teachers were 
part of the local bureaucracy but, after decentralisation, all public school teachers became 
local government employees. The effect is not only on the size of the local bureaucracy, 
of which teachers are now the predominant proportion, but also on the quality of the 
human resources of the bureaucracy. Teaching qualifications have been continuously 
improved, thanks to the central government’s professional certification policy (Chang, et 
al., 2013). It means that in particular areas their value as a resource is indicated by their 
educational qualification, which helps them gain preference (or priority) when competing 
with other local public servants. In big cities that have large economic bases this does not 
create any significant differences, but in small cities like Kupang it certainly does. 
Practically speaking, this gives incentives for government and for teachers. For the 
government, it has contributed to developing its bureaucratic resources, for teachers it 
means more opportunities to advance. 
Ideally, as teachers become more professional, schools and students would benefit 
from improved teaching and outcomes (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Fishman et al., 2003). 
But, in Kupang, the incentive of having professional status with a higher education 
qualification along with a title and rank is linked to teachers’ new role in the bureaucracy. 
Because of their status and qualification, teachers are more than ready to be appointed to 
a number of structural leadership positions within the bureaucracy. For the local 
bureaucracy, this means professionalisation simply because it is able to hire an 
occupational group with legitimate official status as professionals. But this is ceremonial 
professionalisation because in the new jobs teachers are assigned to administrative roles 
that are loosely coupled from their technical skills as an educator. In addition, they are 
forced to enter a new environment where the political control prevails over the 
administrative and professional roles. This entire professionalisation project is used to 
support the legitimacy of the local patronage. 
The most extensive involvement of teachers in the bureaucracy was during Adoe’s 
administration (2007–2012). At that time, the municipal government recruited 60 teachers 
to occupy senior positions in several government organisations. Of those 60, six became 
top leaders of the Dinas departments, that is, education, citizen registration, taxation, 
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cooperative and small enterprises, urban community development and the civil service 
police department. Nevertheless, the massive movement of teachers into the bureaucracy 
brought public criticism and, in 2013, the new mayor, Salean, returned those teachers to 
schools. He promised not to assign teachers again to administrative leadership positions 
in the bureaucracy. However, he insisted on retaining the teachers who had been placed 
in the education Dinas. The mayor has publicly declared this a professionalisation project, 
saying that teachers are ‘the ones who understand education-related issues’ (Pos Kupang, 
2012). Thus, unlike other sectoral departments, the education Dinas has become the only 
Kupang government institution whose officials are mostly recruited from among non-
administrative employees. In this sense, the administrative civil servants, whose whole 
career is in the education Dinas bureaucracy, have had to yield their opportunity of 
promotion to a higher rank to this new professional group of civil servants. 
Nevertheless, whether the professionalisation project is relevant to the real 
organisational change to a more professional institution can be seen from two aspects: 
content and control (Noordegraaf, 2007). I reinterpret ‘content’ here as the kind of work 
being mandated and the technical skills needed to handle the responsibilities in the 
organisation. As with control, it is the mechanism through which the recruitment and 
performance assessment of the officials are done in more professional ways. 
In terms of content, despite the professional leadership, the Dinas organisation needs 
to use only a little of the professional properties of the teachers in its activities. This can 
be explained by the fact that educational role of the Dinas is more administrative than 
technical, so that it is managerial skills that are most needed in the organisation. The 
Dinas only has one relevant technical division in its organisational structure, the 
curriculum division, but because the central government has set content standards, what 
is left for the Dinas to do normatively is to coordinate the implementation of these 
standards. In that sense, the education Dinas nearly functions as a clearing house that 
schools and teachers can refer to in obtaining information about central government 
policies. The other divisions are administrative divisions such as infrastructure and 
personnel management. One education Dinas official spoke of his routine activities in the 
following manner. 
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What we usually did [with regard to technical education matters] was to distribute 
information (sosialisasi) to schools … We passed on what the central government 
has told us related to, for example, the new curriculum, new policy … We facilitated 
teacher discussion groups to develop the syllabus … Other than that, we are 
managing infrastructure, admissions, teacher allowances, … teaching hours … 
(Participant 01). 
	
In terms of control, the education office did appear to become more of a professional than 
administrative institution because it was then run, not by technical administrators, but 
rather by knowledge-based professional teachers. However, having the Dinas occupied 
by professionals did not necessarily mean that professional values prevailed over the 
traditional bureaucratic norms. If professionalism requires autonomous professional 
judgement, then the Kupang Dinas did not allow this to be exercised; it functioned as the 
full executor of higher political decisions. In Kupang, the Dinas officials could not use 
any initiative on strategic personnel matters, such as the appointment of principals and 
teacher recruitment, in areas where they should be in charge, because they must defer to 
political intervention from the mayoral office or the DPRD. For example, in the student 
admission process, where Dinas had the responsibility to set up standard procedures, 
frequently they could not prevent these procedures from being subverted by politicians. 
Parents often sought a recommendation from a politician to avoid the standard admission 
requirements so that their child may be admitted to a preferred school. On many occasions, 
the mayor intervened in education matters. On this, a principal shared his experience 
(Participant : 
IZ: How often did you attend meetings in Dinas? 
P: I am not sure. But mostly we were summoned when the mayor had some issues, 
for example, when parents have complained about school policy … umm, but yea, 
I think we met quite regularly when new student admission season comes … 
IZ: What was discussed in the meeting? 
P: … the Dinas official usually passed on the mayor’s concern, what he wanted us 
to do in response to particular issues and we were asked to stick with that … 
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Nevertheless, the most important thing behind this teacher professionalisation was what 
it meant for the local government. On the one hand, the particular skills relevant to 
teaching are not needed in the Dinas and, on the other hand, the appointment of all Dinas 
personnel is subject to mayoral discretion; the placement of teachers does not necessarily 
consider whether the person meets the requirements of the job. According to some local 
participants, appointments to a number of administrative positions were related to 
‘political redemption’. A respected local university professor and social scientist I 
interviewed in Kupang said that following the dynamics of local politics, teachers offer 
more electoral potential because they have traditionally long been de facto leaders in their 
respective communities. Politicians can benefit from the political influence these teachers 
have in their communities. As compensation, politicians offer positions in the local 
government bureaucracy (Participant 10). But only teachers who have supported the 
winning political group could earn a position in the office (see Box 7.1). 
	
Box 7.1: AF’s story 
A number of research participants told the story of AF, one of the education Dinas’ most 
senior officers. In 2009 he was suddenly removed from the X school headship before his term 
ended and seconded to be a government teacher in a mediocre private school. He mobilised a 
number of teachers to protest against the decision, arguing that no proper procedures were 
followed and no reasons were given. This did not change the decision. The head of Dinas 
replied that his decision-making authority cannot be questioned. Controlling his anger, AF 
managed to join Salean’s political campaign team aspiring to remove education from political 
interests. He saw that Salean would support this mission, [because] he was the only non-
partisan, independent candidate standing. Upon Salean’s victory, he was promoted to the 
senior level in the education Dinas. Because of his influence, he was also elected the local 
PGRI (teachers’ union) leader a few months after his appointment to the Dinas. Because he 
had the power, he applied the political rules. AF followed the traditions of the predecessor he 
had opposed. Only four months after the new mayor was sworn in August 2012, the Dinas 
discharged 24 school principals and five inspectors in favour of new officers (Tribunnews, 
2012). One year later, the second such move was much greater: no fewer than 88 principals 
and three inspectors were replaced (Pos Kupang, 2013). 
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Challenging the External Pressure: the Case of School Principal Appointments 
Professionalism has become a contested discourse between the central government and 
the local government in Kupang. The contest is framed by each party’s interest in the 
control of education governance. On the one hand, the central government has long been 
worried by the potential for local government political intervention in schools and, with 
this in mind, it initiated the creation of a more autonomous school administration through 
the school-based management (SBM) scheme. The extent to which school-based 
management can be productively implemented largely relies on strong and professional 
school leadership (Botha, 2006; Cranston, 2002; Leithwood and Riehl, 2003). In this 
sense, the criteria of professional leadership should be reformulated and mechanisms to 
meet such criteria should also be designed. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, 
education personnel are the largest component of the bureaucratic apparatus and the local 
government has a great need to optimise its control over them. This means that the local 
government’s discretion to manage schools and their personnel will be used to fulfil such 
interests despite all the central government’s efforts to realise its own ideals. Hence, in 
opposition to central government demands, the Kupang government opts to define its 
position on professionalism from the fact that all certified teachers are professionals by 
law, so that nominating any of them to perform a job of school leadership would be more 
than enough. By adopting this position, the local government is more relaxed in using its 
discretion. 
From 2003 to 2010, the MoEC has developed at least three regulatory frameworks to 
standardise the nomination of school principals by each local government authority 
(MoEC, 2003, 2007, 2010). It is a standard that requires that principals must come from 
the teaching profession but possess five more competencies as indicators of their 
professional capacity: personal integrity, managerial competence, entrepreneurial skills, 
supervisory competence and social competence (MoEC, 2007). The ministry uses a very 
strict mechanism to make sure that these indicators are possessed by each nominated 
principal. The most important of these is that the candidate must be actively involved 
from the very beginning of the recruitment process. Unlike the common practice in which 
the local government head at his or her discretion directly appoints a principal, the 
standardised processes would involve training and assessing each candidate. The process 
takes up to two years before the official placement is made. 
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As the MoEC’s regulation has it, the professional route of principal recruitment started 
from the nomination proposed not by the Dinas but by other professionals, namely current 
principals and school inspectors. The Dinas then assess the proposed names against 
administrative and academic criteria. Once selected, the candidates must attend a 100-
hour professional training course organised by any institution accredited to the MoEC. 
As part of this training, they also have fieldwork for three months. By the end of the 
training, their achievement is then assessed to decide whether they deserve certification. 
Only candidates with a professional training certificate are eligible for official 
appointment and posting. The appointment itself is not solely made by the Dinas official 
but rather involves an independent consultative committee whose membership consists 
of school inspectors and members of the city education board. Once appointed, a principal 
is entitled to a four-year service period that may be extended for another term should they 
show significant achievement (see Figure 7.2). 
	
Figure 7.2. National Standard Process of the Nomination of Principals 
	
Source: (MoEC, 2010) 
	
Nevertheless, such a standardised mechanism has been disregarded when it comes to local 
government practice. For the local government this is not a regulation they feel obliged 
to comply with. In Kupang, almost all principals acknowledge that they were appointed 
without any preliminary selection process as mandated by the national regulation. All 
they know was that they were appointed by the mayor at his discretion and that they had 
never been actively involved in this process. Of eight senior secondary public school 
principals interviewed, only one said that he was recruited through open competition and 
that was before the decentralisation process. This senior principal compared the process 
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of his recent appointment as principal with the first time he became principal, before the 
decentralisation was effective. 
	
At that time I was involved in the selection process. I attended some interviews, 
tests and training. There were tiered assessments from the district office to the 
central government’s education department. The competition was nation-wide or at 
least province-wide. Then [following the decentralisation program] there was a 
merger of Kandep (the district office of the education department) and education 
Dinas ... Based on the district level grading, I got the highest ranking. I was then 
appointed on the basis of a provincial Dinas decree. Now there is no more 
selection ... I don’t know if there is an internal selection in Dinas ... But, in terms of 
the selection that actively involves us in the process, I don’t think so (Participant 
05). 
	
The Dinas official himself admitted that his office developed its own methods. According 
to him, the Dinas selected the candidates from among the teachers and assessed them 
using the criteria of official rank, length of teaching service and managerial capability. 
The head of the Dinas then nominated the selected candidates to be assessed by a local 
civil service agency (BKD) and local rank and position consideration agency (Baperjakat). 
The Baperjakat passed recommendations to the mayoral office with the mayor making 
the final decision. However, this process is a normal procedure for PNS promotion to any 
senior civil service position. No external committee, as instructed by the MoEC, was ever 
established in Kupang for the process of school principal selection. Therefore, as the 
Dinas official himself acknowledged, the selection process tended to be ceremonial since 
the mayor would normally select the candidates from his ‘side’ only. Aware of this, the 
Dinas usually screened the candidates being proposed to the mayor and in the end ‘politics 
overcame professionalism’ (Participant 01). The professionalism was simply reduced to 
a label attached to all certified teachers. The Dinas officials perceived that the appointed 
principals were simply professionals because they were selected from the professionally 
certified teachers. 
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The national standards for the recruitment of principals failed to gain legitimation in 
Kupang. The professional intentions of the national standards have been politicised to suit 
the interests of those who want to retain the patronage arrangements in the bureaucracy. 
A participant, who was chief editor of the leading local newspaper, said that the 
appointment of principals was like any other posting in the bureaucracy, which was based 
on either of two reasons: rewards (balas jasa) or retaliation (balas dendam) (Participant 
12). The terms have been widely used in local political discussions since direct mayoral 
elections were introduced in 2007 (Tidey, 2012). Mayoral elections (Pilkada) have 
become the key event where all the processes of this bureaucratic politicisation originate. 
This is the moment of truth for local bureaucrats who want to keep their position or 
advance their career. This is also the chance for retaliation by those who have been 
displaced by the ruling regime. Some principals, however, were not comfortable with the 
term ‘retaliation’, but agreed with ‘rewards’ arguing that in a political competition all 
parties are aware of the consequence of their decisions. As one principal acknowledged: 
	
There is no such thing as balas dendam. Everyone knows the consequence of his or 
her political choice. Principals who choose the losing candidates understand the 
consequence of being sacked in order to accommodate those who helped the 
winners. This is a redemption (balas jasa) and it is normal (Participant 04). 
	
As Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested, institutionalised actors tend to take their routine 
practices for granted. The pressure of working with a politicised bureaucracy has made 
the involvement of principals and teachers in the political process routine. A principal 
wisely put it this way: ‘there is no political mobilisation initiated externally... it is rather 
those principals and teachers who mobilise themselves’ (Participant 05). The pattern of 
relations among organisational actors as a consequence of local elections has constrained 
the way teachers react to the political dynamics. They are trapped in a situation in which, 
as local leadership is contested in a more open political battle, positions in the bureaucracy 
follow suit. Local élites ‘identify who are with and against them’ (Participant 01) and 
principals feel that this is a time when their careers are at stake. Displacement of 
principals from their positions happens because, as clients of their patron, most principals 
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would stand or fall with his success or failure at an election. The 2007 and 2012 mayoral 
elections did see the incumbent fail to be re-elected and this explains why many principals 
had been replaced after the election. 
Nevertheless, as organisations, schools give major political actors an amount of 
bargaining power because they possess some potential resources that are politically 
invaluable. The Dinas officer acknowledged that a school’s political capital rests on its 
two community groups: senior students and teachers. Senior secondary schools host 11th 
and 12th grade students, most of whom are new voters, according to Indonesian electoral 
system records. In addition, schoolteachers traditionally serve as informal leaders in their 
respective communities and their influence in their community is very useful for political 
promotion (Participant 01). The relations of constraint between schools and bureaucracy 
has made education highly politicised. Principals are those responsible for organising the 
potential of such political capital in their schools. They are held responsible for all 
potential votes coming from the school community. They co-opt teachers to consolidate 
the student vote and the school committee to take care of the parents’ voting intentions 
(Participant 12 and Participant 14). One testimony by a principal explains how this 
happened: 
	
We first persuaded our relatives and showed to the [mayoral candidate’s] team 
members that they supported the candidate ... [Also], because a school principal is 
public figure, his or her act would by any means influence other people’s choice. 
Teachers usually know our choice and the majority of them would follow a 
principal’s choice. In our regular meetings, I presented the candidate’s reputation 
and programs so my teachers would know him better. The rest is up to them. 
However, I never spoke about other candidates’ weaknesses. I also suggested other 
supporters to run a polite and fair campaign, avoiding any backbiting against our 
competitors ... We never posed intervention to 11th and 12th grade students. We 
just let them know [our stand], no more. If we gave them too much intervention, 
they will tell their parents and that will appear in the newspaper (Participant 04). 
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Nevertheless, not all members of the school community always agree with the principal. 
Most principals tend to support an incumbent’s political agenda, but teachers who have 
nothing to lose are more diverse in their political preferences. There is always internal 
competition for positions by members of a school’s teaching staff and this affects their 
political preferences. Teachers who have been waiting long for an advance in their career 
would support those candidates who are likely to offer them better opportunities 
(Participant 14). The higher the school’s prestige, the more intense is the competition. In 
this sense, such political dynamics do not or rarely galvanise less favourable, small 
schools. Most of these schools are miles away from the city centre and have fewer than 
two hundred students. Some have no access to public transport and serve only a 
neighbouring community that has to cope with poverty. With a poor budget allocation 
from the local government and an inability of most parents to pay a tuition fee, principals 
have to struggle more than their colleagues in larger schools. Hence, it is unlikely that 
this kind of school is one that local politicians are interested in. This, for instance, is 
reflected in my interview with the principal of a senior secondary school which had fewer 
than 150 students and 17 teachers of whom only five were permanent employees. 
	
IZ: After decentralisation I heard that many teachers are actively involved in local 
politics. What do you know about it? 
AD: Yes, surely they are. But I only know about it: [for example, I know] this one 
is working for this candidate [and the other one for the other], and you don’t have 
to be involved [to have such knowledge]. Indeed, such a thing was present ... it’s 
no longer a secret ... though there is no legal evidence, but I know it was there. 
IZ: What about in this school? 
AD: Here such things never influenced my teachers. Moreover, there are not any 
permanent employees. They did vote but are not actively involved in politics. 
IZ: What about you? 
AD: In my case, when I got [this position, it was because of] trust, it is nothing to 
do with that [politics] ... I don’t know why [I was appointed] ... [politicisation is] 
impossible in this school because the [number of] teachers is still small ... not 
many students ... it’s just not possible (Participant 02).	
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The Politicisation of Formal Structure: the Case of Student Admissions 
Another aspect of education management that has also been regulated by the central 
government is student admissions. School admission is the crucial case where the 
professional logic of school reform faces challenges in the local arena. The ministerial 
regulation on student admissions was first issued in 2002 but was revised in 2011 and 
again in 2014. There are no significant changes in the 2014 revision, but this study bases 
its analysis on the 2011 regulation. The central ministry requires that admissions must be 
a matter for individual schools and organised with the assistance of the school committee. 
The regulation stipulates the admission principles of objectivity, transparency, 
accountability and non-discrimination. It also prescribes details, such as student age limits; 
the maximum number of students for each learning group; the restriction of admission 
fees; the use of the national exam score as a selection criterion; and the specification of 
home-to-school distance. In all of these processes, the Dinas is left with the role of 
authorising the inter-district and inter-school student transfer as well as general 
coordination and monitoring of the admission process in the schools to comply with the 
nationally regulated standards (MoEC and MoRA, 2011). 
Unlike the case of the appointment of principals, the central government standard for 
student admissions became an unchallenged institutional pressure for local governments. 
The local government bowed to this pressure; the formal structure of student admission 
practices is set out in ‘the Education Dinas guideline for new student admission’ (Dinas 
Pendidikan Kota Kupang, 2014). In the guideline, for instance, the Dinas set 34 as the 
maximum number of students a public school could admit to each learning group. This is 
below the maximum number allowed by the central government, which is 40 students. 
Because in each of 12 senior-secondary public schools in the city there were eight 
learning groups, every school could have enrolled a maximum of 272 students and, in 
total, there would be 3264 new students admitted (Dinas Pendidikan Kota Kupang, 2014). 
In the schools, eligibility criteria for admitting students were also set up. Every school 
launched its admission team whose responsibility was to select candidates based on the 
specified criteria. To control the enrolment size, some schools employed the minimum 
score taken from the previous school level’s final examination. This normally applied in 
some élite public schools. For others, they did not require any score limit. 
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Table 7.4. Senior Secondary Student Admission in Kupang, 2014 
No. Institution Acreditation* Quota** Realisation*** 
1 SMAN 1 Non-acredited 272 694 
2 SMAN 2 B 272 607 
3 SMAN 3 A 272 765 
4 SMAN 4 B 272 503 
5 SMAN 5 A 272 345 
6 SMAN 6 B 272 324 
7 SMAN 7 B 272 349 
8 SMAN 8 B 272 193 
9 SMAN 9 B 272 255 
10 SMAN 10 C 272 68 
11 SMAN 11 B 272 65 
12 SMAN 12 Non-acredited 272 56 
Sources: * http://referensi.data.kemdikbud.go.id/ (accessed 20 November 2015) 
 ** New Student Admission Guideline, Kupang City Education Dinas (2014) 
 *** http://dapo.dikmen.kemdikbud.go.id/ (accessed 20 November 2015) 
	
However, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) maintain, the formal structure serves as a powerful 
rationalised myth to legitimate organisational behaviour, but will last only as a window 
dressing policy when the demand for technical efficiency comes. At this time, the 
organisation will decouple this formal structure from its practices. In our case, the formal 
guideline for admissions had never translated into practice. Such decoupling was 
inevitable because the professional logic of national standards runs counter to the 
established cultural belief that is supported by the patrimonial politics. This cultural belief 
centred on another myth, that of sekolah favorit (favourite schools). This is the local term 
for élite public schools. The myth was not rationalised by the number of observable 
achievements, such as accreditation score, but rather by the commonly accepted beliefs 
about a school’s reputation. There were four favourite high schools (of 12 in all) to which 
parents and students’ aspiration were concentrated every year (schools 1 to 4 in Table 
7.4). The parents insisted their children be admitted despite the schools’ limited capacity. 
The higher accreditation ranking of other, non-favourite schools did little to attract these 
parents. A high school principal illustrated the huge pressure for children to be admitted 
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to those favoured schools by saying: ‘they even do not care if they squeeze together in 
one classroom as long as they are enrolled in those schools’ (Participant 2). 
The strength of this myth has provoked a profound political resonance. The parents’ 
aspirations for their children soon transformed to political pressure, which involved not 
only those parents but also high-ranking officials and politicians. All shared the pressure 
over schools. It has been a traditional practice that senior officials in the bureaucracy use 
their influence to press the principal to give favourable treatment to their relatives. Parents 
who got their wishes to place their children in desired schools unfulfilled went to the 
Dinas officials or city councillors to ask that they use their political influence to prevail 
over the school’s admissions policy (Ombudsman and PIAR NTT, 2013). Thus, the 
professional logic of formal structures gave way to political influence. Principals had no 
choice but to follow, or risk their position. A principal described the conflict between 
professional and patrimonial logic in the admission process as follows: 
	
Within the admission guideline it has been clearly written what is to be done. Yet, 
when the entire process ended, [but] some interests remained unfulfilled we were 
then summoned [to a meeting] and then asked to find the way out for all to stay safe. 
In the end, [we had to] bypass the official guidelines. So, there was no consistency 
between regulation and implementation. Sometimes we were confused. We were 
blended into the political process. In politics illegality [is the one] which should be 
endorsed (Participant 08). 
	
In this sense, two types of admission were possible: the official admission (seleksi resmi) 
at the first phase to comply with the formal regulation, and unofficial admission (seleksi 
tidak resmi) at the second stage to accommodate popular interests (Ombudsman and 
PIAR NTT, 2013). Some principals also called it pure selection (seleksi murni) and 
impure selection (seleksi tidak murni). One of the principals of an élite school 
acknowledged that the proportion of both types of admission could be equal at his school. 
It means that half of the student population in this favourite school was recruited 
‘unprofessionally’. During the school admissions season, the principals of these favourite 
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schools became the centre of attention. Their offices and houses attract visitors lobbying 
for places. A principal of one favourite school admitted: 
	
In this city all people know me. They contacted me, came to my school or my house. 
[To avoid them] I often disappeared. I switched off my cell phone ... I asked my 
wife to tell these people I was going to Jakarta, while in fact I was at home taking 
a nap (Participant 04). 
	
However, only those who have strong backing are admitted through political selection. 
Children of relatives of high-ranking officials are more likely to secure a place, for the 
others it depends on how hard their backers fight for them. In addition to Dinas officials, 
local councillors frequently play a role as a backer for a student’s admission. The chief 
of the education committee of the city representative council confirmed that: 
	
There has been misperception among parents, they always said that particular 
schools are favourites and others are not. Eventually they took all the efforts to send 
their children into those schools although they didn’t have enough score 
qualification. We in the council received many rejection forms brought by these 
parents. Because they insisted, we then decided [asking those public schools] to 
open morning and late afternoon classes … It is our responsibility to accommodate 
people’s aspirations and it is the government responsibility to provide education for 
its people without discrimination (Participant 14). 
	
The launch of morning and late afternoon classes means that student numbers in each 
class go beyond the ideal. The practice of unofficial admissions has become routine and 
the government has been always tricked by its own policy. In 2010, after the regular 
admission process, the government offered 13 new class places in some favourite high 
schools. In 2012, the DPRD and Dinas made a controversial decision when they ordered 
the number of classes in one favourite school to be three times the optimum (from 5 to 16 
classes). The most contentious point was that the decision affected one school only, which 
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is the favourite school in the city and in high demand, although there were ten other public 
schools. The reason for the decision was the excessive insistence by parents that their 
children should be admitted to that school. To cope with inadequate classroom 
accommodation, the school modified other rooms, such as teacher rooms, laboratories 
and libraries. In addition, students admitted through this unofficial channel had to pay 
extra money as compensation for the school to provide more facilities and to pay for 
teachers’ extra hours. 
Student admission has created an education crisis every year. Certainly the problem 
not only stemmed from the patrimonial political environment but also from uncertain 
policy arrangements. Few education policies in Kupang were endorsed by local 
legislation, on which the city councillors and mayor should agree. Each government 
policy has been supported only by what are known as ‘technical guidelines’ (Petunjuk 
teknis or abbreviated as Juknis) that were issued by the local education Dinas. This kind 
of Dinas-made regulation can be easily changed at any time. Besides, its implementation 
is prone to subversion and intervention from higher authorities. Some civil society 
organisations have pushed to legislate for these policies but have yet to get any response 
(Participant 16). In addition, the myth of favourite schools has been increasingly 
institutionalised because of the support from the technical environment of school policy 
arrangement. What makes a favourite school favourite, apart from mythical aspects of 
pride and history, is that these schools are more advanced in terms of facilities and 
accessibility. Although favourite schools are spoiled by continuing government aid, this 
is at the expense of the other schools, which are overlooked. Because the government 
grant is given on the basis of individual students, big schools always get more. 
	
Internal Resistance to the Neo-patrimonial Education Governance 
The strong dominance of the neo-patrimonial structure has led to structuration that either 
constrains the patterns of relations in the organisational fields or incites resistance from 
those who have been disempowered by the structure at the expense of its dominance. In 
Kupang, the dominant neo-patrimonial structure was proven to lead to agreement and 
convergence because most believed that decision-making in education governance was 
controlled by the ruling patron and those who wished to be part of the dominant system 
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must follow the known but unwritten rules. Yet, as sociologists like Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012) contend, the relational system in the organisational field is dynamic and 
therefore the potential for disagreement and dissonance always exists. These opposing, 
the less dominant, come with different frames and narratives to justify their resistance 
(Thornton, et al., 2012: 166). In Kupang, not all education personnel were co-opted by 
political patronage. There are school inspectors and principals who criticise the political 
approach in education arrangements. They use some confronting vocabulary such as 
‘incompetent official’, ‘poor performance’, ‘violation of the procedure’, ‘intervention’, 
and ‘political interests’. 
School inspectors were among those critical of the local education governance in 
Kupang. The school inspector office was an organisation under the Dinas responsible for 
monitoring the technical aspects of education in schools, and more important, school 
principals’ leadership and teachers’ teaching performance. During the New Order era, 
school inspectors were highly empowered because they were part of the regime’s 
surveillance system. A senior school inspector I met explained that, before 
decentralisation, school inspectors were ‘very respected and nerve-wracking [for 
teachers]’. He illustrated this by saying that at that time a school inspector could impose 
on-site punishments to school principals or teachers who were found coming late to 
school or failed to show a teaching preparation document at the time of inspection. Their 
recommendations on teachers’ and principals’ performance were considered highly 
important by the Dinas or the central government ministry. But after decentralisation, 
although their official supervisory function remains, the inspector’s role is marginalised. 
In Kupang, the school inspector office was no more than a shelter for senior educators 
and school principal retirees who were dumped because of their contrary political views. 
Knowing that their careers are affected more by political influences than by professional 
and that inspectors’ evaluations had no more influence on their careers, school principals 
and teachers are now behaving differently. For example, as one school inspector told me, 
he has frequently visited schools that were unattended by their principals despite his 
giving them notice of his visit. 
This organisational change has made many school inspectors critical of Dinas policies 
despite their positions as members of the Dinas bureaucracy. I met three school inspectors 
and all expressed disappointment with the pattern of education governance in the city. In 
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the matter of principal appointments, a senior school inspector saw that the state-co-opted 
process has sacrificed the more competent in favour of the less capable. According to him, 
the school inspector office always had regular evaluations of principal and teacher 
performance reported to Dinas every semester. Yet, these reports have never been 
reflected in mayoral decisions. He noticed that the 2013 appointments mostly 
accommodated the professionally mediocre leaving many more capable teachers 
unposted or even discharged. He bore witness of how political preference is advanced in 
the face of professional records and integrity. He narrated a profile of a successful school 
principal who was dumped from his position because of political considerations. 
	
There was one principal who has made exceptional achievements during his term ... 
He made a number of important changes from the first day he served. First, the 
improvement of graduate quality ... then the improvement of graduate percentage ... 
But he is now removed unreasonably ... Before his arrival, the school was in a total 
mess ... Graduate percentage was extremely low ... Then came this guy and 
everything changed dramatically ... Whereas during the old principal’s term you 
would have seen most school buildings covered by tall grass ... Toilets were awfully 
dirty ... There was no good [environment] for students’ learning (Participant 15). 
	
However, although the demand of change was high from these opposing field participants, 
not all were committed to active involvement in bringing about the change. In other words, 
not all were playing the role of institutional entrepreneur. Institutional entrepreneurship 
is defined as ‘the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or transform existing 
ones’ (Maguire et al., 2004: 657). In this sense, despite their critical voices, the school 
inspectors failed to drive any change in the politicised environment. However, some 
principals succeeded in playing the role of ‘institutional entrepreneur’ to counter the 
prevailing logic of patronage and to offer their own way to promote professional 
behaviour. 
Hence, not all principals were passively submerged in the patrimonial bureaucracy. 
Some I interviewed claimed that, despite the powerful local government, the regime was 
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in fact powerless at the same time. This particularly stemmed from the lack of knowledge 
and of economic capital: there were not enough resources to maintain control consistently 
or universally. The local government involvement in school affairs mostly happened on 
the ‘front stage’ and rarely reached the ‘back stage’ (Van Tatenhove et al., 2006). Thus, 
besides the technical and substantial matters of the learning process, the local government 
also lost control in some administrative areas. Because high schools were given money, 
mostly from external resources, such as the central government, parents and the private 
sector, the local government did not have the legitimacy to control school spending. Some 
principals on their own initiative communicate with and lobby MoEC officials in Jakarta 
to get some funding and the Jakarta officials directly monitor the spending through on-
site visits. 
Some critics among school principals see that the situation reflected local government 
ignorance and indifference to education development, despite its continuous politicisation. 
But for some others, the situation was seen as an opportunity to advance the professional 
logic in their own school environment. Among those seeing the opportunity behind this 
politicised governance was Principal AB. The elaboration of AB’s story is important to 
be presented here because it offers not only arguments for resistance to the highly 
politicised field but also the narrative of institutional entrepreneurship through his effort 
to establish a professional environment in his school. The narrative of AB was popular 
among school inspectors in the city: he was known for his effort to reform the school 
away from local government support despite his failure to survive for a second term. His 
narrative will be complemented by the contrary narrative of AA, his predecessor in school 
Y and strong upholder of the hegemonic patrimonial logic. 
I managed to interview AB one day after his replacement was announced. For 
comparison, I also interviewed his predecessor, AA, the principal stigmatised by the 
school inspector as a non-achiever but who managed to retain his position under two 
different political regimes. AB came to take over AA’s leadership in that school in 2009, 
or two years after the mayoral election. The school was not known to be among the élite 
schools. Until the end of AA’s leadership in 2009, its reputation remained the same. AB 
described his impression on his first arrival; the environment was just as the inspector had 
told me: ‘boggy schoolyard with tall grass, dirty toilets, damaged classrooms, low 
accreditation …’ (Participant 08). During his leadership he transformed the school. He 
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improved the accreditation grade from C to A in less than three years. He built five new 
classrooms and renovated the old ones. He also transformed the previously marshy 
schoolyard to a sports training facility. He claimed that all of these physical developments 
were made with not a single cent of local government funding. 
To improve the school’s management, he introduced more transparent administration 
and more disciplined behaviour for school personnel. He required all his staff to come to 
and leave the school on time. He imposed an unprecedented, strict regulation of monthly 
food allowance entitlements: the allowance is now precisely calculated on an attendance 
basis. Previously, the staff received additional allowance by default, regardless of the 
number of unattended days. The discipline, he acknowledged, had to some extent helped 
reduce teacher absenteeism because teachers often left school for outside employment. 
After this regulation was enforced, teachers were forced to focus on their responsibilities 
at school. 
However, these reforms eventually caused him trouble. Some teachers who disliked 
his policies accused him of acting against the norm. They particularly questioned the food 
allowance policy, which was seen as abusing their rights and they lodged a report to the 
mayor who was supportive of their protests. That AB belongs to an ethnic minority group, 
he supposed, aggravated his situation. There are indeed some theories saying that ethnic 
affiliation does matter in the recruitment of civil service officials in Kupang (Dagang, 
2004; Tidey, 2010). AB also believed that the new mayor preferred his own ethnic group 
and relatives being posted to the public service. After all that he had done, he was 
disappointed that his career as a principal ended unexpectedly. He claimed that from the 
performance point of view, all the benefits he had achieved for his school should have 
granted him a second term. Yet, like other principals, he had never been shown his 
performance evaluation and that makes him think that no proper procedure had been taken 
to remove him. He complained, pointing out that some underperforming principals were 
granted another term. 
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Everything is out of the procedure. If procedure is to be followed, the local 
government should have reviewed my performance and let me know what their 
opinion is … I bet among all the existing principals, I am the only one holding 
principal training certificate ... But when we talk about decentralisation, power 
speaks louder than regulation (Participant 08). 
	
But, unlike AB, AA strongly believed in the neo-patrimonial leadership and intentionally 
involved himself in maintaining its domination in Kupang’s education governance. After 
his six-year spell in school Y, which was branded a failure by the school inspector, AA 
was promoted to school X, one of the élite public high schools in the city. And, at the 
time when AB was dismissed, AA was given a second term as principal in the same school. 
It has been a political tradition in Kupang that the next step, after being a principal in 
school X, is a senior position in the Dinas bureaucracy. Several times, former principals 
of this school were promoted to lead the Kupang education Dinas. However, unlike AB, 
whose leadership had achieved much for the school, AA’s leadership resulted in a decline 
in the school’s quality. The school inspector considered that, despite its strong popularity, 
the school’s academic reputation had been challenged not only by its private school 
competitors (Christian and Catholic institutions) but also by other, less-favoured, public 
schools (Participant 15). The accreditation score fell down from A to B and, as I observed, 
the school did not present a good environment for learning: the classrooms were overfull 
and schoolyards were poorly cleaned. Parents were competing for places for their children 
in that school because of its historical reputation only. 
AA himself acknowledged that what concerned him during his leadership in school X 
was neither the progress of students’ learning nor the school management. He claimed 
that the school enrolled the best students of the city so it takes only a small effort to teach 
them. Similarly, in terms of the managerial system, he argued that the school bureaucracy 
had also been settled for a long time so that there is no need to create any improvement. 
What troubled him the most was the external pressure from politicians, government 
officials, mass media and the parents. This is because the school is the place where all 
these interests meet. According to him, becoming a principal in school X always brings 
anyone fame not only among élites but also among the common people. Hence, the most 
important skill needed is how to deal with external pressures. Or, as he put it bluntly: 
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To survive as a principal here you have to smartly analyse the direction of ‘political 
gale’. Whether we want it or not we have to be involved in politics (Participant 04). 
	
AA shows how he managed to internalise this logic so that he survived different political 
assignments. According to AA, the competition to win the position of principal in school 
X is always tough, even though he claimed that he never particularly placed himself in 
contention. He delayed his acceptance for a period of religious contemplation when 
offered the job for the first time. But, for him, blending into local political games is 
unavoidable and it was his political preferences during the mayoral election that got him 
through. He believed that those discharged principals were either supporters of the 
opposition or simply reluctant to be part of the game. AA himself survived three mayoral 
spells during his career as a principal. He strongly believed that as part of the local 
government bureaucracy, public school principals are the mayor’s servants so that they 
must be loyal to him or her. In the first direct mayoral election in 2007 he put himself on 
Adoe’s side, the incumbent vice-mayor. This was because Lerik, the mayor at that time, 
did not stand. In the second election in 2012 he initially went for Adoe, but since the 
incumbent failed to go to the second round, he shifted his support to Salean, whom he 
saw had the potential to win. This political move was part of what he called ‘a smartly 
analysing political gale’. 
	
Conclusion 
In Kupang, educational decentralisation has led to the emergence of a politicised 
schooling environment. This has happened because the central government’s national 
standards of education management failed to cope with the locally established structure 
of a neo-patrimonial bureaucracy. The neo-patrimonial structure prevails because it suits 
the entrenched interests of local institutional actors, politicians and bureaucracy élites. 
This local structure then assimilated the elements of the professional logic of national 
standards to legitimate its domination. The professional discourses have been politicised 
in many instances: bureaucracy, school leadership and student enrolment. However, 
structuration involves the dynamics of domination and resistance as well as agreement 
and disagreement. Thus, despite the hegemonic influence of patrimonial bureaucracy, 
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there are some education personnel in Kupang who seek the opportunity to challenge the 
established structure. Although these attempts at resistance end in failure, in the sense of 
influencing the whole organisational field of Kupang education, but some of them have 
been successful in changing their own organisations. The next chapter will discuss 
different educational decentralisation practices in which the local élites have otherwise 
used the national standards as the source of institutional legitimacy to break down the 
established local structure and invent a new governance tradition. 
	
 Chapter VIII  
Educational Decentralisation and  
the Rise of the New Managerial State:  
the Case of Surabaya City 
 
We hired the university (for recruiting school principals) because we have a new 
vision regarding school principals. For us, they are more than ordinary educators: 
they are managers (Participant 17). 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, there has been a growing number of local government leaders 
whose legitimation emerges as they change their leadership style away from traditional 
bureaucratic approaches. They are not career politicians but have managed to combine 
political populism with the discourse of the new public management, which promotes 
ideas of good governance, accountability and privatisation. President Joko Widodo 
(Jokowi) was among the early figures who brought this trend into popular discourse when 
he became the mayor of Solo (2005–2012) and then the governor of Jakarta (2012–2014). 
While he was mayor he introduced some ‘business friendly’ policies to restructure the 
inefficient bureaucracy, deregulate business procedures, and redesign public service 
offices to be like bank lobbies (Von Luebke et al., 2009). All of these were combined 
with populist programs, such as providing free healthcare services, awarding education 
scholarships, and revitalising traditional markets (Mietzner, 2015). Since 2010, there has 
been a growing number of local governments adopting similar managerial styles and 
Surabaya is one of them. This managerial government is another example of the local 
response to the political decentralisation framework, which then influences the 
construction of local policy arrangements, including those in the education sector. 
Just like Solo under Jokowi in the mid-2000s, Surabaya under Mayor Tri Rismaharini 
(Risma) has also been in the national spotlight since 2010. Although not the originator of 
several public service reforms in the city, the public gives her credit for those reforms, 
which centre on the transparency, efficiency and empowerment. Similar to Chapter VII 
(on Kupang’s case), this chapter analyses how this locally developed managerial state 
corresponds to the central government’s pressure for standardisation; whether 
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institutional contradiction has taken place in Surabaya and how this local institutional 
setting gives effect to the arrangement of local education governance? Before answering 
such questions, this chapter will start with a brief discussion on managerialism and its 
relationship to decentralisation, education and educational decentralisation. 
 
Decentralisation, Managerialism and Education 
Managerialism and its relationship to decentralisation and education decentralisation has 
been the subject of many studies (for example Clarke and Newman, 1997; Gewirtz, 2002; 
Mok, 2003; Simkins, 2000; Thrupp and Willmott, 2003). Decentralisation and 
managerialism have a number of similarities in terms of goals, strategies and even 
technical terminologies. First, managerialism and decentralisation share the idea of 
revisiting the state’s role in public services. Decentralisation offers the transfer of 
responsibility from the central to the local level: managerialism offers the transfer of 
method from structured bureau-professionalism to business-like public management 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997). Second, both share the strategies of how to reduce the 
government role in public administration, that is, by giving autonomy to schools or any 
unit in the management and empowering parents as consumers. Third, decentralisation 
and managerialism are supported by some official discourses, such as management 
effectiveness, accountability, efficiency and competitiveness. The most familiar concept 
associated with education decentralisation has been school-based management (SBM). 
As many have described, SBM is the way a school changes from a classical bureaucratic 
structure by adopting business management principles and instruments (Gewirtz, 2002; 
Hatcher, 2005). And this reflects the essential core of managerialism: the superiority of 
management in organisational life (Hoyle and Wallace, 2005). 
Nevertheless, most debates about the relationship between managerialism and 
decentralisation centre on a contradiction: despite its vision of decentralisation, 
managerialism also provides another means for centralism to find its way back. Hoyle 
and Wallace differentiate ‘management’ and ‘managerialism’: the former is a means to 
achieve effective leadership for the sake of greater organisational goals, the latter is 
management as a goal in itself (Hoyle and Wallace, 2005). What is meant by 
‘management’ here is the leadership culture and practices commonly used to run private 
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enterprises. In this sense, it is strongly believed that practices that are effective and 
efficient for the private sector should be relevant to the public sector (Rees and Rodley, 
1995). Because the very core business of management is the art of leadership and control 
(Koopman, 1991; Lynn, 1996), managerialism becomes ‘an ideology which holds that 
not only can all aspects of organisational life be controlled but that they should be 
controlled’ (Hoyle and Wallace, 2005: 68). 
How does that control take place in the managerial context? Historically, the ideology 
emerged in reaction to the centralised welfare state whose overarching bureaucracy 
suffered from inefficiency and was ill-adapted to the demands of complexity and change 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997). The environment that shaped its massive institutionalisation 
was the collapse of welfarism and the reinforcement of the neo-liberal market economy. 
Thus, as Newman and Clarke argue, managerialism transformed the state and its public 
service apparatus from bureau-professionalism, characterised by socio-political 
impartiality, commitment to public service and valued knowledge, to the rule of managers, 
characterised by individual freedom, market competition and valued efficiency (Clarke 
and Newman, 1997). Managers are guided by technical rationality and bounded by a self-
disciplined culture of cost-effective performance. Management must have tight and 
transparent budgets. To achieve efficiency, public service and public goods, provision are 
pushed to embrace the competitive market mechanism by contracting third-party 
providers. As with the state managers, performance is measured by universal criteria of 
accountability. Managerialism is held to promote the decrease of professional values and 
the intensification of work over organisational goals (Rees and Rodley, 1995). 
Nevertheless, just as centralism can be reversed through the dynamics of central–local 
relations (Karlsen, 2000), so can the managerialism (Desai and Imrie, 1998). As an 
ideology, managerialism is not only a national or state level business. As local 
governments adjust to political decentralisation, they can initiate managerial practices and 
build their own managerial states with or without a national institutional template. Apart 
from a central mandate, the managerialisation of a government also depends on other 
legitimating environments, such as the extent of modernisation that is being promoted 
(Brooks, 2000; Cochrane, 2000), the dynamics of local politics, and the development of 
a market economy (Dannestam, 2008; Desai and Imrie, 1998). For example, because of 
their relatively strong desire for greater modernity and the benefits of an advanced market 
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economy, urban local governments are more likely to adapt a managerial ideology faster 
than rural administrations. More recently, the increased use of information and 
communication technology has inspired many city governments in the world to improve 
the capacity of their managerial administration, creating what is popularly known as e-
government (Moon and Norris, 2005). This new technology, on the one hand, strengthens 
coordinated network building, increases external collaboration and empowers citizens as 
customers (Tat-Kei Ho, 2002). Yet, on the other hand, as a managerial instrument, it also 
enforces effective accountability through the architecture of information control 
(Homburg, 2004). As Homburg describes it: 
 
The information architecture consists of one or more relatively centralized 
databases that more or less enforce common procedures to be used. Here, 
informatization is the precursor for further standardization, formalization and 
(implicit) centralization (Homburg, 2004: 554). 
 
In the meantime, scholars have shown in a number of studies how managerialism affects 
the organisation of education (Hall, 2005; McInerney, 2003; Simkins, 2000; Thrupp and 
Willmott, 2003). McInerney states that the managerialist education decentralisation has 
paved the way for schools to enter ‘a dangerous territory’ because it ‘devalues the 
pedagogical attributes of school leadership and reinforces a growing divide between 
teachers and administrators’ (McInerney, 2003: 57). Having interviewed a number of 
Australian principals for his study of the effect of SBM on school leadership, he found 
that, in their view, educational leadership has nothing to do with educational skills but 
with administrative skills such as budgeting and setting organisational programs 
(McInerney, 2003). As such, Wong has shown how decentralisation creates massive 
deskilling for teachers because of an overwhelming government control over curriculum 
and testing within a competitive schooling environment, and increased administrative 
workloads being imposed (Wong, 2006). 
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The Political Construction of the Managerial State of Surabaya 
Flyn (2000) argues that the institutional changes that support the rise of managerial logic 
are preceded by either one or more of three events: a fiscal crisis that requires a spending 
reduction; a legitimacy crisis that pushes the government and the political parties to 
restore popular support; or an internal power struggle that makes managerial reform a 
critical way to retain or gain power. The second and third scenarios have been reflected 
in the Surabaya experience. Since the first post-reform election in 1999, Surabaya has 
been an area of strong support for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). 
The party had been widely known as the New Order’s strongest political opposition and 
it inherited huge political popularity from the collapse of the regime. Despite winning the 
local election, however, the PDI-P failed to dislodge the local strongman, Sunarto 
Sumoprawiro, from the mayoral office. At that time, the mayor was elected by the city 
representative council (DPRD) and Sumoprawiro used his political influence to retain his 
position as mayor. However, in October 2001, Sumoprawiro fell sick for a long period 
and went to Melbourne for medical treatment. His absence allowed the opposition to plot 
his impeachment in January 2002 and paved the way for Bambang Dwi Hartono, a PDI-
P politician, to be appointed mayor (World Bank, 2003). 
Hartono was the founder of Surabaya’s managerial state and his willingness to favour 
it was much more constructed by the local political environment. Newly appointed, he 
had little of the political capital needed to run the government effectively at a time when 
political power rested with political parties, the military and the bureaucracy. Hartono 
was the first civilian mayor of Surabaya after decades of military leadership ever since 
the country’s independence. Unlike Kupang’s mayors, who have all arisen from dominant 
local bureaucratic patronage, Hartono was a former mathematics teacher who turned to 
politics shortly before the end of the New Order. He could not control local politics and 
the DPRD because he was not a party leader. However, despite the odds, he was 
determined to build his own political regime. The only institutional resource to for him 
to legitimate many of his policies were the central government’s civil service reform 
programs. 
In addition to political decentralisation, the central government after 1998 did much to 
differentiate itself from the New Order. The new government introduced managerial 
discourses of good governance, transparency and accountability as antitheses to the New 
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Order’s image of corruption, bureaucracy and inefficiency. Vast quantities of regulations 
and academic papers were produced and disseminated to support and legitimate the 
implementation of these principles in public service administration, nationally and locally. 
In 1999, the government promulgated Law 43 of 1999 to amend the New Order’s civil 
service Law 8 of 1974. One of the most important changes being made in the amendment 
was the replacement of the term pembinaan (development) in almost all parts of the 
regulation with the term manajemen (management). The term pembinaan was seen as 
patronising, and had characterised the previous Indonesian bureaucracy. In contrast, 
manajemen is a completely new term that is hardly to be found in the old version of the 
law. In the particular article l of Law 43 on civil service management, the law is explained 
as follows: 
 
Civil service management is the whole effort to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and the degree of professionalism in the implementation of official 
tasks, functions and obligations consisting of planning, provision, quality 
development, placement, promotion, payment, benefit and termination (GoI, 
1999b: article 1 [8]). 
 
The law strictly regulates the detachment of civil service bureaucracy from political 
organisations: civil servants are forbidden to become members of any political party. This 
was contrary to the New Order tradition that all civil servants should be members of the 
Golkar Party. The central government also produced hundreds of regulations to 
standardise public service management throughout the country. Despite the national 
campaign, local autonomy and strong local patronage in the bureaucracy have led to 
differences in the reform implementation. But in Surabaya, the central policy became the 
institutional resource for the new leader to create a new tradition as well as a new power 
resource. 
By garnering the institutional legitimacy from those central standards, Hartono 
initiated the path to managerial reform in Surabaya’s bureaucracy. He introduced business 
ethics to his bureaucracy: performance, accountability and transparency. To support those 
goals, he started to promote fresh, young professionals to fill top positions in his local 
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government bureaucracy: Rismaharini, his then successor, was one among them. The 
managerial reform also involved the recast of managerial structures of local government-
owned companies from being bureaucrat-dominated to being more autonomous, 
controlled by professional managers with open, third-party agents involved in recruitment 
(Ashadi, 2012). Later on, under Rismaharini, this recruitment system has been extended 
to many public service areas including education. Hartono also initiated electronic-based 
public goods procurement (e-procurement) before the central government introduced the 
same system in 2003 (Ashadi, 2012). His successor, Rismaharini expanded this electronic 
management to a number of sectors: budget (e-budgeting), administrative performance 
(e-controlling), departmental work planning (e-planning) and civil service performance 
assessment (e-performance). Under Rismaharini’s administration, e-performance is 
central to her managerial reform. It is supported by an incentive scheme in which civil 
servants are rewarded or punished.  
The affiliation to the national standards had strengthened these mayors’ external 
legitimacy but at the same time threatened their internal legitimacy. They obtained 
institutional supports from the professional communities among Jakarta-based 
policymakers and university academics, but had to face resistance from the entrenched 
patrimonial structure of local political parties and bureaucratic elites. Having the 
bureaucracy turned into business-styled organisations means that civil servants are very 
unlikely to extend their political influence to technical decisions and therefore to gain 
personally from the process. During their leadership, Hartono and Rismaharini were both 
faced with impeachment by the DPRD. Less than a year after his inauguration, on 11 July 
2002, all members of the DPRD, including members of the PDI-P, decided to impeach 
Hartono because they were not satisfied with the mayor’s accountability report. 11 
Hartono’s successor, Rismaharini, faced parliamentary impeachment in 2011 because of 
a trivial case involving charges for street billboards.12 However, both mayors did not 
																																								 																				
11 Some analysts contended it was because the mayor refused to provide ‘special compensation’ for the city 
councillors as had been traditional. The other reason was that Hartono had a very bad relation with his 
party’s leader who was also the DPRD speaker, Muhammad Basuki. This latter name was then gaoled for 
corruption (Aribowo, 2008).	
12 Shortly after her inauguration, Rismaharini issued two mayoral decrees to increase the street billboard 
charge by up to 300 per cent. This was to deal with city streets overcrowded with billboards. This was 
against the interests of businesses that had benefited for a long time and some of the businessmen were city 
councillors. In 31 January 2011, the DPRD announced its official recommendation for the impeachment of 
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retreat and the impeachments were denied by Jakarta. Instead, the impeachment 
proceedings earned both of them much more popular support.  
In time, these managerial leaders successfully installed themselves as the new local 
power source. Hartono and Rismaharini were both extremely popular during their time in 
office. In the first direct mayoral election in 2005, Hartono won the contest against three 
other contenders. In 2010, he was legally barred from standing for another term and 
therefore endorsed a former member of his staff, Tri Rismaharini, to stand while he acted 
as her vice-mayor. Both won office in the 2010 mayoral election thanks to Hartono’s 
popularity. Yet, after the pair won the election, Rismaharini unpredictably managed to 
move from under Hartono’s shadow and to become a more popular and stronger political 
figure. This made for friction between the two, which led to Hartono’s resignation in 2013. 
Rismaharini proved her reputation when she won the 2015 election for her second term 
with 80 per cent of the vote despite conflicts with Hartono and with all the Surabaya 
political parties. This gave her important source of internal legitimacy to strengthen her 
managerial government despite the challenge from the entrenched interests of local elites. 
In the next part, I will discuss how the managerial state influenced the structural form of 
local education management.  
 
The Making of the New Managerial Leadership 
From Bureau-Professional to Managerial Leadership 
As an institution, managerialism legitimates the introduction of market values and 
business management ethics to public service organisations. In terms of organisational 
structure, managerialism empowers the managerial class to replace the established 
bureau-professionals who were subject to politicisation and state co-optation (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997). These institutional models have been adopted in restructuring the 
organisation of education in Surabaya. However, this kind of managerial class is not the 
one that, as Gottfried once characterised, had ‘already had positioned itself in a corporate 
economy and would now provide state-authorised social services’ (Gottfried, 2001: 51). 
Rather, this new managerial class develops from among traditional bureaucrats as the 
																																								 																				
the mayor. Hartono, who was Rismaharini’s deputy at that time, was suspected to be the mastermind behind 
this impeachment because the competition that started to rise between the two leaders (Amalia, 2016).	
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result of the promotion of managerial values. In Surabaya, the acceptance of managerial 
values is also conditioned by the dynamics of resistance against the politicisation of the 
bureaucracy. 
Traditionally, the organisation of the education Dinas in Surabaya was the realm of 
professional educators, where teachers, usually, were assigned to leadership positions. 
Hartono’s regime kept this tradition: he assigned former school principals to fill top 
positions in the education Dinas throughout his mayoral term. During his two terms in 
office, the Dinas was led by two teachers, both former high-school principals, Soeparno 
and Sahudi. Other teachers filled second-tier positions, such as secretary and technical 
field coordinator (kepala bidang). Just like Kupang, the organisation then came to be led 
by professional educators, where teachers controlled the administration. And, as we have 
discussed in the case of Kupang, this kind of professional grouping is easily politicised. 
Hence, despite his managerial reforms, Hartono was not able to control fully the 
intrusion of political interests in his bureaucracy, particularly the education sector, which 
is among the biggest disbursers of local government funding. Hartono himself became 
increasingly influential in the PDI-P élite, and it may be inferred there was some 
accommodation of political interests. During Hartono’s time, the reputation of Dinas had 
been crushed by a number of corruption scandals involving its head. From 2005 to 2011, 
a number of adverse reports were lodged against the Dinas head; the cases involved 
manipulation of central government’s special allocation fund, online school admissions 
corruption and the misuse of local school grants. In 2006, the police named him a suspect 
for the provision of fake microscopes in schools. However, he was said to have strong 
political backup, particularly from the PDI-P, and remained in office until the end of his 
term in 2011. 
Rismaharini ended such bureau-professional traditions after her election in 2010. This 
was because of her attitude that a political party is more ‘a troublemaker than problem 
solver’ (Participant 27). The nominations for positions of leadership in the education 
Dinas was a long process that caused tensions between the mayor and the party, the PDI-
P. From the beginning, the party had warned that for political ethics’ sake she should 
respect the party’s advice despite her right not to. The reason, as Baktiono, a PDI-P 
politician and chairman of the city representative council’s education committee, 
explained, was simply because the party was involved in delineating the mayor’s 
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education program for an election campaign (Antarajatim, 2011). The PDI-P suggested 
that the tradition of appointing bureau-professional officers should be kept by selecting 
from among internal Dinas professionals. Some opposition parties, such the Welfare and 
Justice Party (PKS), argued for the nomination of external, but professional, people 
whose visions on education were widely known (Koran Nusantara, 2011). These political 
differences took eight months of negotiation from Sahudi’s last day in office on 1 July 
2011 until the inauguration of a new head on 1 March 2012.  
Against all political pressure, the mayor firmly defended her stance. She intended to 
extend her managerial vision, isolating the Dinas from intervention by political parties. 
In 2012, she appointed two external, non-teacher bureaucrats, M Ikhsan and Aston 
Tambunan, as the head and the secretary respectively of the Dinas. The former had spent 
most of his career in a city development-planning agency, the latter had been a local tax 
office administrator. These portfolio appointments tell us much about Risma’s vision for 
the education bureaucracy. Ikhsan had some educational experience in his academic 
background as a psychologist. He also had been a part-time lecturer at a local public 
university. However, as the Dinas secretary described, 
 
Ikhsan only started his self-learning about education and its technicalities soon 
after he assumed the Dinas headship. Luckily, he has proven himself as a fast 
learner. He can involve himself in a complex discussion on any education topic 
including the curriculum (Participant 17). 
 
I did not manage to interview Ikhsan, but I did attend one of his presentations at a 
conference in Batu, a small town 30 kilometres from Surabaya. For the conference he 
brought with him a 118-page power point presentation titled, ‘Leading Surabaya to 
become a national education barometer’. The document, complete with graphs, showed 
all that he had done during his one-year leadership, along with plans to achieve the 
ambitious goal of making Surabaya’s education system a national benchmark. 
The Dinas secretary described himself as an experienced administrator. He admitted 
that he had been put in such a senior position with a mandate to sort out technical 
administrative issues, especially budget management. For him, because education reform 
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had become the local government’s priority program that consumes almost 35 per cent of 
the annual budget, the key to successful execution of education programs mostly lies in 
budget management. He claimed that since he first took office, he had fixed the problems 
to do with bad accounting and budget leaks. He imposed very strict standards of 
administration, and back-door transaction were not tolerated. It had been common, for 
parents, teachers, politicians, businessmen and community leaders to lobby Dinas officers 
to accommodate their private interests. It had been possible previously because the Dinas 
had an absurd degree of autonomy from the politically established government so that 
political interests always were able to be entertained. Now, according to him, the 
education Dinas was given a significantly greater degree of autonomy to the extent that 
even the mayor had to refrain from being involved in technical policies.  
In 2012, the city promulgated its first education bylaw. The regulation defined more 
clearly the role of the education Dinas as the local education authority. As the bylaw 
specifies, the head of Dinas is authorised to advise the mayor on teacher appointments 
and transfers, on the appointment of principals, on the guidance and development of 
teachers’ careers, and on the performance and discipline of teachers and other education 
staff. As well, the regulation also stipulates that the head of Dinas is the one person 
directly responsible to the mayor in education matters (Government of Surabaya, 2012: 
article 135). The regulation has become the firm foundation for Dinas to manage with 
authority. As the managerial authority, the Dinas official added, the mayor has repeatedly 
directed the Dinas leadership to have more autonomy in translating her vision for 
education into practical programs. As we shall see, this managerial style eventually led to 
another occasion for politicians to strike back. 
The Recruitment of School Principals as Professional Managers 
Apart from the Dinas, the principals as school managers have also become members of 
the new managerial class. Unlike the Dinas managers who have emerged as a result of 
the tension between politicians and the established bureau-professionals, the group of 
school managers has been created through institutionalising managerial technologies. The 
central government has set the standards for school principals, among which is the 
possession of five competencies: personality, managerial, entrepreneurial, supervisory 
and social (MoEC, 2007). In addition, the central government has also issued a regulation 
on the procedures that local governments must use to select and appoint public school 
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principals so that national standards can be achieved (MoEC, 2003, 2010). Like the case 
of Kupang, many local governments do not comply with such ministerial regulations 
because the regulations limit local government heads from exercising their privilege to 
make appointments. However, Surabaya’s response has not been typical. Since the period 
of Hartono’s leadership, the Surabaya government has been adopting the central 
government standards to organise the recruitment of public school principals. In the past, 
there were seven steps in the selection of candidates and part of the process involved third 
party consultants from Surabaya State University (UNESA), a local teacher-training 
university. Even so, after passing written and oral tests (set by consultants), the candidates 
must pass a test by the local government to show that they are fit and proper persons to 
be appointed (Participant 21). 
Later, when Rismaharini took office and the tradition of bureau-professional 
administration in Dinas was largely nullified, the Dinas had a stronger legitimation to 
expand its managerial vision to school principal recruitment. The Dinas office even went 
further than the central government standards required. According to the national standard, 
to be nominated as candidates, teachers needed to be recommended by either current 
principals or school inspectors. Nevertheless, since December 2012, under the new 
managerial leadership, the city government of Surabaya commenced a new recruitment 
system. The Dinas allows any individual teachers, who are at a particular career rank, to 
have the opportunity to nominate themselves through an online recruitment system called 
Seleksi Calon Kepala Sekolah (school principal candidacy selection) or SICAKEP. All 
the administrative selection and written tests are done online and assessed by a 
computerised system. All candidates can go online to check the progress of their 
applications. 
More than before, the Dinas kept itself above the selection process and extended the 
roles of the third parties. The Dinas also changed the type of the third party consultant 
hired for selecting principals and this move reflected a symbolic significance with regard 
to the managerialisation project. It no longer employed the services of a teacher-training 
university, which suggested professionalisation. Rather, it used Airlangga University, a 
bigger university and one of country’s best, on consideration that it has more extensive 
knowledge specialisation departments. The Dinas was aiming at producing not only 
principals with professional leadership in education but also principals with broader 
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managerial skills who are able to provide solutions to problems. The move to a different 
type of third party client was in line with the shift of Dinas’ perception of school 
principals. The Dinas official described the decision as follows. 
 
We hired the (Airlangga) university because we have a new vision regarding 
school principals. For us, they are more than ordinary educators. They are 
managers. They have to possess excellent leadership, know how to solve 
problems and have visions for their schools. We believe that the university has 
the resource and capacity to provide us with what we want (Participant 17). 
 
The Dinas more particularly hired the university’s department of psychology to run the 
assessments and this department also outsources academics from other relevant 
departments within the university to assess the required skills of candidates. The 
consultant fully developed the recruitment system and organised almost the whole 
process of selection. In addition to the online process, the consultant also organised 
separate written psychological, and focus-group, discussion-based leadership assessment 
tests. In the leadership assessment, the candidates were challenged to conduct 
collaborative work with their peers to solve problems (Dinas Pendidikan Surabaya, 2012).  
Another aspect in which the local policy goes beyond the central government standards 
of principal recruitment is the introduction of a new method to assess a candidate’s social 
and individual integrity. This is done by a special committee formed by the Dinas. In this 
sense, the assessors secretly gather information from the candidates’ former supervisors, 
colleagues, relatives and other relevant parties. Some principals liken this assessment 
method to those used by intelligence services because they have no knowledge who from 
or where the committee collected their profiles and private information. According to the 
Dinas official, this surveillance method is important because the Dinas needs not only a 
technically capable principal but also one who is morally trustworthy. For the official, a 
public school principal is a role model for many people, not only for their students and 
teachers, but also for the larger community. A principal supporting this policy explained 
why the Dinas has taken this path. 
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There was a principal who was found committing polygamy, and his legal spouse 
went to the Dinas with a complaint. Polygamy is forbidden for a civil servant. The 
Dinas then summoned this principal and he explained that he already lived 
separately from his wife for a long time without legal divorce. I myself understood 
his situation and did not blame him, but the Dinas had to remove him because this 
had led to a chaotic condition, which was no good for the school. 
 
With all the processes, the Dinas official claimed that recruitment is free from external 
intervention, even from the mayor herself. The Dinas was given authority to take 
responsibility for the entire process. The organisation has the final say on those who are 
appointed and to which schools they are placed. Therefore, the Dinas official claimed, 
public schools have highly qualified and independent principals. However, the extent to 
which those ideal qualities, ‘qualified’ and ‘independent’, are consistent with reality is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The Performative Culture and the Expansion of Managerial Reforms 
Institutional pressures serve as templates to which the organisation refers for its structural 
formation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Studies reveal that the biggest contradiction 
between managerialism and the spirit of decentralisation is one called ‘performative 
culture’. Decentralisation aims at releasing state power and giving autonomy to 
professionally managed organisations, and the the performative culture becomes the new 
control mechanism by which centralism resumes in a different setting. This performative 
culture controls organisational accountability and efficiency (Ranson, 2003; Stone, 1999). 
Ball (2003) defines performative culture or performativity as: 
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A technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, 
comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change—
based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances 
(of individual subjects or organisations) serve as measures of productivity or output, 
or displays of ‘quality’, or ‘moments’ of promotion or inspection (Ball, 2003: 216). 
 
The officers of the education Dinas of Surabaya have made this performative culture 
central to their managerial governance. Dinas has a number of policies to force schools 
to do their performative best. The government generously rewards those who comply with 
the standardised performance measures and become more competitive. Those policies 
range over teacher performance, budget control, school mergers and the formation of élite 
schools. All of these performative demands are supported by large funding. The city 
increases its education budget annually and in 2013 it reached IDR1.8 trillion, which 
makes it 33 per cent of its annual budget. Because of such massive funding, the local 
government is well able to support the central government’s program of compulsory 
education. 
Teacher Performance Allowance 
One among the performative managerial reforms is teacher performance allowance or 
tunjangan kinerja guru (TKG). Public school teachers earn their basic salary and a 
professional allowance from a central government transfer. These funds are given to pay 
teachers for their core responsibility, namely teaching. Particularly for the professional 
allowance scheme, the central government has set up its own performative standard and 
the teachers are entitled to the allowance if they comply with the standard, that is, fulfil 
the requirement to teach a minimum of 24 hours per week. TKG is an additional 
performative scheme imposed by the Surabaya education Dinas to control teacher 
accountability in non-teaching assignments. In this scheme, the school principal must 
assign additional responsibilities to all his (or her) teachers, and TKG is disbursed 
according to their performance. 
The policy requires school principals to assign teachers to fill positions in eight given 
tasks that are listed in an online application called the ‘teacher performance information 
system’; these are student affairs, finance, curriculum, facilities, general affairs, treasurer, 
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academic supervision and extracurricular supervision. Teachers assigned these 
responsibilities then undertake self-assessment of their detailed performance by filling 
out the online form. The principal reviews this assessment and endorses his or her 
satisfaction with the teacher’s performance. The system then automatically converts the 
result of this assessment into workload points from which is calculated the amount of 
TKG the teacher is entitled to. 
Nevertheless, the TKG is problematic in two ways: ideological and practical. First, the 
TKG reduces teachers’ professional work to the regime of administrative responsibility 
and accountability. As professional educators, the teachers should be primarily evaluated 
on the basis of their performance in achieving the goals of their teaching. The TKG would 
trouble the teachers with non-technical, administrative tasks unrelated to their core 
responsibility as professional educators. However, this ideological problem did not 
translate into reality because the implementation of TKG itself was decoupled in two 
ways: means-end and policy-practice decouplings. And, this is the second problem. 
The means–end decoupling appeared in the sense that, like the central government’s 
teacher certification, TKG was designed not to address the fulfilment of managerial 
accountability. Rather, it was introduced as a replacement of the old sources of teachers’ 
non-salary income. There is an absurd demarcation between accountability as the goal of 
the policy on the one hand, and the allowance as the reward for the achievement of that 
goal on the other. In practice, the reward has been institutionalised as the goal itself and 
the administrative arrangement of the policy becomes the ritual classification for 
legitimating that goal. A school principal I interviewed confirmed this, saying that the 
TKG has otherwise made teachers slacker rather than conscientious. 
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In the past, teachers could earn additional income when they were involved in 
numerous school activities like meetings, invigilating exams, representing their 
school in attending workshops or seminars, organising extra-curricular activities, 
etc. But after the implementation of TKG, all of these sources of income were 
abolished from the school budget. Now there is only one source of (extra) 
income ... Teachers become reluctant to take some tasks, for example, 
representing their school at external activities or doing extra administrative jobs, 
because there is no allocation (in the budget) to pay for their time. The payment 
is already calculated in the TKG scheme but it is not (as) big (as before). 
Sometimes I myself felt uneasy to give order (Participant 19).  
 
In addition, TKG has also created technical complexity in its implementation (policy-
practice decoupling). The policy demanded that all teachers must take non-teaching 
responsibilities; it means that they must be posted to all the defined eight job titles by 
which they will have permanent work assignments to be claimed for. The problem is that 
the number of teachers, particularly in big schools, would be disproportionate to the 
available job titles that make the school organisation fat and inefficient. In one school, 
for example, there are 59 teachers to be distributed in those eight portfolios so there might 
be around seven teachers assigned for each, but a position like treasurer might only need 
two or three teachers. Besides, assigning teachers to some clerical positions will also 
duplicate the work of existing administrative staff in the schools. However, because of 
allowance incentive, many principals and teachers just did it ceremonially in two ways. 
First, the school principal randomly distributed the teachers to the jobs regardless of their 
capacity and motivation. Second, as long as the teacher fills out the self-assessment form, 
the principal found no reason not to provide positive feedback so all teachers would 
receive the maximum amount of their allowance entitlement. 
The Budget Restriction 
Since 2010, Surabaya has implemented a 12-year, universal, free schooling program for 
all primary and secondary school children. For this, the local government allocated a per-
pupil, school operational grant to cover the difference between the standardised cost and 
the established central government’s school grant. Applying this policy, the Dinas banned 
all public schools from collecting additional funding from extra-government sources, 
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including parents and, therefore, imposed more restrictions on a school’s budgeting 
policy. This latter policy involves electronic budgeting using an online application, called 
the school financial management information system (SIPKS). A Dinas official maintains 
that the policy will force schools to become more accountable, to avoid corruption and to 
be competitive with each other. 
As a mode of performative managerial policy, SIPKS allows the Dinas to control not 
only the school budget itself, in terms of administrative accountability, but also school 
activities. This is because the system provides templates for the school to set up its budget 
from the planning to the report stages. Before this system was first implemented in 2010, 
the schools had the freedom to propose whatever activities that were consistent with the 
amount of money they wished to spend from their annual budget. In this regard, different 
schools would propose different activities and therefore different allocations from their 
budget. The government argued that such a system often led to unaccounted budgeting: 
illegal mark-ups became a common practice because school personnel could easily 
manipulate the budget to earn additional income. Hence, through SIPKS, such problems 
could be avoided because the system itemises every single activity and product, along 
with their prices that are available to be proposed in the school budget. Here activities 
proposed outside the template’s limits would be automatically rejected by the system. 
School Rationalisation 
Another product of managerial reform in the Surabaya educational system is the 
enforcement of efficient schooling. The Dinas has made an effort to make schools and 
teaching personnel more closely match local demographics, and to be distributed evenly 
across the city. Unlike the national trend, the policy has made the number of schools in 
Surabaya gradually decrease. Since 2005, the government has been closing or merging 
what they claimed to be ineffective and inefficient schools. This unpopular policy drew 
its legitimacy from the national standards for education. On 12 February 2008, the Dinas 
launched its plan to restructure 20 per cent of the 1511 primary and secondary schools. 
The Dinas head claimed these schools did not comply with the standards set by the 
national government (Surya, 2008). The plan caused a public controversy because almost 
all these schools had been open for decades and employed thousands of people. Yet the 
government persisted with the plan and by July 2008, the Dinas had closed 55 private 
schools (20 junior secondaries, 25 senior secondaries and 10 vocationals) (Kompas, 2008). 
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As for the public schools, the government imposed some mergers. In 2009, Mayor 
Hartono established the Committee for Public Primary School Mergers in Surabaya, 
which resulted in the merger of six public schools in 2010. 
Under Mayor Rismaharini, the program for school restructuring continued. In 2011, 
the Dinas closed 31 private senior secondary and vocational schools and 39 others were 
under a threat of not being granted permit extensions. In June 2013, the rationalisation 
campaign was endorsed by the introduction of a new mayoral regulation on school 
management in which this issue was treated more specifically. This new regulation added 
more complex requirements to the strict central government regulation on school 
establishments. According to the new regulation, there are fifteen criteria to be met by 
each school to obtain a new permit certificate. Some are related to education, such as 
syllabuses, funding resources and management structure, but others are not related to 
education, such as traffic effect analysis certificates, building certificates and disturbance 
permit certificates (Mayor of Surabaya, 2013). In addition, the Dinas monitors 
accreditation scores regularly. The higher the score, the less frequent is the need to apply 
for a new permit and vice versa (see Table 8.1). The regulation also endorses school 
mergers and closures when all of those requirements are not met. 
 
Table 8.1. School Permit Regular Appraisal 
Accreditation score Appraisal period 
A 3 years 
B 2 years 
C 1 year 
Non-accredited 6 months 
Source: (Mayor of Surabaya, 2013) 
 
This regulation gave the Dinas more legitimacy for its rationalisation policy. In 
September 2013, the Dinas resumed its school merger project, which involved 135 
primary schools. This reduced the number of primary schools from 463 to 395. Later, 
from April to June 2014, the head of Dinas caused headlines and a public controversy for 
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his decision to close down another 28 schools. The mayor claimed that her Dinas’ school 
rationalisation has eased the management of schools and relieved students’ psychological 
problems (Humas Pemkot Surabaya, 2014). However, the new regulation, and the 
government measures that followed, ignited greater protests, particularly from the private 
schools. Dozens of school principals, parents and students rallied against the Dinas, 
protesting that the rationalisation policy was inhumane, despite it being consistent with 
the regulation (Antarajatim, 2014). The protesters claimed that the schools had been 
serving the nation for decades despite the lack of government support. Hence, they 
asserted that the new regulation was unfair and had been invented not to facilitate the 
development of education but rather to restrain it (Surya, 2014). 
The Creation of International Standard Schools 
In 2007, the central government initiated a project called International Standard Schools 
(SBI). A number of élite schools, private and public, were selected to be ‘a national school 
that prepares the students based on the national education standards and offers an 
international standard [education] by which the graduates are expected to have 
international/global competitiveness’ (Kustulasari, 2009: 53). The central government set 
exceptional standards for these schools to differentiate them from ordinary schools: 
English to be the medium of instruction; an international curriculum, like International 
Baccalaureate Oxford and Cambridge, were to be followed; strict selection of students 
admission; and allowing parents to contribute school fees, even for basic education 
(MoEC, 2009). However, the policy was controversial because it was seen as creating 
social stratification in the education system. This was exacerbated by the fact that many 
SBI schools demanded high tuition fees. Hence, in January 2013, the Constitutional Court 
accepted a public petition and set the policy aside. To comply with the verdict, the DoEC 
abolished the SBI system and ordered all SBI schools to return to the regular national 
school system. 
Surabaya became the only school district that provided a different response to the 
court’s decision. Despite removing the SBI label, the mayor insisted that the system 
continue. She said that the problem of SBI was its costly tuition fees; as long as the school 
is free of charge there would be no reason to revert to the previous system and that she 
would not change anything from former SBI schools in Surabaya (Kompas, 2013b; Surya, 
2013). Her decision provoked another controversy; one Constitutional Court judge 
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accused her of acting against the law (Kompas, 2013a). Aware that the Department of 
Education approved of her move (but could not officially endorse it), the mayor kept her 
policy but renamed it, Sekolah Kawasan (SK), which translates to ‘District School’. The 
term ‘district’ was adopted because the system is to empower and develop selected public 
schools to be like SBI but distributed regionally so that good quality schools are not all 
in the city centre. The choice of the term ‘district’ was intended to counter the dominant 
discourses associated with SBI, which in Surabaya’s context were to do with élitism and 
preferment of the city centre. With the SK policy, all children from the peripheral areas 
would attend the best schools available in their neighbourhood so they need not travel to 
the city centre. One of its effects is that, as the Dinas official put it poignantly: ‘SK is an 
educational solution to control the urban traffic’ (Participant 17). Until 2014, there were 
23 public schools under the SK system, comprising 11 junior and 12 senior secondary 
schools. 
Nevertheless, except for the absence of school fees, SK represents the continuation of 
the abolished central government’s SBI program. Its establishment fulfils the managerial 
ethics of performative competition (Ball, 2003). The system created a competitive 
environment for students from its beginning. It employs competitive selection, the 
process and criteria of which are regulated by the Dinas. Unlike the regular schools, to be 
eligible for taking part in winning one of the SK limited places, the students must have a 
national examination score of 85 (0 to 100 scale) at a minimum. Then, they also have to 
sit a written test, the Tes Potensi Akademik (TPA), which is similar to the American GRE 
system, and was organised and developed by Airlangga University as the third party 
consultant. Aspirations to be admitted to SK are high every year; it was reported that 
many final-year students of elementary and junior secondary schools spend their after-
school hours in school or at private tutoring to prepare for the TPA (Jawa Pos, 2014b). 
The competition for the SK admission compares with competition for admission to the 
best universities. 
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Responses to the Managerial Reforms 
Contesting the Rhetoric of Social Justice Settlement 
On her analysis of the rise of managerial schools in the UK, Gewirtz (2002) differentiates 
‘welfarist’ and ‘post-welfarist’ settlements. The welfarist settlement was reinforced by a 
combination of social democratic-affiliated power groups, a coalition comprising major 
political parties, big business and the trade unions on the one hand and by the legitimation 
of greater popular support on the other hand. What this welfarist settlement is committed 
to had been the one of ‘distributive justice, that is … the redistribution of social goods on 
a more equitable basis’ (Gewirtz, 2002: 1). In contrast, the post-welfarist settlement was 
underpinned by neoliberal ideology and its formal commitment to the enforcement of 
market democracy and competitive individualism (Gewirtz, 2002). 
In Surabaya, even though the managerialist settlement has appeared in some 
managerial policy reforms, the legitimation of those reforms is owed, paradoxically, to 
the spread of the welfarist rhetoric of social justice. The social justice settlement, which 
is enforced and, at the same time, contested by powerful groups of politicians in the 
government and in the DPRD, always garners massive popular support. At a particular 
point, the policy paradox can affect the disengagement between government and school 
interests. In this sense, all the managerialist reforms in Surabaya are supported by the 
expansion of the social justice rhetoric of free schooling. This very popular policy has 
given the government political popularity as well as the legitimacy to impose its 
performative regimes onto school institutions. To some extent, this was against the 
interests of both opposition parties who were politically disadvantaged by government 
popularity on the one hand and the schools, particularly their principals, who have been 
promised more relaxed, independent managerial authority on the other. 
Initially, politicians in the city council were reluctant to endorse the free schooling 
policy. Early in 2011, those councillors affiliated with parties other than the PDI-P 
reportedly criticised the Dinas proposal to extend free education to senior secondary 
schools. For example, a councillor from the Golkar Party stated that free education was 
against the characteristic of Surabaya as an upper-middle-class city (Republika, 2011b). 
Another councillor, from the PKB party, criticised the policy as having lacked a sense of 
priority: the fund should be allocated to improve the infrastructure in elementary schools 
(Republika, 2011c). Nevertheless, because the city council did not want to argue against 
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the popularity of the government’s free schooling proposal, in early 2012, that institution 
agreed to include the proposal in the first education bill, which was passed as a bylaw in 
June 2012. The passage on this reads that ‘the city government is obliged to fund the 
provision of education in both the primary and secondary levels’ (Government of 
Surabaya, 2012: article 112 [1]). Because of the popularity of the policy, a councillor who 
previously opposed the free schooling explained: 
 
The bylaw is one of our most important legacies … Certainly, there were debates 
on free education. Some people said that the policy is unfair for the poor … The 
money should go to the neediest more. But, this is about social justice. Even the 
rich have equal rights … They pay tax more … [But] there is an affirmative 
solution included in the bylaw … that every public school must save at least 5 
per cent of their admission places for the poor. The government should cover 
everything they need: uniforms, books and even their meals (Participant 25). 
 
This policy obtained more divisive responses form school principals, particularly those 
of senior secondary schools that were the most affected by the policy. Unlike basic 
education institutions, senior secondary schools get the central government’s operational 
grant whose amount is lower the calculated national standard of education cost (see Table 
8.2). To make up the difference, schools used to collect regular tuition fees from parents. 
Different schools collected different amounts of fees. The free schooling policy 
commanded schools to cease collecting fees from parents. Hence, whereas the city 
council and the Dinas arrived at a convergence with regard to the social justice approach 
to education provision, the secondary schools are divided. 
Schools may be categorised according to their perceived social standing: favourite and 
non-favourite schools. To some extent, this certainly reflects different school interests. 
Many favourite schools, which used to enjoy abundant demand for enrolments and have 
a huge number of students from high socio-economic backgrounds, tend to reject the 
policy. The number of these favourite schools increased following the introduction of 
Sekolah Kawasan to 12 of 22 senior secondary schools by 2013. In contrast, non-favourite 
schools that had always suffered from low enrolments and catered mostly to students from 
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lower socio-economic backgrounds, certainly see the policy as a blessing. A principal of 
one favourite school, who is critical of the free education policy, for instance, blames the 
policy for misguidedly forcing budget standardisation, which undermines the idea of 
school competitiveness, as suggested by the Dinas itself. 
 
You cannot compare my school with school X … The parents wanted to send 
their kids here not because they wanted them to get schooled in the ordinary way. 
Rather, they wanted them here because they see something different in this 
school … We might have an equal number of students with school X, but 
certainly our dreams and visions are different … The free schooling has the 
potential to shut those dreams down (Participant 19). 
 
In contrast, there are those who praise the free school policy because it has helped poor 
students, as one principal mentions: 
 
The free education is a breakthrough. This is a form of government commitment 
to small people … I have some experiences of dealing with students who 
couldn’t afford the certificate after graduation … [their] debt was because of 
overdue tuition payments … We were always facing dilemmas of that sort … 
We found that free schooling has helped us cope with that kind of difficulty 
(Participant 20). 
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Table 8.2. The Comparison of the Central and Local Governments’ Per Pupil Non-Personnel 
Operational Grants to Schools in Surabaya, 2013  
School level 
The 
Standardised 
Unit Cost per 
Pupil per Year* 
Grants (USD) 13 
CG BOS LG BOSDA 
Shortfall/ 
Surplus 
Primary 48.2 48.2 28.9 +28.9 
Junior Secondary 59.1 59.1 70.4 +70.4 
Senior Secondary 81.9 46.6 151.7 +116.4 
* Based on MoEC Regulation 69 of 2009  
 
In fact, the local government has allocated funding that is much higher than the central 
government’s standard unit cost and far more than the central government grant for senior 
secondary schools (see Table 8.2). For each student, the institution receives IDR2.4 
million in total annually. It means that the more students, the higher the amount from 
central and from local governments. Despite critical arguments, Dinas officials insist that 
such treatment will make public schools compete for student enrolments. Yet, the 
favourite schools, even with the generous student grant from the local government, have 
had their income decrease. Before the free education policy, in 2010, the Sekolah 
Kawasan that used to be under the central government’s International Standard School 
program, were authorised to collect a student tuition fee of IDR400,000 (USD53) per 
month (Faiq, 2010; Surya, 2010) that is, each student paid at least IDR4 million (USD530) 
per annum. This figure does not include income from a parent contribution scheme, called 
a ‘development fund’, that is paid once a child has been accepted for a place in the school. 
The Dinas officials and politicians struck back at the principals who opposed the policy. 
 
  
																																								 																				
13  The conversion is based on the USD to IDR exchange value rate as of December 2013, USD1 = 
IDR12,021	
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The public complained to us about many fee quotations in schools (that is why 
now we impose strict prohibition) … It is normal that some [principals] criticise 
the policy because they lost some potential income. But they will understand. 
Otherwise, they have no option but to run on our track (Participant 17). 
 
One councillor noted that the opposition to the free schooling policy is about changing 
the business mentality in schools. 
 
They [principals] have to change their mentality. A school is not a for-profit 
institution. As long as the government has enough money to fund education, so 
we can’t put the burden onto the people. And, the schools have to follow 
accordingly (Participant 25). 
 
Nevertheless, there is something more than just the money that causes some principals to 
be opposed to the policy and that is the extension of control over schools. Under the free 
school policy, schools are subject to frequent audits, performed by state and non-state 
organisations. For the state, they are justified because they ensure that performance 
standards are being met. For civil society, because their funding is from the government, 
public schools are regarded as state institutions whose performance must be publicly 
accountable. The mass media are the major non-state agents that pay continuous attention 
to this issue and, as I observed, some school principals contended that media attention 
can be intimidating when it comes to the issue of government money or parent 
contributions. Some principals felt that popular education policies, such as free schooling 
and electronic budgeting have been politicised. They have put schools under a spotlight 
that is focussed more on administrative arrangements than on educational achievement. 
In November 2012, for example, one leading senior secondary school caused media 
controversy when its school committee decided to collect voluntary parent contribution 
for extracurricular activities. The DPRD then held a session to investigate the case and 
invited representatives from the school and some independent university experts. The 
school declined to attend the session. There were public debates about the issue but 
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interest in the issue evaporated with time. Referring to this case, a principal from one non-
favourite school responded: 
 
We have to be very careful with this issue now … We cannot freely discuss our 
school plan publicly … The media is very much fond of this. I frequently remind 
the chief of the school committee to avoid talking about money in parent 
meetings. When a school is caught discussing money with parents, the media 
will headline it and politicians will compete for popularity (Principal 20). 
 
In defending his colleague from that kind of media attack, another principal argued: 
 
Sometimes the parents themselves take the initiative to give a contribution, for 
example, for the provision of air conditioning because they were concerned that 
their kids were studying in very humid and hot classrooms. And it was all 
organised by the school committee, we [the school] never took part. But, as the 
information leaked to the media, it was then blown up with a provocative 
headline charging the school with quoting illegal fees (Participant 21). 
 
The Return to Bureaucracy and the Myth of the Autonomous Manager 
Advocates of managerial reform always claim that the reform is to reduce the role of state 
bureaucracy and to empower the onsite manager (Exworthy and Halford, 1998; Islam, 
1993) and these two ambitions are the intellectual foundations of school-based 
management: that managers should drive change and progress for their school. The same 
argument came to the fore in Surabaya’s managerial reforms. As a Dinas official noted, 
the set-up of the online, third-party-managed and candidate-involved process to recruit 
school principals is to delegate responsibility to the ‘professional manager’ and to put an 
end to the stereotype that principals were always titipan politik14 (Participant 17). During 
																																								 																				
14	There is no English equivalence for ‘titipan politik’ or ‘orang titipan.’ The term is best described by 
Stevens and Smigdall-Tellings (2010) as ‘someone put in a certain position because he knows a VIP or an 
insider, not because he is qualified for the job’ (p. 682)	
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the mayoral election in 2010, for instance, it was reported that the then head of education 
Dinas mobilised the teachers and principals in a number of political campaigns (Surabaya 
Pagi, 2010) and some reform did result. The Dinas official said that the institution will 
protect a principal from any external intervention. He said that his office frequently 
rejected some influential figures who wanted to have their relatives admitted or 
transferred to their desired schools. As with the principals, all of them make the same 
claim. One principal illustrates this as follows: 
 
The first time I came here I found one senior teacher who for many years had 
been doing clerical stuff while neglecting his teaching responsibility. Yet, 
instead of getting a clerical-staff salary, he retained all of his teacher’s 
entitlements … None had him warned because of some connection he had. By 
the time I arrived, I just didn’t care about his connection and directly altered his 
status and entitlements from teacher to administrative staff (Participant 19). 
 
The teacher performance allowance (TKG) policy was also claimed to empower 
principals internally. They could assign people for certain position, monitored their 
performance and assessed whether these people are entitled to a proper reward. One 
principal, for instance, praised the TKG policy because it gave him more ‘bargaining 
power’ in dealing with teachers (Participant 21). Principals could punish underperforming 
teachers by simply leaving their self-assessment report unreviewed or giving more critical 
comments. But, another principal contended that such empowerment is on paper only. In 
practice, he said, TKG caused the principal more pressure because it has removed the 
principal’s control of money. In the past, they could assign teachers for non-routine 
activities and paid them accordingly. Now, the source for additional income is limited in 
the TKG scheme (Participant 19). Nevertheless, on this matter, we can argue that even 
before the reform, the principals’ internal authority over their school personnel was never 
an issue. In Indonesian patrimonial bureaucracy, career rank was enough to define how 
much cultural and political capital you have in comparison with others. As long as there 
was no external political intervention, as the most senior government officer in schools, 
certainly the principal’s power was mostly unchallenged. Sometimes teachers respected 
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their principal but also were fearful. A principal can move members of his staff to 
particular roles and positions with almost no dissent. 
However, although external political intervention is no longer an issue, the challenge 
to the school-based management project in Surabaya is coming from the local government. 
When they take up their positions as a public school principal, they return to their original 
employment status, that is, as a member of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Following March 
and Olsen (2014), as bureaucrats, these principals are still guided by the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ rather than the more rational ‘logic of consequences’. Their activities 
are bound more strictly by government rules and regulations, rather than by any 
independent, professional decision. They are trapped in the lowest position in the ranks 
of bureaucracy. The critical regulatory requirement affecting the implementation of 
school-based management is the electronic budgeting policy. The policy has an 
isomorphic effect on schools in the way that schools are now having more standardised 
programs and activities. The electronic budgeting system ignores the difference in school 
characteristics that used to be. Schools can only propose budget funding for activities 
listed on the budget template. Every school used to have its own plans and strategies to 
achieve their goals. But the strict budgeting system enforces conformity, and schools tend 
to have similar activities. One principal complained: 
 
We used to be called a favourite school. Previously, a principal could push 
students or teachers to become more creative. [You can] propose any activity 
you want and the school committee will find the money. But now, there is no 
difference between my school and [so-called] non-favourite school. We all are 
doing what the Dinas told us to do through their list of activities (Participant 21). 
 
Because this policy has become routine, it militates against the original purpose of 
managerial reform: performance effectiveness. Some principals have acknowledged that 
the standardisation has also caused schools to suffer ineffective planning. In many cases, 
the strict government budget allows for unneeded goods, but needed ones may not be 
obtained. For example, a principal of another favourite school commented: 
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The only one that makes us different is student numbers. The more students you 
have, the more you get government funding. But even if you have more money, 
you won’t use it all. We cannot propose activities or goods different from what 
have been listed on the system. So, every six months I often return around IDR50 
million cash to the government. What for? Every time you proposed a new 
activity, it was always rejected [by the system]! [Also] why bother buying goods 
you already have? (Participant 19). 
 
However, the most important effect of this performance regime is the central importance 
of accounting in school performance. Following the budget reform, principals are, by 
whatever means, forced to master every detail of budgeting: from planning to monitoring. 
The principal of one non-favourite school added in this regard: 
 
Formerly, all technicalities of budgeting were delegated to administrative staff. 
The principal only gave general advice … But, it is no longer the case now. We 
have to know every detail … I am the most responsible person here. I have to 
sign and know where every cent of money is being spent. Otherwise, we risk 
being put in jail only because of a small accounting mistake made by our staff, 
whether deliberate or not. This should not be our task, should it? But we cannot 
escape (Participant 22). 
 
Hence, the return to hierarchy has ended up with the return of external pressure on school 
principals, perhaps stronger than previously. The domination by state institutions in this 
managerial governance has been anticipated should we look at the very basic structure of 
the managerial governance. That is, the institutionalisation of a managerial state in 
Surabaya has lacked the support of a strong market institution. This has allowed the 
domination by state or quasi-state institutions to remain unchallenged. 
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Managerialisation with(out) Privatisation 
Almost all scholars have argued that the birth of the managerial state is supported by the 
expansion of the market as the leading political and economic institution (Apple, 2005; 
Ball, 2009; Clarke and Newman, 1997).The discourse of schooling quality across 
countries has been dominated by the belief that ‘private schooling’ is better than public 
(Toma, 1996). Hence, in many cases, the former institution became a reference from 
which the latter borrowed some institutional models. In Indonesia and particularly 
Surabaya, this has never been the case. Generally, private education institutions 
outnumber their government competitors, making the latter more exclusive and 
competitive. Certainly, there is a growing number of new and more exclusive private 
schools to cater for upper-middle-class parents, but the government’s policy was soon 
initiated to block their influence. 
 
Table 8.3. Figures for Public and Private Schools in Surabaya, 2013 
School Level 
Public Private 
Institutions Students Institutions Students 
Primary 463 174,905 416 80,618 
Junior Secondary 52 44,643 285 69,303 
General Senior 
Secondary 
22 20,137 146 32,727 
Vocational Senior 
Secondary 
11 21,202 104 38,987 
Source: (Government of Surabaya, 2013) 
 
In the absence of balanced competition within the field, the city government has tended 
to apply a contrary treatment to the two institutions: that is, privatising the public schools 
and ‘deprivatising’ the private schools. The government started to ‘privatise’ the public 
schools by introducing business rules to school governance and by establishing more 
exclusive public schools across the territory. The involvement of a third-party contractor 
in the selection of principals and in school admission processes, and the expansion of 
performative policies, such as budget restrictions and teacher performance allowances, 
represents the introduction of private-sector rules in school management. Private-sector 
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practices have been used with the introduction of the SK program. SK was introduced to 
maintain the established social division of favourite and non-favourite schools. Using 
stricter selection criteria, the SK has limited the chances of academic underperformers 
from gaining admission, pushing them into regular schools. The Dinas official said that 
the policy is also aimed to bring the government schools up to the standards of the 
exclusive private schools whose number has increased in parallel with the expansion of 
the middle-class population in Surabaya. These private schools are run by well-known 
providers, such as Ciputra, St Louis, Petra, Muhammadiyah, Al-Hikmah and Ta’miriyah. 
More importantly, the SK policy conforms to the trend of middle-class residential 
settlement to spread in the city’s outskirts. The distribution of élite public schools 
throughout the city district areas followed the trend of the development of élite housing 
complexes in the peripheral areas. 
On the other hand, however, the local government also launched a number of 
‘deprivatisation’ campaigns. This is done in such a way that their autonomy is gradually 
decreased through the introduction of conditional government funding per pupil and 
closing underperforming institutions. In the first instance, similar to public schools, the 
city government provides all private schools with per-pupil, operational grant 
entitlements. Having received this funding, however, private schools must comply with 
the attached conditions, among which are limits on the tuition fees from parents and the 
adoption of programs for the admission of students from poor families, programs known 
as mitra warga, (people partner). These programs require that all government-funded 
schools allocate at least 5 per cent of the school places for students who can provide 
official ‘poverty certification’, which exempts them from fees (Government of Surabaya, 
2012). In July 2014, the city council’s education committee found that 14 grant recipient 
private schools were not complying with the people partner policy. Against the regulation, 
these schools continued to charge all parents regardless of their socio-economic 
background. The government then threatened to retrieve the grant as punishment (Jawa 
Pos, 2014a; Republika, 2014). 
For most average private schools, the grant is huge and essential for their survival. For 
some élite private schools that have been spoiled by unlimited contributions from parents, 
the grant is too small to buy their compliance. Therefore, many élite private schools 
decline the grant. However, as one of these élite private schools acknowledged, the fees 
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limitation and the pro-poor policy are not the most important reasons for rejecting the 
government grant. Another reason for rejection is the failure to conform to the 
bureaucratic culture. To be allowed the grant, schools must follow numerous procedures, 
lodge paperwork and submit to official inspections. An élite school principal explained: 
 
IZ: Is your school among the BOP recipients? 
P: We received the BOP grant from 2009 until 2011 … Last year [2012] we 
decided not to propose any longer … It was tough … too many restrictions and 
paperwork. Also, the Dinas school inspectors visited very often to inquire 
about pointless issues …  
IZ: Do you have any objection to fees restriction as well? 
P: The thing is that on average our students are coming from upper-middle- 
class families. They are willing to pay … But, we also have a number of poor 
students. They pay not a single cent. Here we have a cross-subsidy mechanism 
to cover them … So, with all due respect, we should take our own way 
(Participant 24). 
 
The most evidence for the campaign for ‘deprivatisation’ is the school performance audit, 
the result of which can result in the closure of a school. As discussed before, hundreds of 
private schools were closed during Hartono and Rismaharini’s tenures. The reasons are 
many, but all of them refer to the failure to comply with rules, most importantly with 
regard to the local government’s strict permit requirements. The Dinas imposes regular 
monitoring on the basis of accreditation scores. The higher the score, the less frequently 
do schools need to apply for a new permit and the converse. Most private schools have 
the lowest accreditation score or are not accredited at all, which ensures more frequent 
appraisals. 
Having survived disruptive bureaucracies in the past, these private schools are now 
finding themselves unable to obtain many documents needed in modern education 
administration. Dozens of these private schools were threatened with closure because they 
did not meet requirements for certification. The market pressures also contribute to 
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conditions that will bring about shutdown. Many schools proved to be less efficient and 
uncompetitive. They are not professionally managed because of the lack of resources: the 
personnel are poorly paid and serve the school on a voluntary basis. In addition, they 
could not compete successfully for admissions and recruited few students, which 
therefore affected their income from the government’s per-pupil subsidy and parent’s 
contributions. These humble private schools have to compete not with élite private 
schools but rather with regular public schools, which are free. 
 
Conclusion 
In Surabaya, the national program of education decentralisation has been adapted into a 
managerial education reform. The reform owes its legitimacy to the convergence of the 
national and local institutional environment. Nationally, as well as education programs, 
numerous regulations to promote general governance reforms have also been 
promulgated. Local government autonomy has allowed different responses to these 
programs and regulations, depending on how influential local institutional agents are in 
supporting or avoiding transformation. Surabaya has been blessed by the presence of 
managerial figures who benefited the support from the growing popular democracy, 
which is contrary to the established patrimonial politics. Thus, the managerial discourses 
on transparency, efficiency and autonomy gain popular support: what have lost favour 
are practices of the bureaucratic state that would maintain the status quo and are 
associated with corruption, politicisation and bureaucratisation. With the institutional 
entrepreneurship of these new managerialist leaders, the government has successfully 
launched a number of reforms in education governance, with the objectives of 
professional autonomy, transparency and efficiency. 
Nevertheless, that managerial reforms owe their legitimation to popular democratic 
support has led to internal contradictions. The reform becomes highly dependent on 
political populism, which then leads to the rejuvenation of bureaucratic control and de-
legitimation of market institutions. The former strikes back at the very idea of public 
school autonomy and freedom from external intervention, the latter has legitimated the 
battle against private schooling. The extensive government funding for schools has to be 
compensated with intense scrutiny of public schools, not only from state institutions but 
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also from the increasingly vocal non-state actors. If less complex and efficient school 
management are to be the goals of the managerialist reform, then the reform has just 
added more complexity. In addition, this managerial reform is built on the weak market 
structure where the (élite) private schools sell the products but public schools win the 
customers. Moreover, the government’s performative policies have pushed the ‘less 
competitive’ private schools away from the market battlefield, while its public schools 
are more and more improved. 
 

	 
Chapter IX  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This study seeks to reveal the interaction between global, national and local contexts in 
preserving the institutional legitimacy of educational decentralisation, using the post-
2001 Indonesian education reform as the case study. What makes the Indonesian 
educational decentralisation reform different from its previous decentralisation trial is not 
only that it expands the decentralised sector of education to secondary education, but also 
that the decentralisation extends beyond the educational realm. The reform has not only 
led to the reorganisation of the central government’s education bureaucracy, particularly 
through the closing of hundreds of local offices of the central government’s ministry of 
education, but also by the restructuring of the whole education governance system, in 
which the central government appears like no more playing the dominant role. This then 
creates a new constellation of political legitimacies on the basis of which the state can 
manage its education sector. 
This thesis tracks the process of the institutionalisation of educational decentralisation 
in Indonesia since its adoption, as a result of external and internal pressure, until its 
implementation nationally and regionally. At the heart of this institutionalisation is the 
question of legitimacy. This thesis looks at how the institutional legitimacy of educational 
decentralisation is obtained, manipulated and contested. This final chapter consists of 
three parts: the first sums up the empirical findings from three research questions 
(described in Chapter I). The second part discusses the theoretical implications that can 
be developed as this study’s contribution to the sociological neo-institutional theory. The 
third part considers the implications of these findings to the current national policy and 
offers some measures that the Indonesian and other governments might adopt in dealing 
with such problems. 
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Summary of the Findings 
There are three research questions around which the research findings are described in 
this chapter: first, how did the global and local contexts provide the institutional 
legitimacy for the implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia?; 
second, how did the central government preserve its legitimacy when devolving powers 
to the local governments, while also retaining significant powers of its own?; and third, 
how is the institutional legitimacy of the educational decentralisation policy contested at 
the local district level? 
With regard to the first research question, a finding of this study is that the reform was 
adopted as a response to external pressure from powerful global institutions on the one 
hand, and the internal crisis of state legitimacy emanating from local movements against 
centralised authorities on the other hand. Chapter 5 has highlighted that the Indonesian 
government could not resist the pressures of the World Bank and other international 
funding organisations to save the country from the economic catastrophe that undermined 
the long-standing centralist government and, in turn, led the country to one of the worst 
legitimacy crises in its history. Decentralisation was imposed as a loan condition by the 
World Bank and also became the magic wand that progressively dampened secessionist 
aspirations from the regions and eventually restored the legitimacy of the national state. 
Educational decentralisation was infused into this celebratory moment and implemented 
as a taken-for-granted consequence, even when its guidelines were yet to be formulated. 
From the central government’s perspective, educational decentralisation reform was more 
a legitimacy-making project than a technical approach to solve the real educational 
problems. There was an initiative to systematically revise the education decentralisation 
strategy by establishing a special task force but its recommendations vaporised when the 
2001 decentralisation reform started. 
In relation to the second research question, as Chapter 6 has discussed, this study found 
that the central government used a decoupling strategy to delegitimise the local 
government’s role, and for the central government to retain its control in education. 
Decoupling is built on two foundations: efficiency and confidence (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The discourse of ‘inefficient locals’ was prominent among the central government 
officials, who argued that decentralisation would lead to the politicisation of education 
personnel. The argument for efficiency was also used to play down local government 
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officials’ capacity in handling technical education matters. In 2003, a new education law 
was introduced to redefine the central government’s control and to limit the role of local 
government in education. The new law adopted decentralisation with the ritual of 
‘confidence and good faith’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This meant that decentralisation 
was subsumed in the new law but the lawmakers then entrusted the central ministry of 
education to set the details. The central government made some effort to restore its 
influence through the creation of a national standardised system of education. The law 
has inspired hundreds of government and ministerial regulations that stipulate every detail 
of how education arrangements should be; from curriculum to classroom size. To support 
the implementation of these standards, the central government increased education 
funding and introduced a number of centrally coordinated inspection mechanisms, such 
as teacher certification, national examinations and school accreditation. Despite its 
political repercussions, the government reiterated that this standardisation is a 
professional project, developed by independent professionals and aimed at ‘improving 
professionalism and institutional accountability’ (GoI, 2005a). 
For the third research question, this thesis shows that the decoupling strategy does not 
always result in efficiency and confidence as the institutional theory claims. It is not 
always successful in settling the discord between institutional legitimacy and technical 
efficiency. For local governments, educational decentralisation is simply one part of the 
greater political decentralisation policy that provides them with more autonomy. In this 
context, a return of central government control cannot provide technical efficiency 
because it runs counter to local governments’ autonomy. As it turns out, beyond the 
central government’s control, the standardisation does not result in field structuration, 
that is, the structural convergence of education arrangements. Rather, it leads to 
destructuration or the breakdown of hierarchy and coordination. In this sense, local 
governments complement decentralisation with their respective agendas, which are seen 
to support their autonomy. The extent to which the national standards of education might 
be adopted by the local governments as institutional pressure depends on whether they 
support or legitimate the local government’s interests. 
For such question, we have conducted two case studies, of Kupang and Surabaya, 
which represent different styles of local government. Kupang is a poor area that relies for 
most of its education funding on central government transfers and is supposedly more 
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bound to follow central government directives. On the other hand, Surabaya is a big city 
that generates its own funding to support most of its education needs, which tends to make 
it unresponsive to the adoption of the central government’s rules. However, the fact is 
that the central government support does not necessarily influence local government 
response to the central government rules. Neither Surabaya nor Kupang let themselves be 
confined by central government standards in organising their local education system. 
They adopted the national standards eclectically so long as those standards served their 
purposes. It is the established local socio-political environment that continues to guide 
the local governments’ arrangement of education. 
In Kupang, the current unchanged neo-patrimonial bureaucracy facilitates a highly 
politicised education governance, centred on the mayor and his political allies. Education 
resources are seen as political capital to support the ruler’s legitimacy. Teachers are drawn 
into political contestation to win positions in school and government administrations. The 
local education office employs many teachers in administrative roles: senior positions are 
filled by teachers who manage to maintain their patrimonial loyalty to the mayor. School 
policies are subverted by external interests, that is, by parents, bureaucrats and politicians. 
The student admissions policy, for instance, which should have been the responsibility of 
school-based management, is highly politicised to accommodate the high demand by 
parents for their children to be enrolled at favoured schools. Despite most of its education 
funding coming from the central government, the Kupang local government is not bound 
by central government regulations. For instance, it allows public primary schools to 
demand tuition fees despite the central government’s prohibition, and the local education 
office has never followed the national standards in the appointment of principals. 
In Surabaya, the present local education system is organised in the managerialist way; 
the local education office has been given a considerable degree of autonomy to run 
schooling matters free from mayoral political intervention. The education office is free of 
officials from school-teaching backgrounds; instead it has career bureaucrats with 
management aptitude and skills. Public school principals are recruited through a 
transparent process developed and operated by a third-party consultant. The education 
office has launched a number of management reforms to install a performative culture in 
school governance, such as teacher performance allowances, budget restrictions and 
school rationalisation. School managements are standardised on the basis of this 
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performative regime. Surabaya may be a case where national standards accordingly apply 
and are, even more progressively, advanced. In the case of school rationalisation, for 
instance, the local government refers to the central government’s standard of student-per-
classroom limits and adds its own criteria to restrict the issuing of school licenses. 
However, the adoption of central government education standards does not necessarily 
imply that all central government prescriptions are followed. The local governments, for 
instance, insist on implementing the already prohibited, exclusive, international standard 
school system. 
 
Table 9.1. Education Governance in Kupang and Surabaya 
Characteristics Kupang Surabaya 
Government structure Neo-patrimonial state Neo-managerial state 
Decision-making authority Centralised in the office of 
the mayor 
Decentralised to the city 
education office 
Personnel recruitment Political Procedural 
Control mechanism Individual loyalty Performance audit 
School management Politically co-opted Standardised 
Affiliation to national 
standards 
Eclectic but rarely adopting Eclectic but mostly adopting 
Idealised values Equality and accommodation Equality and competition 
 
Some Theoretical Implications 
The New Institutionalism and the Study of Change 
Though used in an array of organisational studies, the theoretical assumptions of the new 
institutionalism have been continuously criticised. With respect to  our discussion on 
educational reform, some critics have claimed that institutional theory is not viable for 
analysing organisational change. It is regarded as a theory that could not forecast change. 
Greenwood and Hinnings (1996) note that, because of its weakness in analysing the 
internal dynamics of organisational change, ‘the theory is silent on why some 
organisations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same 
institutional pressures’. More specifically, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) conducted a particular 
study to prove the institutional theory’s inadequacy in analysing organisational change. 
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They examined some institutional axioms against the change in the behaviour of 
American liberal arts colleges during the period 1971 to 1986. They found that 
organisational changes during that period could not be said to result from the process of 
institutional isomorphism. Instead of becoming similar over time, the liberal arts colleges 
had been increasingly showing heterogeneity. They also observed that technical 
environments became an important factor in organisational changes, although they were 
institutionally illegitimate. And, those technically adaptive changes ‘had no negative 
implications—and often had positive implications—for organisational survival and 
health’ (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996: 831). 
Indeed, as Scott et al. (2000) argue, organisations will change radically when they 
experience a profound institutional change. Otherwise, they only adopt the change 
ceremonially and keep to the old practices to maintain technical efficiency (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). This profound institutional change is conceptualised as 
deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992) or destructuration (Scott, 2008). Both concepts have 
much the same meaning, that is, the breakdown and discontinuity of traditional forms of 
belief systems, patterns of behaviour, governance structure and activities of the 
organisation. Oliver introduces three antecedents of deinstitutionalisation: functional, 
social and political (Oliver, 1992), which I found useful in analysing the 
deinstitutionalisation of the Indonesian New Order’s centralist regime that led to the 
introduction of the new decentralised system. Hence, contrary to the critics, neo-
institutional theorists like Scott (2008) and Oliver (1992) believe that 
deinstitutionalisation provides a strong basis for the institutional analysis of change. 
However, I see the problem being deeper than merely the compatibility to analyse 
change. As this study has suggested, even within a profound institutional change, the 
resistance to the change remains potential: not only from the actors in favour of the status 
quo, but also from new actors who find their interests unfulfilled as the change ensues. In 
this case, despite the adoption of decentralisation, the reformist central government 
formulated a new mechanism to retain its central control because it assumed that local 
government officials were  technically incompetent, which in the future would affect the 
quality of educational provision. As the reform evolved, the central government’s 
tendency to recentralise the system becomes much stronger. Many, many regulations 
were produced by the central government and trillions of rupiah were issued to preserve 
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central control. Hence, I argue that what is more important is not whether a theory is 
feasible to analyse the change, but rather whether it is able to question, criticise and 
illuminate the essence of the change itself. 
 
External and Internal Legitimacy 
The new institutional theory has been pre-eminent for its concern with external legitimacy. 
It is said that an organisation’s conformity to its external environment is for the sake of 
gaining institutional legitimacy. This external legitimacy ensures an organisation’s 
survival in a field with many other organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The concept 
of external legitimacy is useful in analysing the institutional effect of education reform in 
the context of globalisation. Davies and Guppy (1997) propose that the institutional 
convergence of economic globalisation and global rationalisation has driven the 
isomorphic characteristics of education reform in Anglo-American nations. Similarly, in 
his study of Michigan public-school reform, Lubienski (2005) highlights the globalisation 
of marketised environments as the condition for the emergence of competition-oriented 
reform in the local arena. Other institutional scholars have claimed that educational 
decentralisation has become a ‘world model’ (Daun, 2007) or ‘global ideology’ (Baker, 
et al., 2005) so that nations across the world predominantly lean to it. In this study, it is 
also an assumption that the globalising effect of decentralisation reform has touched 
Indonesia, thanks to the institutional influence of global organisations. 
Nevertheless, as this study has also conceived, an external legitimacy is not the only 
reason Indonesia adopted decentralisation. No less an important factor is the national 
response to its internal legitimacy, which had also deteriorated. Here, the internal crisis 
of legitimacy refers to Habermas’ depiction of the crisis of the state-led capitalism as 
follows: 
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After all, the state apparatus does not just see itself in the role of the supreme 
capitalist facing the conflicting interests of the various capital factions. It also has 
to consider the generalisable interests of the population as far as necessary to retain 
mass loyalty and prevent a conflict-ridden withdrawal of legitimation (Habermas, 
1984: 656-7). 
 
The internal crisis of legitimacy arises from the unredeemed ‘generalisable interests of 
the population’, which in the Indonesian context was exhibited in the massive popular 
distrust of the centralised New Order regime. Not only had centralism effected severe 
bureaucratisation and inefficiency as the World Bank contended, but, for the local 
population, centralism was believed to be responsible for having siphoned all the local 
resources to Jakarta. Therefore, the adoption of decentralisation must also be seen in this 
context, that is, to maintain ‘mass loyalty’ (Habermas, 1984). 
Not only that—the inclusion of internal legitimacy into institutional analysis is also 
important in the context of the institutional versus technical environments distinction. 
Friedland and Alford (1991) have noted that such a distinction has distorted the nature of 
institutional analysis that should bring everything back to an institutional lens: even 
technical is institutional. I argue that internal legitimacy would also blur the boundary 
between institutional and technical environments; when the institutional legitimacy 
becomes contrary to the technical efficiency, the whole organisational function would be 
at risk. In the Indonesian case, the central government has an understanding that the 
consistent application of decentralisation would run counter to the effective provision of 
education because of the assumptions of local officials’ technical incompetence. 
Therefore, another scheme to ensure central control must be put in place. However, this 
move is easily spotted by local governments, which already enjoy autonomy. The effect 
is that local officials are disinclined to follow the central government policies. 
 
Bringing the State Back into the Institutional Analysis of Education 
In its earlier development, the institutional analysis was concerned with the nation-state 
development as the main reason behind the expansion of modern mass education. It was 
believed that the worldwide expansion of mass education was the outcome of an 
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ideological process of rationalisation and nation-state formation. Education was regarded 
as the means to produce rational individuals who  would legitimate their full membership 
in the new nation-state (Boli, et al., 1985; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). As the number of 
new nation-states increased after the second World War, so did the need for educated 
citizens who would be significant for building equal international relations and economic 
competition. The connectedness among organisations worldwide had driven governance 
structures in every nation-state to maintain their institutional order and thus to become 
isomorphic. Educational governance has been part of this isomorphic reality. The similar 
arrangements of educational organisation ranged from the establishment of ministries of 
education as the national education authority, the acceptance of schooling as a model of 
state-sponsored education (Boli, et al., 1985; Meyer, et al., 1992; Ramirez and Boli, 1987), 
and even the emphasis on  similar subjects in school curricula (Benavot et al., 1991). 
Governments became more active in taking over and controlling educational 
responsibilities that previously had been accepted by institutions, such as churches and 
other private entities. 
Nevertheless, since the early 2000s there has been some criticism of this kind of state-
centred analysis of education. Davies et al. (2006), for instance, contend that the state-
centred institutional analysis of education is no longer relevant because the institutional 
environment has changed. They argue that private education is now growing and there 
has been much political rhetoric that accuses public schools of being substandard. 
Therefore, they call for a more market-oriented institutional analysis that puts more 
emphasis on divergent, rather than isomorphic, change and on recoupling more than 
decoupling (Davies et al., 2006). Similarly, Rowan (2006) argues that some market-based 
reforms in American education have forced student performance to be more closely 
inspected, which allowed the rise of learning support industries, such as testing companies 
and private tutoring, and increasing the diversity of education actors. In this sense, not 
only do educational organisations have to respond to external institutional pressures 
(government rules or social ideals) but now they also have to respond to demands on their 
internal technical effectiveness (students’ test preparedness, competitive curricula, or 
effective school management). Meanwhile, in her study of the US No Child Left Behind 
policy, Burch (2010) contends that for-profit firms have replaced the state’s role in 
performing structural isomorphic pressure through selling outdated curriculum. She also 
claims that the proliferation of private-sector educational institutions has led to the 
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structuration of neoliberal ideology and practices in the organisational field of education 
(Burch, 2010). 
However, the Indonesian case provides a different context of environmental change. 
Here, private schools have proliferated in the field of education since the nation-state’s 
formation, but only one per cent of them are as competitive as, or better, than public 
schools. There is no ‘market’ in the field when most schools are using the same national 
curriculum and the few alternative private schools are too expensive (McGinn and Welsh, 
1999: 44). The decentralisation reform does change the institutional environment but it is 
toward the proliferation of state rather than market institutions. Decentralisation has 
allowed the central government to invent another way to retain its control over national 
education governance by regulating the standards. However, this control has never been 
effective because the decentralisation has created politically more autonomous local 
governments, which realise full command over their respective education sectors. This 
then hampered the realisation of the school-based management program because, as part 
of the local bureaucracy, school personnel are subject to local bureaucratic arrangements. 
Hence, from the national perspective, rather than promoting an isomorphic change, the 
proliferation of these decentralised states has led to diverging changes. As we have seen, 
Kupang and Surabaya have different education arrangements despite being subject to the 
same national standardisation pressure. 
I have used this divergent effect of the proliferation of state institutions to reinterpret 
Scott’s concept of destructuration. Instead of using the concept for simply identifying the 
breakdown of established institutions (Scott, 2008), for me destructuration is the process 
whereby the dynamic of institutional pressures fail to produce structural convergence in 
the field. The dynamic might arise from either the unsuccessful decoupling of the 
organisation’s technical arrangements from its institutional environment, or the conflict 
between the organisation’s external and internal legitimacy. In our case, the 
destructuration is the result of the conflict between external and internal legitimacy. 
Because they run counter to the interests of local government autonomy, many local 
governments ignore the implementation of some national standards, which in many 
instances accommodate the World Bank’s prescription and follow common global 
practices. 
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Some Policy Implications 
A Standardised Anarchy 
The benefits of educational decentralisation have become a worldwide rationalised set of 
beliefs whose adoption gives the nation-state external legitimacy to run its education 
management. It has prevented Indonesia from being caught in a global spotlight as 
international institutions, like the World Bank and UNESCO, critically and regularly 
inspect its education governance and compare it with the ideal implementation of 
education management. It also adds to the country’s confidence that its education 
governance has been part of the global trend and aiming at the shared global objective of 
a more efficient and competitive education management. 
However, the pressure of educational decentralisation also came internally from the 
central regime’s crisis of legitimacy that threatened the nation’s survival. During the late 
1990s, a number of regional movements demanded more control over their own territory 
and threatened to secede from the Republic. The adoption of internal pressure has trapped 
the nation into a more serious game of legitimacy. In 1999, President Habibie enacted 
new laws to enable local autonomy; educational decentralisation was simply attached as 
part of this district-based political decentralisation big bang, with no regulatory 
framework established. The devolution of power to its sub-national territories in 2001 has 
created new, uncontrolled local ‘states’. This gave the nation-state legitimacy to survive 
but at the same time eroded much of its influence. 
Just two years later, in 2003, a set of more technical regulations for decentralisation 
was introduced, that is, through the promulgation of new national education system law. 
The law restores the central government’s power but in a different form. The central 
government then started to impose many regulations to standardise the management of 
education throughout the nation—but it was too late. As a former vice-minister 
acknowledged, local governments had been overjoyed with their autonomy. The 
standardising effort faced more challenge because a new local government law was 
introduced in 2004, which granted local government elites a new source of legitimacy: 
popular suffrage. Since then people have voted directly for local leaders. This allows the 
excuse for local leaders that they are more obliged to attend to their constituents’ needs 
than to those of the central government. 
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Standardisation implies a legitimate action of governing. It denotes the established 
relation of power, with the standard maker being the competent and legitimate power 
holder on the one hand and those upon which the standards are imposed being the 
incompetent and, might be, illegitimate, on the other hand. Standardisation, then, 
constitutes a coercive institutional pressure in reference to which all organisations in the 
field construct their legitimate structure and, therefore, gears the whole field towards 
structural isomorphism. However, when the standard maker is aware that such an 
institutional constellation is absent, that the standard maker is not the only legitimate 
power holder in the field and that its legitimacy to govern can be contested, then what has 
been standardised is only anarchy. 
Based on the degree of the legitimacy problem, the standardised anarchy can be 
characterised into two general behaviours: the general inconsistency between central and 
local policies and local resistance to the central policy. The central-local policy-practice 
inconsistency has a lower degree of legitimacy and the problem is mostly justified by the 
differences in resource capacity. The implementation of the national program of free basic 
education is more successful in Surabaya than Kupang because Surabaya generates 
sufficient local revenue to enable it to fund its schools; Kupang does not. Yet, from the 
national perspective this could not be the reason because the central government has 
allocated school operational grants and some other development funds to all schools, 
particularly in more needy areas like Kupang. Other cases like the failure to fulfil the 
standardised student-teacher ratio, size of physical infrastructure, and teacher 
qualification are examples of general inconsistency. 
Meanwhile, the local resistance-based standardised anarchy arises exclusively from 
the problem of legitimacy. The resistance occurs because the local government sees the 
central regulation as challenging its local political autonomy. The Kupang recruitment 
system for school principals is an example of this. Rather than adopting the ministerial 
regulation on the standard for the selection and appointment of principals, the local 
government uses its own system because the regulation mandates the assignment of an 
independent committee as the selector. But an independent committee would be counter 
to the mayor’s authority to control appointments as he wishes in his bureaucracy. 
Surabaya’s refusal to dissolve the international standard school system as mandated by 
the Constitutional Court is another example. Despite the judge’s rejection of her (the 
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mayor) interpretation, the mayor insisted that her government only needs to eliminate the 
core problem behind the system ban, which is commercialisation, without necessarily 
dissolving the whole system. The fact is that Kupang and Surabaya both survive despite 
neither complying with national policies and the central authorities are unable to apply 
sanctions. 
The cases of Kupang and Surabaya have shown that all localities with different social, 
political, economic and cultural backgrounds can be potential sites where standardised 
anarchy is upheld. This is to say that the standardised anarchy is not about what happens 
in localities, but about the institutional arrangement at the national level. It is an ideal of 
educational decentralisation that the areas to which the power is devolved are managing 
their education systems differently, based on their own culture and capacity. In this sense, 
the role of the central government is to assist those that struggle. Standardisation can be 
an alternative to finding a national balance between different practices. However, in the 
case where the central government interference tends to be resisted, the standardisation is 
better not to be introduced through a coercive, regulatory institution, but rather through a 
cultural-cognitive institutional channel. Independent, non-state organisations such as 
universities and professional associations can take this role.  
 
Towards the Separation of Normative from Regulative Institutions in the 
Decentralisation Context of National Standardisation: a Policy Recommendation 
Scott (2008) maintains that institutions have three fundamental pillars: regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive. Through the regulative pillar, institutions constrain and 
regularise behaviour by means of coercive rules and sanctions. The state is the 
manifestation of the regulative institution. Meanwhile, normative institutions comprise 
values and norms: the former refers to the conception of preferred social behaviour; the 
latter refers to the appropriate means to achieve such values. Normative institutions are 
the domain of the professions. In addition, cultural-cognitive is the realm of tradition and 
cultural belief through which people have a shared understanding and taken-for-granted 
compliance.  
National standards of education are retained through the combination of normative and 
regulative institutions, in which professionals develop the standards and the state enforces 
them through coercive instruments: regulations and bureaucracy. This study would 
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suggest that the central government might retain its national standards in the 
decentralisation context by separating the normative from the regulative institutions. To 
some extent, normative institution can establish collaboration with the cultural-cognitive. 
By separating the normative from regulative pillars, the national standard would 
become a rule-like national benchmark where local governments and schools adopt it, not 
as an obligation but as a suitable choice. The central government would leave the role of 
promoting the implementation of this national benchmark to the professionals. The 
central government would hire and distribute these professionals to give advice and 
assistance to local governments and schools with technical educational problems. The 
locally based professionals can be recruited from local universities, academia or from 
reputable school managers. They would be given the autonomy to interpret the national 
standards and adjust them for the local culture and capacity. These professionals would 
help the local education policymakers in developing competitive local advantages, so that 
the variation effect of educational decentralisation would be based on those different 
advantages. No government or ministerial regulation should be in place to enforce the 
standards. Rather, the national standards are promoted and campaigned for through 
professional and cultural forums: academic discourse, religious meetings, mass media 
and internet-based social networking discussion. As the process continues, these 
standards would become a legitimate rationalised myth to which local governments and 
schools refer in an accepted way. 
The involvement of non-state actors would also solve the problem of legitimacy 
because overlap can be avoided. Professionals have their own basis of legitimacy, which 
is expertise, whereas the states have their basis of legitimacy, which is legality. So, the 
two institutions would create the relation of constraint within the organisational field of 
education. The relations of these two institutions in the field would result in structuration 
rather than destructuration, because each institution could not intervene in the other’s 
domain, otherwise, they will lose their legitimacy. The professionals would not create 
regulations because they would not have power to enforce. As such, the local 
governments could not argue against professional advice on technical matters because 
they lack expertise legitimacy. Indeed, it is possible that the two institutions might come 
into conflict, particularly when their respective interests are unfulfilled or challenged as 
the result of the interaction. However, the conflict will affect restructuration rather than 
destructuration because at worst the system would force particular professional groups to 
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withdraw their membership in the field and the local government would seek alliances 
with other professionals to give its policy more expertise legitimacy. 
 
Limitations 
Educational decentralisation has been one among other popular topics within the larger 
subject of educational reform. This topic, education decentralisation, can be examined 
using many analytical tools with varying degrees of rigour and based on a range of 
theoretical foundations. This thesis, however, only plays a minor role on the stage of such 
a giant universe. Given this, this thesis has some limitations. 
First, this thesis is analysing the global–national–local relations that describe the 
context of education decentralisation policy in Indonesia. However, it attends only a little 
to the global aspect in favour of the national and the local. Ideally, there would be a 
particular section for a comparative analysis of the effect of globalisation in other 
countries that shared similar or different characteristics with Indonesia. Instead of doing 
this, the thesis provides such analysis as part of the literature review. In awareness of such 
a limitation in this study, the globalisation factor is seen more as theoretical than the 
practical implication of the institutional perspective. This thesis focuses more on the local 
effects than the global. 
Second, although the prime focus of education decentralisation is on the most local 
level of governance, which is the school level, this study does not base its analysis at this 
level. Schools are seen as but one among many other members of local organisational 
fields (Bromley and Powell, 2012). Therefore, although it is implied that the structuration 
and destructuration of the field can affect school autonomy, the study is not concerned 
with the analysis of the internal dynamics of schools in exercising autonomy. Further 
study, however, is recommended to look at this school dynamic so that the essential goal 
of Indonesia’s decentralisation can be assessed. 
Third, the study does not seek to reveal the effect of education decentralisation reform 
in terms of technical educational outputs, such as governance, accountability, enrolments, 
student performance, dropout rates, and so on. Nor does it aim at assessing the policy 
implementation in terms of effectiveness or suitability for some local governments. 
Instead, the study is concerned with the understanding of education decentralisation as a 
global policy and how this policy is negotiated for the sake of national and local interests. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
The Global Context 
There are three important suggestions I would make for future research projects. First, 
how might the remaining centralised system cope with the global pressure? In spite of the 
extensive global movement to decentralisation, not all nations are influenced by the 
pressure. Even the country where UNESCO, the vanguard of this decentralisation 
movement is based, France, remains the most centralised nation in its education 
governance. Other countries, like giant Russia and Turkey; some monarchies in the 
Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; and some dictatorial regimes, like Syria and 
North Korea, are also centralising their education system. If the argument that education 
decentralisation has become a global rationalised myth, one that leads pressure to 
legitimate a nation-state’s education governance, can be used as a model, it is certainly 
important to suggest future research on how the duality of global and local pressures have 
been making those centralised countries what they are. In this sense, the legitimacy of 
educational decentralisation might be contested earlier at the level of global-national 
relations where the established national structure is resistant to change and even 
challenges the external institutional legitimacy. 
Second, how would educational decentralisation respond to the challenge from the 
global expansion of systems of national standardisation? Decentralisation is not the only 
global institution that provides pressure to the reform of national education governance. 
There is also another global trend of educational governance that poses a challenge to this 
movement: standardisation. Decentralisation pushes towards more local control in 
education, the more it is decentralised means the more the education system is locally 
controlled. The most decentralised education system means that the more power is given 
to schools to self-manage. On the contrary, standardisation runs in the opposite direction: 
the more standardised an education system is, means the more the system complies with 
the more central regulating standards. The central ministries of education started to 
standardise their national education or introduce more centrally controlled education 
programs to catch up with the global competition. Some decentralised nations have shown 
the move to this standardisation project, such as the 2001 Education Standards Act in 
New Zealand, the 2002 (No Child Left Behind) Act in the USA and the 2003 Every Child 
Matters Green Paper in the UK. The Indonesian experience has shown that this 
standardisation has posed a problem of legitimacy in the decentralisation context. I would 
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propose another study of how the conceptual tensions of decentralisation and 
standardisation could be dealt with in those decentralised countries. 
Third, future research could also consider the phenomenon of global standardisation 
versus radical decentralisation. In this era of global competition, the standardisation 
movement has gone beyond national borders. Educational standards have been even more 
globalised through the rise of international testing institutions, such as Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) and the Progress in International 
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), as well as the prominent international systems, such as 
the International Baccalaureate at Oxford and Cambridge. Many countries have 
subscribed to such international testing, and millions of local schools in many corners of 
the world are in the race to affiliate themselves with the standards required by 
international education systems. And, here lies the very paradox of decentralisation: the 
more decentralised the system, the more are education organisations pressed by the global 
standardising institutions. Schools in a highly decentralised system have more freedom 
to affiliate with IBO or Cambridge than do those under the less decentralised systems. 
Future research must be undertaken with regard to how a local school’s affiliation to the 
global standards movement influences its affiliation to the local culture; the preservation 
of which the decentralisation policy was established in the first place. 
 
The Local Context 
On 30 September 2014, the Indonesian government enacted a new local government act, 
which redesigned the country’s decentralisation policy, including the education sector. 
Through this law, the central government took back some responsibilities from district 
and municipal governments or moved them to provincial governments. In the education 
sector, the law moved the authority to manage senior secondary schools from the district 
and municipal governments to the provincial government. The law was planned to take 
effect after two years, that is, by 1 October 2016. In line with the logic of this study, the 
promulgation of this law would become a new site for legitimacy contestation. 
On the one hand, this shows the central government’s constant effort to recuperate its 
control over education management. Moving the management of education to the 
provincial government would enable the central government to assert its control more 
easily. In addition, provincial governments have the least political legitimacy in the 
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district-based decentralisation design, so their compliance with the central mandates can 
be more assured. On the other hand, the promulgation of this new law would also show 
the local government reaction to contest their deprivation of power. In late 2015, the 
district and municipal government association (Apkasi), which represents more than 500 
local governments, filed a judicial review with the Constitutional Court in Jakarta 
demanding the abolition of the law. Two mayors from the cities of Surabaya and Blitar 
also registered a case with the Court that, in particular, requires the invalidation of the 
provincial takeover of secondary education management. Apkasi has described the 
promulgation of this law as resurrecting the New Order’s centralism and it likens this as 
‘awakening a hideous zombie’ (Apkasi, 2016). 
A decision has yet to be issued by the Constitutional Court. But, whatever the verdict, 
the promulgation of this new law has made the contestation of legitimacy much more 
evident. Any future research should look at how educational decentralisation runs in this 
new institutional setting. In this setting, the voice of schools and non-state institutions, 
like the NGOs and market organisations, should be heard because they might take even 
more important roles in the battle of legitimacy between central and local ‘states’. 
 
Conclusion 
This  thesis argues that educational decentralisation is a never-finished project. I would 
prefer to illustrate the institutionalisation process as a circle as shown by Figure 9.1. The 
key to its adoption is the duality of global and local pressures. Despite the strong and 
constant pressure coming from the nation-state’s external environment, the structural 
change to decentralisation would never have been made unless there was  an internal 
crisis of legitimacy that forced  that change. France is the best and an extreme example 
of how external pressure is not enough to change the established structure of its 
centralised education governance. Despite much pressure coming from its external 
environment (European Union, OECD and even UNESCO), the French centralised 
education governance has strong internal social legitimacy because the system satisfies 
all the expectations socialised in the local culture (Baker, et al., 2005). The Indonesian 
case itself has shown that the external institution found fertile ground in the regional 
resistance against the centralised state. 
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Figure 9.1. The (De)institutionalisation Process of Educational Decentralisation (in Indonesia) 
  
 
Once the new structure of decentralisation is set, and external and internal legitimacies 
have been garnered, the national policy-makers must start to think how the new structure 
might work to technically address educational issues. Because of its external nature, the 
new legitimate structure is not necessarily correlated with what is perceived as a 
technically efficient strategy. At this stage, the strategy has to make sure that efficiency 
is achieved while legitimacy is also retained. In Indonesia, despite adopting the 
decentralised structure, the central government officials thought that the structure would 
not promote an efficient educational strategy because they have no trust in the local 
officials. Therefore, a new mechanism of central control is introduced without necessarily 
altering the decentralised structure. The central ministry of education issued the national 
standards of education and hundreds of ministerial regulations are promulgated to limit 
local administrative flexibility. 
Although the decoupling strategy protects the institutionalised structure from external 
inspection so that external legitimacy is well-preserved, the case is not the same from the 
internal legitimacy perspective. Local governments know that standardisation is another 
way of centralisation and they know that the formal structure of decentralisation 
legitimises them not to be bound by those standards. Thus, rather than gearing the 
organisational field of education to convergence and shared understanding (structuration), 
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the failed decoupling has led to uncoordinated policies and fragmented governance. 
Despite the standardisation, local governments keep governing their education differently 
regardless of the standardised rules. They adopt those rules eclectically as long as they 
serve their local interests. The effort of standardisation in the decentralisation context has 
otherwise created an anarchic standardisation. 
The destructuration reflects a turning point in the institutionalisation of educational 
decentralisation. In the ideal structuration, decentralisation creates different but legitimate 
local practices: they are different as a natural consequence of decentralisation itself and 
are legitimate because those practices are implemented in the regulatory framework on 
which the central and local governments have consensus. These ideally different local 
practices would provide the empirical basis to support the legimacy of the established 
global or national institutional model. However, in Indonesia this ideal is not the case 
because decentralisation has created different but illegitimate local practices. They are 
illegitimate because those practices are not based on the solid consensus of legitimacy 
between the central and local governments. Thus, rather than becoming the empirical 
ground to support the legitimacy of the established institutional model, these practices 
tend to delegitimise such institutions. In the larger picture, the institutionalisation of 
educational decentralisation has reversed to become a de-institutionalisation process. 
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Appendix A - List of Participants 
 
Participant Number Organisational Affiliation Location 
Participant 1 Local Government Kupang 
Participant 2 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 3 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 4 School Principal  Kupang 
Participant 5 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 6 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 7 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 8 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 9 School Principal Kupang 
Participant 10 Academic Kupang 
Participant 11 Local Education Board Kupang 
Participant 12 NGO Kupang 
Participant 13 Local Government Kupang 
Participant 14 Local Representative Council Kupang 
Participant 15 Local Government Kupang 
Participant 16 NGO  Kupang 
Participant 17 Local Government Surabaya 
Participant 18 Local Education Board Surabaya 
Participant 19 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 20 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 21 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 22 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 23 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 24 School Principal Surabaya 
Participant 25 Local Representative Council Surabaya 
Participant 26 NGO Surabaya 
Participant 27 Academic Surabaya 
Participant 28 Local Government Surabaya 
Participant 29 Central Government Jakarta 
Participant 30 Central Government Jakarta 
Participant 31 NGO Jakarta 
Participant 32 Central Government Jakarta 
Participant 33 Central Government Jakarta 
Participant 34 Academic Jakarta 
Participant 35 Academic  Jakarta 
Participant 36 Academic  Jakarta 
Participant 37 NGO Jakarta 
Participant 38 Central Government Jakarta 
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Appendix B – Consent Form 
Note: The interviewer should have the interviewee read this form carefully and ask any 
questions the interviewee may have. Before the interview can start, the investigator and 
the interviewee should sign two copies of this form. The interviewee will be given one 
copy of the signed form. 
Consent for Participation in Interview Research 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Mr Irsyad Zamjani from 
the Australian National University. I understand that the project is designed to gather 
information about academic work to fulfill the requirement of PhD degree. I will be one 
of approximately 30 people being interviewed for this research. I have received and read 
the information sheet provided to me by the researcher. 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for 
my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty. 
2. I understand that most interviewees will find the discussion interesting and thought-
provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview 
session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview. 
3. Participation involves being interviewed by the researcher from the Australian 
National University. The interview will last approximately 60-90 minutes. Notes 
will be written during the interview. An audio tape of the interview and subsequent 
dialogue will be made. If I do not want to be taped, I will not be able to participate 
in the study.  
4. I understand that the researcher will protect my confidentiality as a participant in 
this study as long as the law allows. The raw data obtained from this interview is 
intended for the researcher’s academic purposes only and will not be shared to any 
other parties without my consent. Nevertheless, there might be a possibility that my 
identity is recognized as a result of my participation. Therefore, I have been advised 
not to say anything I do not want to be put revealed in public.  
5. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at the Australian National University. For research 
problems or questions regarding subjects, the Human Research Ethics Committee 
may be contacted through the Ethics Manager and Secretary +6161253427 or email: 
Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au  
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6. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my 
questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this 
study. 
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
 
______________________   ______________________ 
My Signature     Date 
 
______________________   ______________________  
My Printed Name    Signature of the Investigator 
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Appendix C – Information Sheet 
	
Participant Information Sheet 
(Translated into Indonesian) 
 
Researcher:			
I am Irsyad Zamjani, a PhD student of the School of Sociology, College of Arts and 
Social Sciences, the Australian National University, Canberra. I am here to conduct data 
collection for my doctoral thesis.  
	
Project Title:  
Dancing with Legitimacy: Globalisation, Educational Decentralisation, and the State in 
Indonesia 
	
General Outline of the Project:   
My research seeks to collect information about the process of adoption and 
implementation of the educational decentralization policy in Indonesia. It focuses on 
three issues, namely the resumption of centralization and local initiatives in 
policymaking processes. The project involves collecting data through semi-structured 
interviews in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Kupang. You are part of other participants 
consisting of ministerial officers, municipal education officers, education board 
members, local councillors, academics, and NGO activists. The data will be analysed 
using content analysis and findings will be shared to some participants whose 
statements are incorporated in the report to get some feedback. Once finalised, these 
findings will be written as a thesis report and articles for international journal 
publication. This research is partly funded by the Australian National University as my 
home institution, while the rest is funded through my personal resources.   
 
Participant Involvement:  
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. Prior to each activity, you will be 
provided with informed consent form to be carefully read and signed. If you do not 
want to take part, you do not have to give a reason and no pressure will be out on you to 
try and change your mind. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to answer some 
questions about your knowledge and opinion on certain issues in education. There are 
no right or wrong answers. You can refuse to answer, pull out from participation, or 
withdraw the information you have given to the researcher at any time during the 
project. If you withdraw, your data will be destroyed and your withdrawal will not 
affect our relation in both personal and organizational matters. Each interview should 
take around 60-90 minutes. The process will be audio taped and then transcribed for 
analysis. If you do not want to be taped, you will not be able to participate in the study. 
No audiotaping will be done for the survey interview.  
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Risks, discomforts, and side effects: 
There are no specific risks you have to anticipate by being involved in this project. It is 
anticipated that no question will be out of your knowledge or appropriateness to answer. 
The school principal participation is known and permitted by their respective municipal 
education offices. You will be interviewed privately in a location and environment that 
you specify your own so you can feel unpressured. However, in case that you still feel 
uncomfortable, you can just withdraw from participation at any time. 
 
Confidentiality:  
All the information you have provided is used exclusively for academic purposes. 
Access to the information such as names and addresses will be limited because only the 
researcher and the thesis committee can connect the identifying information with the 
responses of individual subjects.  
 
Data Storage: 
The data documents and the audio recording will be securely stored within locked filing 
cabinets, and security codes to any computerized records will be assigned. The 
documents, interview notes and audio recordings will be read and heard only for 
research purposes. This may include publications and conference presentations. These 
data will be kept for at least 5 years from publication. Consent forms will be placed in a 
separate folder to avoid mixture with substantive data. 
 
Queries and Concerns: 
Should you have further queries and concerns about this project, please do not hesitate 
to reach me through my contact below: 
Name : Irsyad Zamjani 
Phone : +6281330020935 
Email : Irsyad.Zamjani@anu.edu.au 
 
Or you can write to my research supervisor through: 
Name : Professor Lawrence J. Saha 
Email : Lawrence.Saha@anu.edu.au 
 
 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has 
been conducted, please contact: 
 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 (0) 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
 
	295	
Appendix D – Interview Protocol (General) 
 
A. Jakarta-based Informants  
 
Personal Questions 
1. How did you land this position?  
2. What are your roles in this position? 
3. What were your roles when the educational decentralisation reform was 
formulated? 
 
Institutional Pressure 
1. Why educational decentralisation was implemented in Indonesia? 
2. What were the roles of international organisations in this reform? 
3. What was the importance of decentralisation reform to Indonesian education? 
4. What was the relevance of decentralisation to the process of democratisation? 
5. What was the relevance of decentralisation to the problem of national 
integration?  
6. Do you think that decentralisation was ideal to address Indonesia’s educational 
problems? Why? 
 
Central Role 
1. What was the idea behind the promulgation of the new education law in 2003? 
2. Do you think the local government is capable to manage its education system? 
3. How should the central government position itself in the decentralised structure 
of education management? 
4. Why are national standards of education important? 
5. How does the central government enforce the national standards in the 
decentralisation context? 
 
Perception of Local Practices 
1. Are the central regulations effectively implemented in the localities? Why? 
2. How do you illustrate the relationship between central and local governments in 
addressing educational goals? 
3. What are your opinions about local initiatives in education policy? 
4. How do you see the role of community-based organisations, like education 
board and school committee, after the reform? Are they actively engaged in the 
policymaking process? Why? 
5. Are you satisfied with the implementation of educational decentralisation? What 
are your suggestions to improve future policy? 
 
  
	296 
B. Local Informants 
Personal Questions 
1. How did you land this position? 
2. What are your roles in this position? 
3. What do you think of the real educational problems in your area? 
4. To what extent has the local policy addressed such problems? 
5. Do you think the educational decentralisation system is ideal for Indonesia? 
Why? 
 
Central-Local Relations 
1. Do you think the national standards are achievable? Why? 
2. Do you think the local governments must always adhere to central regulations? 
Why? 
3. How do you illustrate the relationship between central and local governments in 
addressing educational goals? 
4. What are the problems that come up from this relationship? 
 
 
The Dynamic of Local Practices 
1. What are specific local educational regulations that have been produced in the 
last five years? If there is none, what is the reason for not making such 
regulations? 
2. What are the local government’s important educational programs here? 
3. How does the local government hire and fire officers? How far do non-
professional motives influence those staffing processes? 
4. Does the local government policy make school more innovative? Why? 
5. To what extent is the school principal independent in making decision and how 
far can the local government and other external groups intervene? 
6. What roles have the school committees actively played in school management? 
7. Who and what organisations are actively involved in education policymaking 
here in this city? Why and how they are engaged in the process? 
8. What roles has the municipal education board actively played in education 
policymaking?  
9. Are you satisfied with the implementation of educational decentralisation? What 
are your suggestions to improve future policy? 
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Appendix E – Letter of Introduction 
 
